The Work that must be Done
Volume II
Social Struggle and Society

Contents

Part I

Foundations

1
Base and superstructure

1.1 Social practice and society

Many of the concepts to be used here have already been presented in the first volume. A brief summary of some of the most essential ones may be useful to the reader.

Social labour is the production of socially-validated use values, while exploitative labour involves the decisions about the allocation of some or all of such activities. Within social labour may be distinguished necessary social labour, that which yields use values consumed by those involved in social labour, and surplus social labour, that which remains for consumption by others or for accumulation. Productive labour is that part of social labour which is allocated by decisions of exploitative labour. Hence, it must at least include surplus social labour, but may even extend to all social labour.

The two fundamental social practices of any class-based society are social and exploitative labour. In non-class societies, they are not distinguishable. On the other hand, in societies where productive labour does not encompass all social labour, the remaining necessary social labour is domestic labour.

Within a mode of production, the relations of production must be conceived in terms of the production, allocation, and control of productive labour activities within a production process. In class societies, where decisions about allocation are not made by the totality of those involved, surplus labour is extracted. In this context, I distinguish five modes of production: the primitive communal, slave, corvée-tributary, capitalist, and planned communist modes. In this way, production is the fundamental determinant of society, structuring the central human activities or social practices. This leads to a reformulation of what is commonly considered to be the fundamental contradiction of capitalism in terms of practice rather than as related to control of the means of production.

Social classes are constituted by relations in and to the relations of production. They consist, not of individuals, but of distinct categories of labour. Thus, the two fundamental social classes, in class-based modes of production, correspond to the two fundamental social practices. However, not all social practices constitute social classes: such is the case with domestic labour which has no such relation to the relations of production. Since the two fundamental social practices, in class societies, are in conflict, we necessarily have antagonistic relations. Based on

them can develop conscious class relations.

The support of any social practice must be a biological human individual. What characterises such an individual is the ability to carry out *pre-planned* or teleological labour. This provides the basis for human language, for accumulation and communication of knowledge, for history. In turn, language provides a material basis of social class relations founded in social practice, both through conscious and unconscious differences in the ways labour is and can be pre-planned.

All social practice takes time and this factor must enter into any process of allocation of labour. But, just as the allocation differs with the mode of production, so does the place of time. Only under capitalism does it occupy a premordial conscious position.

Materialism postulates the primacy of being over thought. The dialectic poses the problem of approaching knowledge. The uniting and essential part of both is human practice. Dialectical materialism involves the search for underlying laws to explain and hence to change reality, by the construction of successive levels of contradictory totalities. Each level of totality consists of several moments, one of which is determinant; as well, earlier levels of totality are the more fundamentally determinant of the social whole. In a mode of production, the totality of relations of production and the production process is determinant and, if class-based, the fundamental contradiction is that between these relations in the production process and the relations of struggle.

Practice is composed of three moments, perception, conception, and participation in changing reality, which act in an iterative cycle. Social practices are a specific subset of practice in general: those human activities essential to the maintenance and reproduction of a given mode of production. On the other hand, the totality of human activities is an even wider concept than practice in general.

The two basic categories of practice are practice on nature and practice on the social. The object of practice on the social is social reality, which itself involves pre-planned labour and hence can react back and oppose the practice. This is in contrast to practice on nature where only causal, and not teleological, laws are involved. Antagonistic and conscious practices on the social are two basic subcategories; the distinction depends on whether people simply 'personify' the relations of production or actually pre-plan an attempt to change or to maintain them.

The conceptual moment of practice on nature can have a certain unified form in a given mode of production, but, in class modes, that of practice on the social must depend on social position, on what changes are sought in social reality. Thus, under capitalism, we have the opposition between bourgeois social science and historical materialism.

Although any inadequate conception can be said to contain elements of ideology, I reserve this term for conception within practice on the social. Since conception is necessary in order to change social reality and since, in class societies, such change involves conflict, one point of struggle is over ideology in conception. Each class strives to impose its conception on the other. For the dominant

class, this may take two basic forms: conception may be restricted to inner laws which are not susceptible to human intervention, such as religion, or it may be restricted to observable phenomena, with a denial that inner laws exist, such as empiricism.

Then, the base-superstructure metaphor may be interpreted as a distinction between, on the one hand, practices imbedded in social relations, practice on nature and antagonistic practice on the social, and, on the other, practices seeking to alter the relations of production, conscious practice on the social. In this way, the totality of base and superstructural practices constitutes social practice. Certain aspects of the conscious practices on the social of the dominant class may become institutionalised under an established dominant mode of production. Thus, under capitalism, we have civil society and the state, and, associated with them, a distinctive ideological class.

1.2 The separation between thought and action

The traditional metaphorical distinction between base and superstructure is an intuitively appealing concept for the study of social 'causality'. It seems to provide a basis for ordering a multitude of social facts in terms of their importance in determining social processes. However, closer examination invariably quickly reveals the vacuity of this distinction, its vagueness and lack of usable content. A century of Marxist writing has attempted to fill in this content by specifying what constitute the base and the superstructure and the relations between them.[1] Typical phrases include "being determines thought" and "the superstructure reflects the base in thought".

Marx, himself, while suggesting the distinction, provided little detail of what he meant by it. Hence, it seems preferable to cite, once again, his most well-known text on the subject:

> ... neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of so-called general development of the human mind, but ... on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel ... embraces within the term "civil society" ... In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. ... The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations, it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production ... and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic — in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and

[1] This section owes much to Larrain (1979) and to Williams (1973).

fight it out. . . . one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. . . . Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. (Marx, 1970, pp. 20–21).

Subsequent interpretations of this passage must be seen in the light of the prevalent overall interpretation of Marx's writings. 'Material' is taken in the sense of 'substance' rather than in that of 'transforming external reality'. Relations of production are fetished as 'control over the means of production'. Then, in an active interpretation, 'social existence that determines their consciousness' becomes '*being* determines *thinking*'.[2] Social existence, referring to practices within the relations of production, becomes restrained to production of the physical substances of life, while consciousness is expanded to all thought. On the other hand, in a passive interpretation, 'consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life' becomes 'social consciousness *reflects* social being'.[3] Again, how 'men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out' expands to some general social awareness, while the contradictions of life become simply social being. In the active form, being determines thought by direct cause and effect. A one to one relation exists. In the passive form, consciousness is a more or less faithful *copy* of being but the mechanism by which this copy is generated is not explained.

A fundamental manual/intellectual division of labour spans capitalist society as one essential means by which the ideological class exerts control over the working classes. This same division reappears in these interpretations of the base/superstructure distinction. The ideological class endeavours to divorce all intellectual activity from the working classes are consecrated as an established fact in the opposition between being or existence and consciousness or thought. The working classes produce but do not (normally) think, while the dominant classes think without producing. It is only a small step to the realisation that the working classes are incapable of creating a change of society without the injection of the necessary ideas (correct thoughts) from the outside — from the ideological class, even if this means from 'enlightened' renegade members of this class who have formed a vanguard party.

Various authors have attempted to nuance this basic schema. They may be divided into two groups, those who speak of indirectness of the relations between base and superstructure or of delays in time, and those who look to forms of mediation in the correspondence or homology between the two. Such suggestions tend to reduce even further the value of this distinction since they render it even less

[2] See, for example, Plekhanov (1969, p. 57).

[3] See, for example, Lenin (1908, p. 323). For an outline of the evolution of Lenin's thought on this, see Larrain (1979, pp. 73–76).

easily applicable in any concrete situation. Any observed superstructure can then be said to be 'determined' by the base once the appropriate time lag or mediating element has been introduced.

A recent influential interpretation of the base/superstructure dichotomy has virtually reversed the relationship. In his early work, Althusser (1963) speaks of various 'instances' — economic, juridico-politcal, ideological, and theoretical — which are superimposed upon each other and which are 'determined in the last instance' by the economic. To this, he adds two conditions: the superstructure is 'relatively autonomous' from the base and the superstucture has a return action on the base. In spite of the freezing of the superstructure into the categories of law, politics, and ideology (is the theoretical not also a part of the superstructure?), we find here a fairly classical presentation of an indirect and mediated relation between the two. Then, subsequently, Althusser (1970) suggests that the ideological and repressive state apparatuses serve to reproduce 1 5

the relations of production. Whatever Althusser's intentions, and in spite of his reservations about the abstractness of his analysis, the very idea of reproduction entails a functionalism whereby any given superstructure exists because it is necessary in order to maintain the economic base. What is must be. Althusser claims that, in this way, the topological metaphor, a description, is replaced by a theory.

In its crudest forms, the base/superstructure distinction creates a vast rift between thought and action, a split which is foreign to Marx's thought. It is as if human beings could act (at the economic level) without thinking. Dominant classes have long dreamed of such a situation. But to find it enshrined in historical materialism is quite another thing.

1.3 The unity of thought and action

The reification of base and superstructure may be located within the current known as 'scientific' marxism which runs from Engels and Plekhanov through Lenin to Althusser. An opposing view, based on human social practices, is to be found in the works commonly labelled 'Hegelian' marxism, based primarily on Lukacs and Korsch. This turns around Marx's demonstration how many social relations in capitalist society are hidden behind things, and specifically the commodity relationship. Thus, the economic base is not simply a question of development of the productive forces, control of the means of production, and exchange of commodities. These hide the decision-making power of one social class over the activities of another class. Social relations are inter-human relations, not relations to things. They are relations among social practices.

Once we see that society is based on relationships among social practices, we must also realise that the base/superstructure distinction cannot refer to a relation between being and thought or consciousness in general, for no being, and no practice, is possible without conscious thought. If we remove the blinkers of commodity fetishism and of the capitalist division of labour, we find this clearly

stated in the passage by Marx cited above. He refers to the economic structure of society upon which rises a legal and political superstructure with corresponding forms of social consciousness. Firstly, social existence, i.e. the mode of producing material life, determines consciousness in the sense that the former *conditions* the latter. But, secondly, this very consciousness refers, not to thought in general, but to how human beings become aware of social conflict and fight it out. Finally, the consciousness arises from the very contradictions of material life."... the political and legal superstructure is distinct from the ideological superstructure. The former represents the form in which class struggles occur; the latter is the form in which men become conscious of these struggles." (Jakubowski, 1976, p. 50). Here, we have a much more sophisticated expression of the base/superstructure distinction than any found in 'scientific' marxism, whether the separation between being and thought, the reflection of being in consciousness or the conditions for the reproduction of the economic.

The economic base involves the social practices of producing material life. But, in class society, these are necessarily antagonistic and contradictory because the social practices of one social class involve the control of the practices of another class. This fundamental relationship among antagonistic social classes constitutes the base. However, all practices involve conscious planning. At the base, this involves both the conscious action on nature, including the natural sciences, and the conscious actions within the existing social relations, whether planning the most profitable investment or selling labour power. All of these social practices of the economic base accept the social relations of production as given. But, this economic base, these relations of production, are antagonistic and contradictory. Since human beings necessarily reflect on their actions, this generates a consciousness of the limits of these relations, either of the dangers or of the possibilities of such limits, depending on class position.

Thus, both being and consciousness, in its large, common sense meaning, encompass base and superstructure, for both are integral to any practice. Both material production and philosophy are a part of being; both require a consciousness in the activity being performed.[4] Consciousness, in the context of the superstructure, does not refer to the general capability for human thought, as the quote from Marx makes clear, but to what is more commonly called class consciousness: the forms in which human beings become conscious of conflict and fight it out.

The very fact that such consciousness is in question means that certain practices at the superstructural level take on the forms of struggles to modify thought processes. Superstructural social practices centre around the existing social relations, around their maintenance or modification. But human beings may conceiv-

[4]Thus, Jakubowski (1976, p. 58) is wrong in suggesting that "consciousness coincides with the concept of ideological superstructure, with human ideas." while "social being ... is not restricted to the economic base, but embraces the whole superstructure. Consciousness turns out to be a part of this being." Indeed, he contradicts what he has said a few pages before: "the natural sciences are a productive force, and this means that they can be assigned to the base." (p. 56). Are not these sciences also human ideas?

ably simply accept the existing social relations or they may consider only modifications which reinforce the existing relations. Consciousness involves defining what is possible before deciding what to do about it. If this is the case, then such social practices must include actions upon the thoughts of others: ideological struggle. Acting on thought is here a means of acting on reality.

For the dominant classes, the problem is to maintain and to reproduce existing social relations. Consciousness of the antagonisms arising from the contradictions of the relations of production must be kept within manageable limits. Means of channelling and controlling conflict must exist or be established. This is accomplished through *institutions:* apparently objective, systematic, and organised elements of society.[5] Under capitalism, by far the most important of these fall within the realm of the state. In this way, certain social practices come to be framed within sets of rules which limit the possibilities of action. Institutions act to eternalise existing social relations by setting apparently unquestionable rules of the game. Thus, in times of rapid but peaceful evolution of the social relations, the superstructural institutions may become rigid and frozen, seeming to drag behind the times. On the other hand, in periods of open struggle, even if economic relations are changing little, these institutions may be drastically altered, or new ones instored, so that they are ahead of their time, in terms of the economic base.

1.4 Mode of production and superstructure

The people living within any specific society find their lives constrained within possibilities of existence. More exactly, they most often live these constraints without even noticing them, for the constraints are such that they are accepted without even the realisation of their existence.[6] Human beings are socially determined. The most fundamental constraints which structure a society relate to the ways in which social labour is allocated to various tasks. Most known societies are class societies where one social class has the power to make these decisions about how social labour is allocated while another social class must actually execute the tasks so decided. Only a very limited number of such different ways of allocating social labour are possible; they constitute different modes of production.

Most societies do not correspond simply and directly to one such method of labour allocation, to one mode of production. Complex combinations of the few different systems of allocation are possible. And yet, very often one mode of production dominates the society and structures all activities within it, including the other modes present. Thus, all existing societies may be classified into a very few basic types. However, these are not static forms, since the very means of

[5] See Williams (1976, pp. 139–140).

[6] French historians have called this the history of *mentalités* which only change in the *longue durée*, after Braudel (1958). However, even among Marxists, such as Vovelle (1982, esp. pp. 239, 260), such changes appear to come from the ideas of the dominant classes. More useful is Rudé's (1980) Gramscian analysis, where he distinguishes the inherent, traditional element from the derived, structured ideas in popular ideology (pp. 28–29). This provides a place for the production of ideas and systems of thought by the subordinate classes.

labour allocation, in class societies, involves a tension or antagonism between those taking the decisions and those carrying them out. A mode of production, thus, changes through class struggle as the contradictions develop, but, if it is not to become something else, it can only change within certain well-defined limits.

If the fundamental structures of society, the economic base or mode of production, include only a limited number of possibilities, the same is not true of the superstructure of society. Contradictions and antagonisms in the base give rise to conscious attempts to overcome the limits of the fundamental structure — and to attempts to limit or to stop such consciousness. Here the possible variations are much more vast. Many apparently very different superstructures may correspond to the same dominant mode of production. Consider feudalism and the despotic 'state' for corvée-tributary labour allocation, or parliamentary democracy and totalitarian or authoritarian dictatorships for capitalism.

A change of dominant mode of production means a radical alteration in the ways social labour is allocated. But it may still be possible to channel the struggles arising from the contradictions and antagonisms of this new base through little modified institutions of the superstructure of the old mode of production. On the other hand, such struggles under a given dominant mode of production may only take form, or be channelled, through the development of new superstructural forms corresponding to a new, still subordinate, mode of production growing within the society.

The major epoques of long duration in history are defined by dominance of a given mode of production. They are relatively uniform, not in periodisation, but in structure, across many different societies. More short term history registers primarily the daily conscious class struggle within a mode of production, as expressed through the superstructure. Hence, the latter is very society-specific, depending on the exact historical developments within that society. Present struggles depend very much on the ways in which previous struggles were conducted, and won or lost. Superstructural institutions can be retained and modified to new situations although the economic basis of their original development has disappeared. Or they can appear while their economic base is still in embryo. Enumerable combinations are possible, depending on the vagaries of class struggle.

2
Thought, language, and socio-history

2.1 The place of psychology

Since the pre-planning of action has such an important place in social practice, and is a key to conscious class struggle, it is essential to look more closely at the relationships among thought, language, learning, and social relations. Certain areas of psychological research are most directly relevant to the elaboration of relevant theoretical foundations of the social. Psychologists in these specific branches of psychology have attempted to demonstrate the socio-historical basis of all psychological mechanisms.[1]

What are the results of this research which are so important for social theory? Luria and Pribram discuss them together, apparently for the first time:

> *Luria*: The first [stage] is physiological, the second is the sociological level, and the third is the psychological level. Why? Because psychological processes in man are the result of the combination, the coincidence, the synthesis of biological and social experience, and what we are dealing with when we talk about mental processes are processes which have been acquired by means of speech, by verbal ability, or by appropriation of a social experience...
>
> *Pribram*: At Stanford, we have been teaching the medical students their first introduction to clinical medicine. We organize the course around the same point Professor Luria has just made; we do *not* talk about the physiological level, then the psychological, and then superimpose on this the social as a third level. Rather we talk about the social and the physiological factors and their convergence to produce behavior. Our convergence of thought is really remarkable. (Bridger, 1960, p. 429)[2]

To determine the relationship between the social and psychology, an adequate theory of the latter is required. However, of the four current competing psychological theories, behaviourism, psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology, and social psychology,[3] none provides a foundation adequate to our purposes. However, the

[1] This trend found early development in the 1920's in the Soviet Union and is associated with the names of Luria, Volosinov, Vygotsky, and others during that period. More recently, Luria, and his coworkers, such as Gal'perin, Leont'ev, Talyzina, have pursued the work and it has come to influence certain research in western countries, especially that of Bruner and of Pribram, as well as Bernstein's work in the sociology of education.

[2] See also Caudwell (1971a, p. 187, 1971b, pp. 156–209).

[3] See Garai (1973).

basis for a satisfactory psychological theory has been laid by the Russian school of psychologists, mentioned above. Although showing similarities in some ways to all four currents, this theory finds a dual base in neurology and in social history.[4]

I am interested in the aspects of mental activity which are distinctly human and shall restrict my meaning in this way. Rats may be said to 'learn', by a process of conditioning, to find their way quickly through a maze. And so with the other aspects of 'learning', both of human beings and of other animals studied by research workers, especially in the behavioural school of psychology. In this context, three types of human activities may be distinguished:

(1) those which are instinctive (inborn) to human beings as a species,
(2) those which are reflexive (habitual), often obtained by conditioning, and
(3) those which require thought involving accumulated social and historical experience.

The third type is only found among human beings. We must be able to distinguish it from the other two. Learning, in its broadest sense, implies acquiring the ability to do something, and thus relates to both the second and the third types of activity. There will often be a shift to the second type as learning advances and habits form, but what is most important is the learning of activities which require thought and indirect transfer of experience. Hence, I must deal with thought as much as with learning. And since thought, although a separate process, is inextricably linked with language, the learning of language will play what might be considered an inordinate role in this discussion. The basic thesis will be that the fundamental characteristic of human beings, which makes this high level of thought and learning possible, is the ability to form relational categories. However, what categories are formed, i.e. the content of the categories, is socially determined.

In a famous passage, Marx (1967, I, pp. 177–178) distinguishes human beings from other animals by a distinctly human form of labour: the result of every human labour process already existed in the mind of the labourer before it was begun. But how exactly can this occur? Subsequent research[5] has deepened this insight of Marx. It demonstrates the prime importance of language (and with it, of thought) in learning and in enabling human beings to act as Marx had described them. Thus, any acceptable theory of learning must be constructed around language.

---

[4] A good introduction to this theory is provided by Luria (1973b, 1976). Many of the essential papers which have contributed to its development, although especially work done outside the USSR, are provided in four volumes in the Penguin Psychology Series, edited by Pribram (1969), *Brain and Behaviour*.

[5] For early work, see Mead (1934), Volosinov (1973, 1976), and Vygotsky (1962).

2.2 Learning a language

What distinguishes human language from the most elaborate means of communication used by other animals?[6] Benveniste (1952), in a comparison between human and bee communications, makes a number of important points.[7] Non-human (animal) communication cannot consist of a true dialogue, since the referent of such communication must be an 'objective fact' and cannot merely be a 'linguistic fact' contained only in the communication received. Thus, a bee can describe the location of some flowers which it has discovered, but a second bee cannot repeat this message without first going and visiting the flowers. Human language allows a substitution for experience which can be endlessly transmitted through time and space as animal communication cannot. A second great limitation of bee communication lies in the fact that it can only refer to one thing: food. This communication consists of a very specific symbolism linked directly with the objective situation. In contrast, human language is neither limited in signification nor so directly tied to what is signified. The third major characteristic of human language lies in the possibility of decomposing it into elements of finite number: first into morphemes (the smallest unit with distinct signification) and then further into phonemes (the smallest unit with distinct sound). Using well defined rules, one may combine this small number of elements into a virtually infinite number of different communications. Looked at in another way, human language has three levels of complexity, the phonological (significant sounds), the syntactic (lexic and grammar), and the semantic (meaning). Non-human communications never have these characteristics.

The first and most important thing which a baby learns, distinguishing it from animals, as recognition of mother, etc., do not, is a language.[8] This involves a number of distinct, but very much inter-related processes, ranging from ability to distinguish which sounds are significant for the language being learned, through ability to understand and then to use the rules of syntax, along with the discovery of the meaning of each word (semantics: categorization and concept formation) to the ability to know what enunciation is expected or permitted in any given social context.

The young baby can produce an enormous range of different sounds and has no initial reason to 'prefer' one subset to another nor to 'expect' to hear one subset as against another. However, the baby soon loses the ability to pronounce all of the distinct sounds required by what will be his language.[9] Physiological, as well as mental, development seem to play their parts here as they do in helping to

[6] Chomsky (1980, pp. 132–140) suggests that we should speak of growth of a language rather than of learning.

[7] For other important points, see Miller (1965).

[8] Scaife and Bruner (1975) have shown that one of the first forms of communication between mother and child is the ability of the child to figure out what the mother is looking at by the angle of the mother's eyes. Whether this is also characteristic of animal behaviour appears not to be known.

[9] See Jakobson (1941, pp. 24–25).

create the difficulty people over ten have in pronouncing some of the sounds in a foreign language with which they are not familiar.

A first step which the baby must take in learning a language is to learn what are the significant sounds or phonemes of the language. Different speakers will pronounce the same phoneme slightly differently (have a different accent), and the baby must learn to categorise these variations as the same sound. As well, different words in the language often require slightly different pronunciation of what is in fact the same phoneme, depending on what phoneme precedes or follows it. This process of distinguishing phonemes is produced by social interaction as the infant responds to those sounds which are important in socially relating to other individuals. If we consider the social formation of categories to be the basis of thought, we see here one manifestation of thought in the baby, before it has available a language.

Along with or shortly following this first process of learning sounds, the baby begins to produce its first combination of the permitted sounds as the words of baby talk. This may be seen as a process of interaction among the following factors: those sounds which are mentally and physiologically possible for the baby at the given stage, those sounds found in the language and their possible combinations as heard by the baby in normal adult communication, and the cultural use by the parents of words considered as appropriate for talking to babies (baby talk). The relative historical stability of baby talk[10] may also be explained by these factors which provide the constraints within which it must work.

The first main impetus for a child to communicate through language is that of learning about and controlling the surrounding environment. The young child does not, for a considerable period, have the means of communicating an experience containing information unknown to the listener. The first function of language rather lies in the planning and control of actions, not in the transmission of new information, although new information is being received.[11]

As the baby learns to combine sounds to make words, it also learns to what category of phenomena each word applies. This categorisation, which begins with sounds and words, is one of the bases of thinking and learning throughout life.[12] Hence occurs an important interaction of thought and language: certain categories formed in thought are given labels by language. The language is always specific, however, and contains labels only for a limited number of historically determined categories. Nevertheless, this does not impede simple categorisation thought: when given a problem, the categorisation which has no word labelling may be chosen over one with such labelling.[13]

However, the important part of this ability to categorise is not to recognise the same sound repeated in different contexts by the same person, nor to imitate

[10] See Ferguson (1964).

[11] See Halliday (1975, esp. p. 43, 105–106).

[12] See Vygotsky (1962) and Bruner *et al* (1956), among others.

[13] Bruner (1971, p. 54) has shown this in experiments with the Wolof of Senegal.

combinations of sounds already heard. These might be explained by simple conditioning. The important thing for the baby is, first, to be able to fit sounds not previously heard (e.g. a strange voice speaking the language) into the accepted categories of phonemes and, second, to be able to create new combinations of phonemes, as words, which may or may not exist in the language, but which are permissible combinations of sounds for the language.

The next stage in this language learning process begins when the infant starts to understand and then to produce combinations of words, as phrases and sentences. Again, a certain element of imitation and conditioning enters, but this is minor. The important thing is for the young child to be able to decode sentences never heard before and to generate new sentences. According to the theory developed by Chomsky (1957, 1965), this involves transformation from a surface to a deep structure and/or back, the deep structure being something which is innate in all children.[14] This deep structure is essentially the underlying semantic structure of the phrase or sentence which must be transformed to the surface structure of actual sounds produced in communications. This does not mean that all children have the same meaning for all phenomena genetically built in, but only that this capacity to form categories is available. The actual relation of each category to the external world will be defined by the whole environment in which the child is submerged. The language common to the members of the society is one most important part of this environment.[15]

As in the production of words from a certain limited number of permitted sounds using certain rules of combination, so the generation of sentences from equally finite means is an innovative process with an infinitude of possible results. However, in the first case, the child soon learns that only a subset of all possible combinations of the sounds actually are words in the language being learned, whereas he or she will spend a lifetime creating new sentences. And the set of rules (or generative grammar) used for producing these creations is originally acquired with only a minimum of information, in the form of utterances, correct and incorrect, heard and overheard in the child's environment. All children, except those with certain brain defects, accomplish this feat relatively independently of their 'intelligence' and with an absolute minimum of instruction.[16] However, this theory can only explain the ability to create entirely new sentences, and not the ability to create the *appropriate* new sentences in any given context. Thus, social context is important in determining what utterance will be created, within constraints of expectation and acceptability.[17] On a more macro level, a

[14] Chomsky has produced an asocial theory of language, but one must accept that an underlying human biological capacity to learn language does exist. See, for example, Lenneberg (1964) and Toulmin (1972, pp. 448–477).

[15] Sapir(1921, pp. 217–219, 1929, 1933) and Whorf (1956) attempted to show this in the hypothesis named after them. See, more recently, Halliday (1975, pp. 50, 66, 120–145).

[16] See Chomsky (1969).

[17] See, for example, Ervin-Tripp (1964), Fishman (1965), Frake (1961, 1964), Goffman (1959, 1964, 1971), Hymes (1974), and Schlegoff (1968, 1971).

vital interaction occurs between language use and social relations of a society.[18]

2.3 Thought and action

Before proceeding to discuss in more detail the relationship of context to appropriate action and words, we must consider other important aspects of thought and learning besides language. Up until this point, we have ignored the fundamental importance of action in thought and its development. Try to teach someone verbally how to ride a bicycle, to catch a ball, to skate,... Ask a sculptor, a wood carver, a painter to explain in words the actions which he or she performs. Learn to be a skilled mechanic or a farmer by reading books? Any number of the most important actions of everyday life require thought and learning, but cannot be adequately expressed by language.[19] One might attempt to reply that it is only a matter of trial and error, imitation, and conditioning (although the person performing any of these tasks would immediately object). However, consider a classical Piaget experiment on conservation of volume: the experimenter pours water from a short fat glass into a tall thin one. Among Wolof village children (6–7 years old) in Senegal, who have never been to school, many give a 'magical' reason for a change of volume: "It's not the same because you poured it." But when the children poured the water themselves, most declared the volume to remain constant.[20] The same results for conservation/non-conservation have been found among Western children of given age, although without the magical explanation.

The importance of action and manipulation in thought and in the learning process now becomes more evident. In the Russian school of psychology, this fact has played an important role both in theoretical developments and in their application to instruction.[21] For example, a stage theory of learning ahs been developed[22] whereby the learner begins by mastering an action using objects (such as counting with the fingers), proceeds to mastery by audible speech and finishes by a transfer to the mental plane using inner speech and an eventual consolidation involving abbreviation and, in certain cases, reflex action.

Another aspect of non-verbal thought and learning may be seen in concept formation. We are constantly using concepts (for example, words) in contexts which show that we have a very sophisticated grasp of their meanings and uses. And yet if we attempt to define the concept, we are often either incapable, or provide a definition which is much more restricted than that which our actions

[18] See Bernstein (1971, 1973, 1975) and Labov (1972a, b).

[19] See the interesting discussion in Chomsky (1980).

[20] See Bruner (1971, pp. 43–45, 1973, p. 375).

[21] See Gal'perin (1957), Leont'ev and Gal'perin (1965) and Talyzina (1968).

[22] By Gal'perin (1957) elaborating on the work of Vygotsky (1962). This stage theory of learning is much different from that of Piaget. Here we are concerned with steps in the learning of concepts and categories, basic entities of thought, whereas Piaget is concerned with more complex learning, such as of transformations, and how this varies with age (and with no other variable, such as society); see Bruner (1971, pp. 38–67).

show we have mastered.[23] This also applies to more complex mental operations such as addition. At a certain point, a child may add four plus three by taking the first number and counting on the second: four, five, six, seven. However, if asked to give an account of what was done, he or she may reply by the more elementary procedure of counting one through four and then on to seven. Thus, although "the child can act correctly, and with obvious understanding of objective relationships, yet he cannot give a comparable account of them and of his action" (Gal'perin, 1957, p. 149).

As we can see from this short account, thought, action, and language, although separate processes, are inextricably interrelated in human beings. We shall now explore further how the social and historical enter into the psychological make-up of a human being.

2.4 Language and learning

Language plays an essential role in the self-control of behaviour.[24] The baby finds its behaviour controlled, in interactions with its mother, by oral commands. As the child learns to speak, he or she finds that speech can be used not only to communicate with others, but also for self-control in spoken self-instructions. At a later stage, this egocentric speech becomes internalised.[25] Thus, a function previously shared between two persons gradually becomes "a method of organization of the higher forms of active behaviour which are social in origin, dependent on speech in their structure, and voluntary in their course" (Luria, 1973b, p. 247; see also Luria, 1959). Language thus has two functions: for communication and for inner self-control and thought. Without language, the infant must try out something by movement and action, in the same way as the bee, in order to learn. With the development of langage, the child has the possibility of constructing it abstractly in the mind. Learning becomes a more equally balanced interaction between mind and environment.

With the possibility of constructing alternative behaviours in the mind before the actual act comes the means of integrating each new individual into existing society.[26] From perceptions of the activities of the people in society around him or her, the individual comes to construct in the mind a conception of what certain

[23] See Vygotsky (1962, pp. 79–81).

[24] This most important step in the study of conscious, voluntary action was demonstrated by Vygotsky (1962).

[25] Inner speech is not a concept originating with Vygotsky. For example, Volosinov (1973, 1976) also uses it although not providing the development which Vygotsky does. In certain respects, inner speech corresponds to the unconscious (id and superego) of psychoanalytic theory, with the major difference that the former is socially determined while the latter is assumed to be an innate, invariant characteristic of man; see Volosinov (1976). On the other hand, these stages, and the accompanying egocentric speech, are quite distinct from those of Piaget. For Piaget, egocentric speech and the accompanying actions are individual and self-centred and not a function of social relations with the rest of the world. For him, egocentric speech gradually dies away, to perform no further function in inner mental thought.

[26] See Mead (1934).

people expect or approve of in certain situations. Eventually, this begins to occur even before the expectation or approval is even signalled by these people, as the individual mentally evaluates the various possible alternative behaviours in a situation and the corresponding possible reactions of other people. Thus is formed a mental image of what that part of society familiar to the individual expects. This image controls the social activities of the individual and makes him or her part of a greater social entity.

A key phenomenon has appeared in the actions of the individual: in a certain sense, the future (as derived from the past history of society and of the individual) is seen to control the present! The human being mentally predicts what will happen in the future under various possible conditions and then uses these results to decide present behaviour. This human attribute has played a major role in psychoanalysis, especially in the use of transference. Human being's desire finds its sense in the desire of others, in that one's first objective is to be recognized by others.[27]

One of the behaviours which this process of socialisation controls is the use of the proper utterance in the proper context, for which we sought an explanation above. Once again, the mind must use a method of categorisation, since no two contexts are ever actually identical.[28] This is one of the most complex forms of categorisation required of human beings because of the great number of sources of variation in context which may enter and because of the great need for extrapolation from contexts already encountered. This categorisation occurs as thought with little or no aid from language, as may be seen by questioning someone about the reason certain actions or words are appropriate in a given situation. The extreme case occurs with ritualisation, as for table manners, where both context and actions may be verbalised and frozen.

The importance of this socialisation process is obviously much broader than only the social control of speech. However, the essential point is that the brain is structured in such a way not only to allow language to exist, through ability to form categories and to use generative transformational grammars, but also to allow language to control the resultant speech.

The importance of this social control by language is much more significant than one might believe at first glance, since all individuals in a given society are not exposed to the same people as this process develops. Most societies are divided into social classes; such classes often maintain different types of social control by means of language and, in turn, are reproduced, to an important extent, by this social control. Thus, the different groups of people to whom different individuals are exposed, as they mature, may be categorised by certain major characteristics, determined by their relationships to the relations of production in the society. These characteristics will, in turn, be determinants[29] of the way

[27] See Lacan (1953, p. 146).

[28] See Bateson (1972, p. 259).

[29] Remember that 'determination' refers to constraints and pressures, not to causality.

in which language controls the behaviour of the individual in interaction with society. Members of different social classes will form significantly different social images. This, in no way, implies that all members of the same social class will have exactly the same image, but only that the most significant differences should occur between social classes, while most of those people within a social class should have certain essential common characteristics.

The relationship between language and social class is not a simple one.[30] A child learns the essential parts of language practice, such as social dialect, not from parents, but from the peer group.[31] This group naturally depends on parental social class, but in a complex way. The uses of language as an adult depend, not primarily on social class membership, but on social relationships. Thus, the social practices of the same social class, for example the circulation working class, depend largely on the interactions involved, such as the type of customers served by sales clerks.[32]

Various sociolinguistic codes may be distinguished.[33] For example, communication using a restricted code is difficult or impossible to understand outside of the details of the surrounding social context in which it is produced, whereas communication in an elaborated code does not assume that the receiver is aware of the surrounding circumstances and thus this code is relatively context free, or has a higher, more generalised level of context. The first type of code is more frequently used by members of the working classes and the second by members of the ideological class.[34] This can, in turn, be related to differences in the relations of each social class to the relations of production and to the overall capitalist ideology of individualism. The restricted code is associated with the greater sense of community and solidarity within the working classes where inter-individual relationships are more intimate and assume more of a common background, and with the importance of these for the classes as a whole. The elaborated code emphasises and reflects the individuality of the members of the ideological class and their more formal inter- individual relationships which are important both for their personal social mobility and advance, and for their role of control and surveillance in the relations of production.

It must be stressed that no evidence exists to show that one of these codes is linguistically superior or more complex, or even that all types of thought cannot be handled easily with both.[35] However, important differences do exist within any

[30]The work of Bernstein with differences in language codes among social classes and of Labov with differences between standard and non-standard English have provided important advances in understanding these phenomena.

[31]See Labov (1966a, pp. 210, 266, 1966b, 1972c).

[32]See Labov (1966a, pp. 63–89 1972b, pp. 43–69).

[33]Bernstein (1971, 1973, 1975) has taken two of the social classes existing in modern capitalist society, and has studied in detail one aspect of their speech, the dependence of that speech on the context in which it takes place. Correspondingly, he distinguishes two codes.

[34]This is roughly what Bernstein calls the 'middle class'.

[35]Labov (1969), in his studies of standard and non-standard English, has destroyed the myth that

language in society: variations with social class or other social group distinctions, whether the differences be of code, of dialect, standard/non-standard, diglossia, etc. These differences are used to maintain and reproduce the social distinctions, just as the language differences are maintained and reproduced by the social distinctions, as each individual comes to learn within the predetermined context. However, these differences affect only what is learned and how it is learned, and not the ability to learn, itself, given the proper social context.

2.5 The social context of learning

From its beginning with the baby, learning must be considered as a social process, in interaction with the larger society as a whole. Even if the baby is strictly confined to the family, the parents act as a social mediator. Consciously and unconsciously, the parents bring up the child according to the standards which they have found most useful in their interaction with the larger society. In capitalist society, these parents are usually limited fairly strictly to the nuclear family, but, in other societies, they will include certain specified members of the extended family or perhaps even members of the tribe who are not even closely related to the child.

In capitalist society, one of the most important determinants of the way in which a child is brought up is the father's experience in his place of work.[36] For the working class family, conformity to externally imposed standards, the importance of the overt act, honesty, and trustworthiness are emphasised as compared to the importance, for the ideological class,[37] of internal dynamics, motives, feelings (the child should control him- or herself), and truthfulness. These may be related to the fact that members of the ideological class deal more with the manipulation of interpersonal relations, ideas, and symbols, while members of the working class manipulate things, that the former have occupations more subject to self-direction, while the latter are more standardised and under direct supervision, and that the former depend more on individual action for advancement and the latter more on collective action. This last point, especially, links up with the theory of sociolinguistic codes.

Because of the dominant ideology of individual equality, social class variations in the societal context of learning are camouflaged in capitalist society. Such is not the case in other societies: a concrete example of the institutionalisation of such differences may be seen in the continued existence of elite schools in many European countries, a holdover from pre-capitalist times when only the dominant class was formally educated. However, such differences are often evident to an even greater degree in other non-capitalist societies. Two brief examples of differential learning of speech behaviour will illustrate this.

---

certain social groups of individuals may be linguistically deprived, just as anthropologists and linguists had previously destroyed the myth that some languages are linguistically superior to others.

[36] Kohn (1969) has studied this in detail for the discipline used in the family.

[37] Kohn uses the term 'middle class'.

A first example involves the way in which children of the dominant social class in Burundi receive speech training which distinguishes them from the other social classes.[38] From about the age of two, boys of this class are given formal speech training, including composition of impromptu speeches appropriate in relations with superiors in age or status, formulae for petitioning a superior for a gift, composition of 'praise-poems', quick-witted, self-defensive rhetoric intended to deflect an accusation or the anger of a superior, correct formulae for addressing social inferiors, for funeral orations, for rendering judgement in a dispute or for serving as an intermediary between an inferior petitioner and one's superior. Training also includes appropriate vocabulary and accompanying gestures, posture, etc. Girls of this social class are carefully trained in artful silence, evasiveness, and careful listening.

This training characterises all interaction among social classes. Thus, for a peasant-farmer to produce an elegant defence before a herder or other superior would be an unpardonable blunder. He must stammer, shout, or make a rhetorical fool of himself. However, this same man will show himself an able speaker, as intelligent as any high-born herder, when he is a judge in a local or family affair.

A similar phenomenon of language marking social differences is found in the Javanese language.[39] However, here the differences are not of style and manner, but of levels within the language itself. The 'higher' speaker uses a 'lower' (less respectful, more intimate) form of speech to his subordinate than the subordinate does to his superiors. With some three to six levels distinguishable, a variety of social distinctions may be maintained. Thus, all members of the society must learn, not only what are virtually a number of different languages, but also the context in which they are to be used. However, formal training is not used as in the Burundi case. Such explicit differences in language are characteristic of many traditional societies, but soon disappear under capitalism with the all pervading influence of the school. In Java, the young have been exceptionally quick and adept at adopting the new national language, *Bahasa Indonesia*, taught in school, in spite of the vast differences from their mother tongue, apparently because it allows them to speak to their parents without always demonstrating immense respect. This speed contrasts with the slower progress in areas of Sumatra, where Malay, virtually the same as Indonesian, is spoken.

2.6 Thought and learning

Thinking and learning involve more than just mastery of a language, although this is a fundamental part. Another fundamental aspect is the ability to form categories as concepts. The various scattered stimuli which constantly bombard all of the senses must be sorted and selected in order to determine which must actually be perceived, interpreted, acted upon. They must be interpreted "in terms of objects and their relations, cause and effect, whole and part, symmetry, gestalt

[38] See Alpert (1964).

[39] See Geertz (1960, pp. 248–260) and Tanner (1967).

properties, functions, and so on" (Chomsky, 1969, p. 129).[40] Again, the initial formation of a concept is a conscious activity in that one forms various mental hypotheses which are then tested empirically.

Perhaps the most important and complex aspect of thought is the process of problem solving. In its simplest form, practical, constructive thinking involves the solution of a task for which the desired result is known but the method of attaining it is not. Often, the method cannot be determined empirically by trial and error, but must be constructed in the mind previously.[41] A more complex situation occurs when the desired result is not known: verbal-logical (discursive) thinking must be used to solve a problem which has no readily available answer. The individual must "analyze the component elements of the conditions, formulate a definite strategy for the solution, carry out the operations required by this strategy, and then compare the results with the original conditions" (Luria, 1973b, p. 219).

In general, the process of thinking may be considered to be what a human being, with an appropriate motive making the task urgent and the solution essential, does when "confronted by a situation for which he has no ready-made (inborn or habitual) solution." (Luria, 1973b, p. 327). Thus, someone confronted with a problem to solve must first investigate the conditions of the problem, while restraining any impulsive response, in order to determine the essential elements and the relationships among them. Next, one must select among possible strategies for resolution of the problem the most appropriate one (and this will most often depend on the individual social biography of the problem solver). One then must choose the appropriate tactics in the form of methods, operations, algorithms. These are most frequently ready-made, having evolved through social history. The problem-solver now enters the operative phase, using his or her plan and mental tools to solve the problem. A further phase provides the actual solution or answer. However, the intellectual process does not stop here. The results must be compared with the original conditions and if agreement has not been attained, the process repeated.[42] One of the most interesting aspects of this process, discovered only very recently, is this automatic auto-evaluation of each mental process.

Learning and thinking are obviously complex interacting processes. Much simple learning, of different possible strategies and tactics, etc., is assumed as previously having occurred at each step of the thinking process. The exact way in which any individual will carry through the steps will depend on his or her social biography which is in turn determined by the social context in which he or she has lived.

As any given thought process is repeated a number of times, whether it be some kind of category forming or complex problem solving, certain parts of it will become automatic, no longer requiring direct conscious control. This is not

[40] Bruner *et al* (1956) provide empirical evidence of some strategies used in concept formation under various conditions.

[41] See Luria (1973b, pp. 331–335).

[42] See Luria (1973b, pp. 327–329).

the same as a reflex action which does not use the higher centres of the brain. The evolution of this process allows the brain to handle ever more complex thought processes, and is an important aspect of learning to learn. For example, the development of a given strategy or tactic in problem-solving may originally have required a problem-solving thought process. Once this original problem was resolved (perhaps more than once), the strategy or tactic becomes automatically available in more complex problem-solving contexts. Thus, this learning is a type of thought process which is subsequently retained as an aid in further thought or learning, first consciously, but perhaps, later, unconsiously.

Normal thinking and learning are completely social processes, which cannot occur to individual human beings in isolation. On the other hand, many of the pathological examples of thinking may also be explained as social productions. The best known example of this is schizophrenia.[43] The schizophrenic cannot deduce from the social context of a speech utterance which of its possible (context free) meanings is actually intended by the speaker. This has been explained by the schizophrenic being put in a constant state of 'double bind' in early childhood, whereby the speech of someone close to him or her is usually in direct contradiction with what the context (non-verbal communication) tells him or her is expected. He or she will be punished (rewarded) if the verbal information is followed as well as if the non-verbal information is. Hence, there is no way out. This is reflected in the entire control of behaviour by speech as described above, and creates a situation where the individual never knows what is real and what is metaphorical.

In a restricted sense, the individual biography plays an important role in all psychoanalysis. An attempt is made to trace present malfunctioning of the character back to certain events of early childhood through the interpretation of dreams, etc. However, much of this theory has developed a dependence on certain ahistoric, inborn features of human beings, such as certain sexually related 'drives'. These seemingly ahistoric categories of thought may be traced, to a large extent, to the historical conditions under which the theory was developed, in the way described more generally in the next section.

2.7 The social production of thought

We can now begin to understand, for example, how the great works of art throughout history are so socially determined.[44] The genius in the fine arts has a social biography which has produced an image of the social within him- or herself corresponding to an extreme extent, to the global social class, society, and age in which he or she lives. This then acts to control behaviour in such a way that essential characteristics of the social relations appear in the works of art produced.

[43] See Bateson (1956) and Laing (1959).

[44] See the work of Benjamin (1968), Fischer (1963), Goldmann (1948, 1959), Lukacs (1950), Panofsky (1957), as well as Sartre (1952). Vygotsky (1971) made a first attempt at a theory of this process.

In this way, Lukacs (1950) can explain the importance of the work of Balzac and Goldmann (1959) the works of Pascal and Racine.

This determination of intellectual production by the social relations is not restricted to the arts, but also applies to the sciences, both natural and social, as Bernal (1954) has shown. The discovery and acceptance of any scientific phenomenon at a given point in history is influenced to a very large extent by the existing social relations. This is especially critical in the social sciences, which are studying the social relations which in turn determine them.[45] When the social scientist is too closely linked with one social class, especially a dominant one, the research tends to take on a highly ideological flavour, in the direction favouring the maintenance of existing social class relationships.[46]

A fictitious example of the social retention of historical events may make this clearer.[47] The participants in some uprising in the faubourg Saint-Antoine might, in one possible case, live the event as a victory or defeat of parliament or the royal court, while, in another case, as a victory or defeat of the proletariat or bourgeoisie. These two possible events would not leave the same traces in the human memory. With the disappearance of the parliament or court, the first event loses its value as part of relevant social memory and disappears, whereas the second lives on as long as people consider their revolt to be a struggle for the oppressed class. Thus is history socially produced among one social class. Obviously, a dominant social class would have a different interpretation and retain different elements of the event.

2.8 Learning and instruction

From what has preceded, we see that one extremely important factor, which is, however, frequently ignored, but which enters from the beginning of the process of thinking, is the relevance to the individual of what is to be learned or thought about.[48] Too often, all that is considered necessary, as a motive for thought, is some extrinsic positive or negative reinforcement in the form of reward or punishment. What is to be learned need not fit, in any coherent way, into the previous social experiences of the child nor be seen by the child to be useful in future activities. However, the theory just outlined demonstrates that this is not part of learning as a distinctly human process, but must be reduced to simple conditioning. From another point of view, one may see that teaching which ignores this problem will be interpreted differently according to the individual social biography.

---

[45] See, for example, Goldmann's (1948) study of Kant and Althusser's (1961) study of the young Marx.

[46] See the pertinent remarks by Marx on vulgar economists scattered throughout his work.

[47] See Lacan (1953, pp. 138–139).

[48] See Bruner (1971, 1973) and Vygotsky (1962, p. 83). The value of using relevance in determining what and how to teach was amply demonstrated by Friere (1970a, 1970b) in his experience with literacy campaigns in Brazil.

Until now, I have been concerned with learning through thought, action, and language, in its direct interaction with the society. At times, this involves conscious interaction, as when the mother helps her child in learning the meaning of a word. However, this instruction and learning is directly linked with the use of what is being learned. School learning in capitalist society can be contrasted with this. Many of the things learned are abstracted from their use in the society. This distinct characteristic of institutionalised schooling in capitalist society may be put into direct opposition with the general forms of instruction in virtually all other societies, excluding the instruction of certain select few, for example, among the nobility and clergy of feudal society.

This abstraction of a part of the learning process from use and from the production process has had important implications for thought, as can be most readily seen in concept formation. An evolution has occurred in the use of concepts in the transition to capitalist society. Where previously one referred to an area of land by the time required to cultivate it with the means of labour currently in use, and to a distance travelled by the time required to walk it or to ride it on horseback, these concrete measures came to be replace by more abstract concepts such as kilometres or miles, etc., abstract in the sense of removal from links to direct use.

School instruction has played a fundamental role in this transformation of thought. An experiment, shortly after the Russian revolution,[49] comparing unschooled peasants with people having gone to school illustrates the change occurring. All of the people tested were asked to form a suitable subgroup from four pictures: a saw, a hammer, an axe, and a log. Virtually all people with schooling chose the first three, the saw, the hammer, and the axe, all three being tools, whereas almost every peasant formed the grouping, saw, axe, and log, because all are involved in the same concrete activity.[50] Although both are valid categories, the first uses a more abstract concept.

School plays an important role in replacing a collectivistic by an individualistic orientation. Unschooled children often do not distinguish between their own thought about something and the thing itself. The separation of a word from the thing to which it refers requires a notion that words are in people's heads and not in their referents. As against this, school seems to promote a self-consciousness resulting from the distinction between human mental processes and physical phenomena. The child develops a relativistic conception in school: events can vary according to the individual point of view. The individual conceptually separates him- or herself from the group; he or she becomes self-conscious, aware of having a particular point of view, or a certain individuality.[51]

A fundamental characteristic of both written language and of school instruc-

[49] See Luria (1971, 1973a, 1976), who collaborated with Vygotsky.

[50] Levi-Strauss (1962, pp. 48–99) similarly contrasts the botanical and zoological classifications constructed by certain South American societies with the modern scientific taxonomies.

[51] See Bruner's (1971, pp. 40–41, 44, 65) study of schooled and unschooled village Wolof children in Senegal.

tion is that the individual is introduced to systematic knowledge which can be neither directly seen nor experienced. Instruction produces the reverse process of learning from that done spontaneously.[52] Consciousness and control of a concept developed through direct experience appear late in its development, after it has been used and practised unconsciously and spontaneously. On the other hand, a concept acquired by instruction, whether it be in learning to write, in science, or in a foreign language, begins by verbal definition and use in non-spontaneous operations. This is made possible by imbedding the concept in a generalisation or system: a higher level of concepts including the given concept as a particular case. The system, within which a concept to be taught must be placed, is a further generalisation of a generalisation, a concept of a concept. It is a generalising relationship among similar concepts. Differences in the construction of such hierarchies of concepts distinguish the psychological make-up of people speaking different languages in a much more complex way than was originally supposed in the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis.[53] Only through such a system can conscious and deliberate control of the concept arise. However, the ability to grasp the concept provided by instruction requires a certain level of spontaneous mental development. The two means of learning mutually interact with each other from opposite sides, in a movement towards a common middle point. We thus see how "school instruction induces the generalizing kind of perception and thus plays a decisive role in making the child conscious of his own mental processes." (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 92).

The physical and the social are the bases of the mental; in other words, one cannot resort to an innate psychological theory of human beings in order to explain social phenomena. Social action to which individuals attach subjective meaning is not the fundamental unit upon which to construct a theory of the social,[54] because social action determines the subjective meaning. Social theory must be grounded, not in the individual, but in relationships among the groups which determine the individuals themselves.

Mental activity is based on the unique physical ability of the human organism to construct categories and concepts, the content of which are socially determined by that organism's relationships to the society around it. What is required is a theory of society which provides an adequate basis to explain human mental activity.[55]

---

[52] See Vygotsky (1962, pp. 82–118).

[53] See Bruner (1971, pp. 50–61).

[54] As Weber (1968, pp. 3–31) believed.

[55] As Vygotsky (1925, p. 11) says, referring to Plekhanov, "the psychological mechanisms which define the aesthetic behavior of man are determined by sociological causes. Therefore, psychology studies the effect of these mechanisms, while sociology studies their causality."

3
The state, a complex mystification

3.1 A monolithic state?

The problem of the capitalist state poses a perpetual dilemma for Marxist theory. Difficulties arise both in the study of its origins[1] and in the analysis of its fully developed forms. Here, I am interested primarily in this second question, and, especially in the relations between the state and social classes.

The most divergent Marxist theories of the state have appeared in the last fifteen years. At one extreme, we have the Althusserian approach,[2] whereby the political is a relatively autonomous instance, so that the state can be studied in virtual independence from the other 'instances' of society. At the other extreme, the (primarily German) capital logic school sees the state as simply one form among many of the fundamental capital relationship.[3] In another direction, we find the more classical instrumentalist vision whereby the state is no more than the steering committee for the bourgeoisie.[4] Still others are most concerned with the welfare, legitimation, and crisis management functions of the state.[5]

One must ask how such widely divergent positions are possible when talking about one and the same phenomenon. The answer which I propose here is that each group has seized upon only one aspect of a complex reality. If society is made up of relationships among social practices, then the state is a complex interrelationship of a number of distinct categories of social practice. Each approach has selected one or two of these categories as specific to the state, to the virtual exclusion of the others.

3.2 The social practices of the state

Confusion arises because of the multiple practices in which the state is involved. Five practices are fundamental. In the first place, no market exchange is possible without money and private property. Money is accepted as a symbol of goods to be obtained in the future. The state must guarantee that this symbol will retain

[1] See, for example, the debate around Wittfogel's (1957) conception of a transhistorical bureaucracy under 'oriental despotism'.

[2] Best represented by Poulantzas (1968, 1970, 1978).

[3] See, for example, the texts collected in Holloway and Picciotto (1978).

[4] This can be traced back to Marx and Engels (1973, p. 69). More recently, see Miliband (1969).

[5] See, for example, Gough (1979), Habermas (1973), Offe (1972), and Wilson (1977).

its validity over time. It must also elaborate a system of laws defining how goods can be possessed by private individuals and transferred among them.[6] Both of these practices are closely related to those of the circulation working class. They provide the basis for the autonomous action of the state as the 'collective will' acting to make the market possible.[7]

As a second practice, the capitalist state is always involved, in one way or another, in investment decisions, in influencing or even deciding what production tasks will be carried out. Manipulation of tax systems, grants for investment in certain regions or to create employment, and preferential or protective tariffs are just a few of the ways in which the state can act on the market mechanism of private investment. At the other extreme, throughout the history of capitalism, the state has also made its own direct investments, whether in railways or in nationalised firms, such as steel, coal, or oil.[8] Here, the state performs practices of the capitalist class, and, if we consider the workers of nationalised industries as part of the state, also of the production working class, yet a third practice.

The goal of capitalist decision-making is to gain a profit from the difference between what the production working class produces and what it and the circulation working class consume. The dynamic continuation of this process creates increasing pressure on the working classes, which, if unimpeded, could threaten their ability freely to sell their labour power. The state must intervene to supply certain basic needs to the working class outside the market system, thus as domestic labour or as supplements to wages. This varies from recreation parks, roads, and subsidised housing to family allowances and unemployment insurance. This fourth specific practice, that of the welfare state, has a similar nature to the domestic labour performed by the family within the household, in that the goods do not pass by the market, and, thus, these production practices are not allocated by it.

Finally, we arrive back at the ideologico-repressive practices for which the state is so well known. Capitalist society is a society of in-built antagonisms which work in such ways that class consciousness develops. In a society of competing production units, the divided dominant capitalist class cannot cope directly with the attenuation or suppression of this consciousness. An apparently autonomous state plays this role. An ideology of equality and individual choice is pervasive, best expressed in the impartiality of law as the analogue of the equality of all sellers and buyers in the market and in the political vote as the analogue of the market selection of consumption goods.

With concentration and centralisation of this investment decision-making power, and the elimination of divisions, capitalist and ideologico-repressive practices can become increasingly united in the state. However, the place of the idea of indi-

[6] Pashukanis (1978) demostrates how this provides the basis for the whole law system under capitalism; see also Balbus (1977) and Kinsey (1978).

[7] See Pashukanis (1978, pp. 137–147).

[8] Cartelier (1982) discusses how the state is increasingly taking on the practices of an enterprise.

vidual choice must, then, be restricted since there are only a few or one employer and a few or one producer of consumption goods. This ideology is here replaced by one whereby the impersonal, technocratic state makes decisions in the name and the best interests of everyone.

The complexity of the state arises from its combination of the five most important types of practices of capitalist society. Emphasis on one practice can hide the completely opposite effect of another. And since the practices of all social classes are found within the state, it serves as a focus of class antagonism and class consciousness at the same time as serving to diffuse them.

The capitalist state has a further direct effect on human activities, since it exists only within certain well-defined geographical boundaries, the nation-state. A specific characteristic of the people involved in production practices under capitalism is their relative freedom to choose their job. They have mobility. But, in turn, this mobility must be limited and controlled in some way. Historically, the area of a city proved too small. Thus, the nation-state, with its identity cards, passports, conscription, and citizenship, developed as a uniquely capitalist phenomenon to control labour movements. At times, it is used to prevent a desirable labour force from escaping; at other times, it serves to invite a necessary supplementary labour force to immigrate, within controlled limits, to supply changing needs.

3.3 Three forms of the bourgeois state

Marxist theory has long considered the democratic parliamentary state as typical of capitalist society, as that best adapted to its 'needs'.[9] Any society without such democratic institutions is either in a position of underdevelopment or in a state of exception.[10] Thus, capitalist society is seen as inevitably leading to institution of parliamentary democracy as a teleological end result. Such affirmations fly in the face of the existing world situation, at least since the time of Marx, where representative democratic government has always been the exception among nation-states, a euro-centric exception.

The advanced capitalism of Western society is founded on the myth of the invisible hand of the market. All individuals are free to make independent choices but with, as final outcome, a coherent, properly functioning society. Free workers sell their labour power and choose the products they consume. The despotism of factory work quietly disappears out of sight. The belief in such individual free choice becomes ingrained and natural. It permeates all aspects of life (outside of the work place). Only in such circumstances is the democratic state possible. The efficiency of the market and the liberty of all choices are not questioned or questionable. Then, the choice can extend to who shall govern, since, as with all such choices, it will surely stay within the well-defined, if unperceived, limits of

[9] See, for example, Therborn (1979).

[10] See, for example, Poulantzas (1970, 1975).

capitalism. The liberty to vote rests on the liberty of a smoothly operating market system.

And yet, this democracy is representative and not directly participative. The citizens vote for the representative of their choice, but this very choice must necessarily consist of a weighted compound of many criteria, at least some of which the elector opposes. The candidate has a complex platform which can never correspond even remotely to the equally complex position of each elector on all of the issues. And, of course, the system itself — market plus elections — is never placed in question. Once elected, the representative is freed from dependence on the opinions of the electorate, until the next election, and able to act 'in the general interest' which may often be in radical opposition to the original reasons for election.

We have seen how the state as institution appears independent of the rest of society because of the complex interaction of various practices within it. Here, in the choice of the principal 'decision makers', we find a similar autonomy from the rest of society, or at least from those directly making the selection. In return, awareness of this situation leads to apathy and lack of interest and participation in elections. Under the democratic state, where the population apparently has a direct voice, the appearance of a state for the population is often at its weakest. But since the participation, through elections, exists, people are helpless to see how to change the situation which they apparently create themselves by voting.

A state linked so intimately with the market at the ideological level must necessarily act to maintain and reinforce that market. As we have seen, private law and the guarantee of money are the necessary prerequisites; taxes, incentives, and so on act to direct investment; and welfare measures stabilise the labour market. But, the dynamic of capitalism, through concentration and centralisation of capital, also leads to a restriction of the market, if only because fewer and more powerful competing firms exist, and, hence, to a greater role of the state to replace these market decisions. Within the context of free democratic choice, one source of conflict is over the relative places of the market and the state in making investment decisions and in reproducing free labour power.

Capitalism, as a specific type of society, must always rely on the market for the distribution of goods produced. The dominant class cannot predetermine the requirements of the subordinate classes. This does not imply that it must always rely primarily on the market for investment decisions nor even for the sale of labour power. Instead, state planning takes the place of such market decisions as most or all industries are centrally controlled. With one owner-employer, investment is centrally controlled and the seller of labour power faces a unique employer. As we have seen, such a situation tends to arise out of the very dynamic of capital accumulation but also may be created in certain specific circumstances of revolution in less advanced societies.

In the absence of the market, the basis of the ideology of the free individual does not exist, undermining the foundation for a democratic state. Instead, the state must be seen to operate in the name and interests of everyone. The state

manages investment, but for the good of all; it cares for everyone through its welfare measures. To be able to accomplish its task, the state must be able to look into and interfere with the affairs of everyone. The collectivity, represented by this state, knows and controls all for everyone's benefit: totalitarianism.

The legitimacy of the totalitarian state does not arise directly from the fundamental social relations as does the democratic state from the market. The former must be supported by more directly conscious ideological, and repressive, measures. The ideological class, united with the capitalists within the state, must perform the delicate task of maintaining the image of a 'socialist' workers' state. The very difficulty of the problem means that it is often the victim of its own repression as the united ideological front must be modified to meet the developing contradictions.

For either the democratic or the totalitarian state to exist, the working classes must be developed to a point where they are disciplined to accept either the market as the most efficient mechanism for investment decisions and the guarantor of freedom or the 'socialist' state as looking after their welfare. The very existence of the two forms of state reinforce each other. For the workers under democracy do have a real liberty of choice when compared with totalitarianism; the totalitarian state does look after the working classes, as compared with the open competition of democracy.

Many capitalist nation-states do not (yet) have well-developed working classes who would accept the given rules of the game, whether of the market or of a 'socialist' state. Ideology, either individualism or 'socialism', cannot maintain the cohesion of the society. The direct coercion of the authoritarian state, in less advanced nation-states, is necessary where the development of capitalist contradictions is less advanced. Individual capitals are not sufficiently large to carry out major investments leaving only the state with access to sufficient funds. And yet the prevalence of repressive measures does not permit the creation of a 'socialist' ideology so that the market must be relied upon as much as possible, for example, to discipline the working classes. Major investments, once well-established, are turned over to the private sector. Authoritarianism lies in an uneasy tension between democracy and totalitarianism, relying on repression where the ideological means are weak or lacking.

The form of state depends on the type of legitimation imposed upon and accepted by the subordinate classes. No one specific form of state is most characteristic of or suitable to capitalism. For as long as the dominant ideology, whether free individuals or 'socialism', is seen to be the best or only possible state of affairs, social cohesion can be maintained with a minimum of visible repressive force. However, both democratic and totalitarian states can rapidly move to authoritarianism in the face of a crisis of their ideology, if the dominant classes believe that the working classes are placing in question this ideology. Thus, there is a constant tension of movement among the three forms of state. The democratic state tends towards totalitarianism to ease problems of investment allocation and reproduction of labour power as accumulation proceeds and to authoritarianism

under a crisis of legitimation. The totalitarian state tends towards democracy to resolve problems of central planning of investment as well as to authoritarianism with each crisis of legitimation. The authoritarian state, in a perpetual crisis of legitimation, pushes constantly towards one or the other of democracy and totalitarianism to place its working classes on a more stable disciplined basis. All of these tensions are further aggravated by the international relations among nation-states and the pressures so exerted.

3.4 Tendential laws and the state

If power is the capacity to control the activities of others, then the capitalist class has the most fundamental determining power in society, the power to decide to what tasks productive labour is applied. Ideologico-repressive power is secondary in the sense that it acts on these same activities only within the global structuring of tasks determined by capital. In opposition to this power, the only repost of the working classes is their solidarity developing in the production process and, ultimately, a placing in question of the whole system of capitalist allocation of labour.

The ideological class must struggle to control the antagonisms generated by the relations of production without seeming to take sides. It must act to prevent the working classes from questioning the social mechanisms of capitalist labour allocation. Apparent autonomy of the state is the ideal position from which to perform these practices. The combination of social practices within the state easily permits confusion. The neutrality of money and private law provide the cover. But, most important, the domestic labour of the state can be used to draw the working classes into a common position with the ideological class in favour of extending state powers.

The state is a nexus for these various struggles over the power of capital. Because of the heterogeneity of social practices within the state, as well as the apparent autonomy due to the state being outside the individual production units, seemingly strange 'alliances' among classes can develop. This is further complicated since the same category of social practice, the same social class, can be found both inside and outside the state. In this context, the most important relationships are those between private and nationalised enterprises.

This division between private and national capitals can, thus, lead to struggles over the power of capital. Private capital relies on the market for allocation of investment among branches, seeing state intervention as inherently bad, although it never refuses state incentives. Nationalised capitals use more direct means for making decisions about investment allocation, means which involve an ever increasing extension of the state. Thus, national capital will take a common position with the ideological class, against private capital, over the expansion of state powers. And, if the working classes can be convinced that nationalisation plus welfare measures equals socialism, they also can be drawn towards this position.

Even if all production is nationalised, capital cannot enter into the minds of

the working classes in order to know what use values to produce. The products are still commodities passing through a market and labour power is still sold as a particular commodity. The law of value still holds, in its most developed form, and surplus value is extracted. Since nationalised production is not decision-making by the direct producers, some means is necessary to transmit decisions and ensure their application. Within the state, this is the bureaucracy. Thus, struggles of all social classes can lead to an increasing state bureaucracy. Nationalisation in no way changes the fact that one social practice, capital, controls decisions about the activities of another social class.

As long as working class struggles remain within the context of capitalist relations, one goal can be the increase of state domestic labour, since this labour never takes the commodity form and, hence, involves no surplus value extraction. Those fractions of capital located within the state can struggle to increase the role of the state in the control of investment among branches, and, most specifically, struggle for nationalisations. The ideological class can form a common front with either or both of these positions in order to extend the ideologico-repressive activities of the state.

Since all of the social classes exist both within and outside the state, these struggles are all necessarily contradictory, giving rise to no ineluctable results. However, the very dynamic of capitalism does lead to increasing concentration and centralisation of capital. This, in turn, makes allocation of investment among branches within a nation-state increasingly difficult by market means alone. The dominant classes, then, have ever less room to manoeuvre with respect to this role of the state, although the possibilities of international capital displacement remain. The specific complex of struggles among the social classes will determine the forms and the extent of state development in specific countries, but the dominant tendency must be to state capitalism.

The 1960s saw a significant threat to the capitalist control of allocation of working class labour activities. The crisis of the 1970s and 1980s is capital's attempt to reassert firm control over this process. Unprofitability is a manifestation of worker resistance and the refusal to invest is the refusal to buy labour power when labour will not do what it is told. This massive struggle between labour and capital permits various realignments within the global class struggle.

A reduction of production activities does not affect only those involved in the production and subsequent circulation of commodities. If less of the production working class is employed, less surplus value is almost certainly being produced. The capitalists have their capital and can afford an investment strike. But the ideological class depends directly on continuous production of surplus value and is directly caught in this squeeze. A drastic restructuring of ideologico-repressive labour becomes necessary, even more so since much of the threat of the 1960s can be laid to a failure of the ideological class successfully to fulfil its role. Depending on the positions of the other social classes, this may lead to a struggle to reduce the ideological labour of the state. However, given the directness and profundity of the basic struggle, there is little chance that state repressive labour will also

be reduced, and it, more likely, will lead to increased militarisation. Thus, one important question is how the ideological class can reimpose discipline on the working classes.

But the most fundamental struggle is over the ways directly to control the allocation of the activities of the working classes, especially given the at least partial failure of the ideological class. The question of power is more directly laid bare. This struggle revolves around the respective roles of the market and the state in allocating labour activities among branches, in putting the working classes back in their place.

If parliamentary socialists are proponents of a direct application of state capitalism and Keynesians propose a more prolonged and peaceful transition to the same thing, the monetarists attack the state bureaucracy, maintaining that only the market can sufficiently discipline the working classes. They see the state as only necessarily having its first two aspects, creation of money and private law. However, given the brutality of the confrontation they seek, they are not so naive as to believe that an increased repressive role of the state will not be necessary. Hence, militarism accompanies money and law.

For private capital, the role of the state appears simply to be to ensure the proper functioning of the market. But this is only an appearance, for it, in fact, proposes that the state act on and through the market to facilitate and influence the allocation of investment, rather than bypassing the market by direct state intervention in investment allocation. Such playing with the rules of the market must have very specific effects, especially since size of enterprise is a most important factor. The relationship between the state and private capital is here primarily one between the state and 'monopoly' capital. Monetarist measures, such as high interest rates, lead to an increasing rate of elimination of smaller firms, to ever more concentration and centralisation. Thus, the proponents of private capital within the state are caught in an ever tightening contradiction, although they may manage to discipline the working classes in the short run. Their market measures accentuate 'monopolisation', leading to even further difficulties in market allocation of investment.

The contradictory process within which the defenders of free enterprise find themselves does not mean that, within a few years, all countries will have forms of bureaucratic state capitalism. The outcomes depend on very complex class struggles. But as long as the ideological class manages to keep the working classes in a state of confusion over the meaning of nationalisation, both the ideological class and the nationalised fraction of capital may find them willing allies in their struggle for state capitalism.

Part II

Sites of struggle

4
Fighting over words

4.1 Capitalist ideologies

The superstructure consists of conscious social practices which turn around the questioning of existing social relations. Because of this very consciousness, the role of ideas is necessarily very important. No social practice is possible without conception; thought is an integral part, a moment, of all social practice. And yet the antagonistic social practices of the base must remain framed within the acceptance of the pre-given social relations. The very separation between base and superstructure is one distinguishing what it is possible to think. The structure of social practices of the base defines the type of society — the mode of production. Performance of these social practices rests within and accepts this structure. Social practices of the superstructure suppose a non-acceptance of the base structure.

Both base and superstructure are necessarily conflictual. However, the base is, in a certain sense, unconsciously so, since the social practices are simply antagonistic: one class controls the activities of another as a structural given. Only in the superstructure do people become aware of these antagonisms and attempt to take action about them. Here, the conflict is open and conscious. In consequence, an important part of the fight is over this very consciousness, a conflict over ideas.

In superstructural practices, people are consciously aware of societal antagonisms and strive to eliminate, change, or preserve them. In order to attain such a goal, they must conceive of the appropriate actions. Ideology is a system of thought which impedes such conception. No ideology can simply be invented and imposed by will of force.[1] It must be closely linked with existing social relations and selectively use them, or their appearance, as its foundation. Two fundamental capitalist social relations are particularly suitable in this context: the market exchange of commodities and an apparently autonomous state.

In capitalist societies, decisions about what goods to produce, and hence what productive activities to perform, are not made directly with knowledge of consumption needs but are mediated by the market. Each individual brings something to sell to the market, leaving to the ”invisible hand” the role of allocating productive practices to yield the proper proportions of these different things. On the

[1] Sayer (1979) has especially emphasised this point.

market, all such individuals are free and equal, or at least proportionately equal to their buying powers. The exchange of material goods hides the social relations of allocation of productive practices.

The very existence of free and equal individuals interacting on the market, however, presumes some apparently autonomous institution outside of these social relations acting for the good of all. This institution, the state, must, at a minimum, ensure the existence of private property and guarantee the value of money. But because of its very position, many other roles, or practices, also fall to it.

Thus, we see that the two bases of capitalist ideologies are eminently contradictory. The fetishism of the market reveals equal and free competing individuals while, outside these relations, the state acts in the common interest of all.[2]

For the exchange of commodities, capitalism depends fundamentally on a social division of labour so that here people differ in that they do not perform the same concrete social practices. To this must be added the complexity of market distribution of goods coupled to state interference in the universal interest which historically have only been possible within the geographical limits of nation-states. Such divisions can, then, build on physical distinctions of language, sex, race, and ethnicity. Thus, the first two bases of capitalist ideologies serve to hide the antagonistic class relations while here other non-antagonistic relations are placed in evidence as apparently more fundamental and conflictual than class.

In order to conceive, people need a system of already existing tools of thought. The importance of technical progress in the dynamic of the capitalist base has led to the development of the institution of science as the means of conceiving how nature can be acted upon. The very evidence of success of such a system of thought, applied to nature, leads to a belief in its applicability to social relations. This belief, applied in a context of fetishised social relations, provides an apparent means of manipulating social relations which ignores that such relations consist of human social practices and that human beings can react back. In opposition to this, another system of thought about social relations has far older historical roots. Religions provide tools of explanation about the inner laws of the social, but laws which are not subject to human manipulation.

Still another basis of ideology, this common to all modes of production, resides in people daily living within social relations, which, although antagonistic, are accepted as what is and what must be. Existing social relations must be taken as natural and eternal, as well as being the best possible state of affairs. The distinction, base/superstructure, yields a basis in the existence of the former to deny the latter.

Capitalist ideologies can then be seen to operate at four different levels. Individual exchange on the market and the accompanying state can serve to hide antagonistic class relations. The social division of labour and the nation-state can generate non-class distinctions which appear to be most fundamental. Science and religion can provide opposing, but equally superficial, ways of conceiving of

[2]Hobbes (1968) was perhaps the first to see clearly this opposition; see Macpherson (1962).

social relations. The very distinction between antagonistic base and conscious superstructure can lead to the former appearing immutable.

4.2 Possessive individualism

The existence of free and equal individuals interacting in the market place is not an ideology. Nor is the role of the state acting as a neutral arbiter and protector of all. Both are essential phenomena of capitalist society, facts which all people in these societies must take into account in planning their actions.[3] The contrast with pre-capitalist societies makes this even more obvious. Under corvé-tributary or slave modes of production, the subordinate classes do not have this space of liberty and equality that is the capitalist market. They are directly controlled and oppressed by the dominant classes, without any mediating neutral state. If these two phenomena, the market and the state, are not ideological, they are the very material bases of capitalist ideologies. Their very existence means that certain other social relations remain hidden or appear unimportant.[4] And their extreme centrality and importance means that they are taken as the model for the interpretation of many other facets of capitalist society.

The fetishism of commodities is too well-known, and has already often been referred to above, to be once more outlined here. Scarce resources are efficiently allocated through the market while, at the same time, human labour activities are also allocated, invisibly, behind peoples backs. Everything occurs in the market in material goods and everyone appears to have an equal role or, at least, one proportional to his or her financial resources.

The equality of the market exchange hides class relations. The first of these is that not all people bring the same type of commodity to the market. Labour power is a peculiar commodity which cannot be produced by a capitalist labour process. If the exchange is among equals, the prior choice of saleable commodity is not. Those with sufficient financial resources, the capitalists, can choose which commodities to produce and to exchange. The others have no choice but to sell their labour power. Here the class relation begins to appear.

On the market, exchanges may take place among equals, but the subordinate class must sell a part of itself, its capacity to labour. Since the market is the place where things are exchanged, this assimilation of labour power to a commodity, at least for the duration of the exchange, transforms these equal beings simultaneously into things manipulable by the dominant class.

---

[3] See Bourque (1977, p. 31).

[4] "... the social relations of production assume a doubly mysterious form. On the one hand, they appear as relations between things (commodities), and on the other, as relations between the wills of autonomous entities equal to each other — of legal subjects." (Pashukanis, 1978, p. 117, see also pp. 100–101, 118–119, 151–152). "At the same time ... that the product of labour becomes a commodity and a bearer of value, man acquires the capacity to be a legal subject and a bearer of rights." (ibid., p. 112) "The free and equal owners of commodities who meet in the market are free and equal only in the abstract relation of appropriation and alienation. In real life, they are bound by various ties of mutual dependance. ... All these innumerable relationships of actual dependence form the real basis of state structure, whereas for the juridical theory of state it is as if they did not exist." (ibid., p. 14)

If some must sell their labour power, others must be in a situation to buy it: those with financial resources and the possibility of selecting which commodities to produce. Thus, the market in 'things' doubly determines how labour activities are to be allocated. One class can buy and decide how to use the labour power of another. And this decision is made as a function of what can be sold on the market. The capitalist class cannot decide freely and arbitrarily how to allocate the productive labour of the working class, but only within the constraints of the market. However, it does decide.

The market provides a mechanism through which choices can be made concerning which goods will be produced, and, hence, which corresponding labour activities will be performed. These choices are not made universally by all market exchangers, but only by those capable of buying lbaur power. But even here, the decisions are not made in unity and coordination, but under conditions of competition within the capitalist class. Hence, as we have seen in discussion of the labour theory of value, such decisions do not involve an optimisation of all labour times used, however evaluated, but only of those paid for by the capitalist class. In other words, decisions about allocation of productive labour, mediated by the capitalist market, are efficient — for the capitalist class. They optimise the ratio of unpaid to paid labour time, as measured by the rate of profit, and not the total use of labour time spent by the subordinate class.

At least within certain limits, the subordinate class has a moment of freedom in its (necessary) sale of labour power and purchase of consumption goods. Bourgeois economics is about nothing else. But this sale is an alienation of a part of itself, of its power of decision and action. Sale of labour power involves the loss of power to decide about one's own actions. Once the transaction is concluded, the situation changes radically as the equality disappears and the subordinate class must submit to the dictates of its boss. The free market exchange hides the despotic production process of the factory.

The centrality of the market sale of labour power in establishing and renewing the capitalist class relations provides a model for human nature itself. Human beings are able rationally to judge different possible courses of action and freely to choose the most suitable one for their purposes. The market model of human nature is one where all commodities are equivalent and where class relations do not appear. Social relations are the result of these individual decisions and actions and only at most minimally a prior factor to be taken into account. Rather the constraints to be rationally weighed are primarily (or only) the simultaneous decisions of the other human beings.

On the basis of market exchange, the individual subject of rights and duties is constituted.[5] The formal equality of this exchange appears to extend to all aspects of society. But, in affirming this idea, one automatically tends to exclude the workplace from society. At the same time, bourgeois legality tends to break up struggles in solidarity since legal procedures invariably are based on recognition

[5] See Pashukanis (1978, *passim*).

only of the individual legal subject, with an emphasis on the specificity of each *different* person's case within the equal right.[6]

This reduced model of market rationality serves as the basis of many other aspects of capitalist society. Perhaps the most important is the institution of the political. That apparently autonomous institution, the state, can be chosen, at least to a certain extent, through a market-based mechanism. Equal individuals of all classes will freely choose the directors of the state, expressing this choice through periodic elections. In this way, the state will assuredly act in the interests of all but will remain autonomous because of the definitiveness of the periodic choice.

4.3 The autonomous and neutral state

The second fundamental basis of capitalist ideologies is, in many ways, in contradiction with the first. While the market symbolises individual interests, the state represents collective interest. Although both always play essential roles under capitalism, their relative importance is most often inversely proportional. Where the market is central, and the state appears secondary, ideology based on individualism predominates. Conversely, where the state, as the representative of collective interest, leaves market factors in the background, ideology centred on this benevolent, if totalitarian, institution acting for the good of all, is most important.

At the most primary level, market and state are intimately interrelated. The capitalist market entails alienation of goods in return for a symbol, money, of future purchase of goods. Neither the possibility of individual alienation of goods nor the acceptance of money in return is possible without the state. Both must be assured by actors, an institution, outside of these social relations. Here lies the basis of the ideology of the state as neutral and autonomous, serving the interests of all. Yet we have seen that this exchange involves not only material goods but also labour power — a class relation. Private law can protect the holders of material goods but is ill-suited for the case of labour power, in as much as it is human capacity fetished as a thing to be exchanged. Criminal law is class law. Thus, capitalist market relations are only possible through the guarantee of the state and this state guarantee is only necessary for a capitalist market. But the capitalist market is a class relation and the capitalist state is most fundamentally a class state.

The state is intimately associated with the market. But behind the market lies the capitalist production process, the place for the direct authoritarian control of capitalist over worker. Here, the state acting in the interest of all has little or nothing to do or say for those who must simply follow orders. Once the market act of selling labour power is accomplished, state involvement virtually disappears, which is not to say that a complex interaction does not occur between law and the control and surveillance in the production process.[7]

---

[6] See Picciotto (1979).

[7] Kinsey (1979) traces the historical changes in this inter-relationship; see also Lea (1979).

Two other social practices of the state, its roles in allocation of investment and in the reproduction of labour power, reinforce this position of actor in the collective interest. If and when the market does not assure an optimum investment of capital, the state intervenes to assure a maximum of employment and a continued supply of goods to the market. And with the unbridled competition among capitalists for the maximum use of labour power threatening its very existence, the state creates a system of social laws to protect the holders of labour power against themselves and their bosses even in the despotic factory. The anarchy of the capitalist market is reduced to an acceptable level in the collective interest, but only so that the underlying class relations continue to be reproduced.

Given these various factors, the autonomy and neutrality of the state is well-established. And still, the market does instil a rampant competition of all against all. Under certain circumstances, a measure of ideological and repressive coercion is surely necessary to maintain the system. Once again, this must be for the good of all, for such anarchy threatens all. The inherent antagonisms of social class relations do not appear as part of this threat until such time as social practices rise to the conscious level of the superstructure.

Where the capitalist market of free enterprise predominates, the state appears to play a minimal role and an ideology of individualism is pervasive. Conversely, where the capitalist state plays a major role, especially in decisions about investment allocation and in the reproduction of labour power, an ideology of the state as representative of and acting in the name and interests of all, especially the subordinate classes, dominates — the nationalisations and welfare state of socialism. Between these extreme types, all variations are possible.

4.4 Nationalism and racism

As a geographically delimited region, the nation-state provides a suitable place within which a specific money and a specific system of private law can be instituted and controlled. If provides an entity within which allocation of investment can be influenced or even controlled. It defines the limits within which the maintenance and reproduction of labour power can be achieved by the state. It delimits a space for the elaboration of ideological and repressive institutions.

On the market, workers are free to sell their labour power. But this very freedom means that they can, in principle, choose where and when they will sell it. The existence of nation-states places reasonable limits on this potentially unlimited mobility. In this way, valuable skills can be attracted, or prevented from leaving, unemployment induced, beneficiaries of welfare measures limited, political rights controlled, ...

In complementary fashion, the nation-state provides a delimited population which can identify with its autonomous state. The individual appears simply to be a citizen of the country, with everyone juridically equal, rather than a member of a social class. Such an equality of all citizens is only possible on the basis of the free and equal interchange among individuals on the market. Acceptance of

the state as looking after one's interests is reinforced by the fact that only citizens are in such a position and by the imputed superiority of one's own state — and nation.[8]

The division of the world into nation-states, a strictly capitalist phenomenon, plays on historical differences pre-dating capitalism. Language, ethnic, and racial contrasts have been manipulated to create nations where only people existed before. In pre-capitalist societies, everyone who is not an immediate acquaintance is normally a stranger (a foreigner). In contrast, capitalism unites people who have never seen each other and who may not speak the same language, but who are prepared to claim proudly to be citizens of the same country. The invention of printing played an important role in rendering this technically feasible.[9]

The citizen is to identify with the state, as the embodiment of the nation, as his or her state acting in his or her interest. This can only be strengthened if the state, and the nation, are symbolised by a national hero or heroes — a great man or men. The nation is worthy of exceptional pride because someone of extraordinary qualities contributed to its creation. The ideology of individualism becomes concentrated in one individual.[10] Paradoxically, in as much as the ideology of the state acting in the collective interest predominates over the individualism of the market, the place of the national hero increase in importance.

The nation-state divides the population of the world in two. We are the nation and are proud of it. They are foreigners and hence are not like us.[11] Material differences of language, ethnicity, and race are developed and emphasised to yield nationalism — us and racism — them. The more obvious the physical difference, the more important must be the contrast and the possibility of conflict. Social class is not obvious, and hence must be of little or no importance.[12] Nationalism and racism predominate, destroying international solidarity.

4.5 Religion and science

The fundamental antagonism of any class-based mode of production lies in one class making the decisions about the activities of another class. In capitalist society, this division is pushed to an extreme as it penetrates not only what is to be done, but knowledge about how it will be done. Productive labour itself is split by the division between manual and intellectual tasks, a site of continuous conflict. The separation between purchase of labour power and the resulting work actually performed leaves no direct and automatic means of capitalist control over the labour process. Knowledge of production is generated by the actual transformation of nature but, if left with these direct producers, provides them with

[8] Bourque (1977, pp. 33–38) bases nationalist ideology on the doubly free individual.

[9] See Anderson (1983, *passim*).

[10] See Caudwell (1971a, pp. 20–32).

[11] For the use of racism in the development and attempted management of crisis, see Hall et al (1978, *passim*).

[12] See de la Pradelle (1979, pp. 176–177).

substantial power to regulate their activities. The dominant classes must continuously struggle to acquire this knowledge and to turn it against the subordinate classes.

Acquisition of knowledge does not mean that those already with it have lost it. But such acquisition does mean that the subordinate classes cannot hide behind their knowledge and protect themselves from the demands of more work to be performed. A first result is that the dominant classes know more accurately what work it is possible to perform. The problem is still to enforce this. The second step is to embody the knowledge in machines which can soon provide a monopoly of such knowledge for the dominant class since the original source of production of that knowledge for the subordinate classes has disappeared with the introduction of the machines. However, new sources of knowledge become available to the working class with this introduction, as it learns practically what is needed to run the new machines efficiently. So the struggle continues.

The conflict over knowledge in the production process is one important means of control over the working class. Not only can such knowledge be turned against the working class but it can also be used as a divisive factor. Knowledge of a particular process or job is something not everyone has, so all workers are not interchangeable. Workers can be divided into a skill hierarchy by their actual knowledge. But this hierarchy can be compounded and reinforced by a strictly social construction of the hierarchy. Exclusion is produced by acquisition of social symbols of competence, little related to actual useful knowledge, such as apprenticeships, diplomas, society memberships, etc. Differences of knowledge become transformed into ideological divisions fragmenting the working classes.

The struggle to restrict working class access to knowledge becomes institutionalised in the systematisation of knowledge as science.[13] In the technical division of labour, knowledge is removed, as far as possible and in continuous struggle, from the direct producers, and then turned against them in machines. The third step is to formalise, systematise, and abstract it so that it is no longer intelligible to those located where it originates. Science is an institution of knowledge about the transformation of nature designed to exclude those actually involved in the transformation of nature. The very formalisation, systematisation, and abstraction of such knowledge allows it often to be applied to cases situated far from the original source of the knowledge. In this way, it appears that science is the prerequisite for knowing how to change nature rather than the latter being the source of the knowledge which becomes science.

Such an institution of science must be the business of specialists. But in so far as these specialists are concerned with knowledge about production through the transformation of nature, their work is part of the production working class. However, the institutionalisation of the ideological divisions within the working class turns them against their very class. For this knowledge is used against those

[13] Marcuse (1964, esp. pp. 91–102, 120–138) analyses the ideological roles of science and technology.

directly involved in transforming nature. Thus, the existence of science creates an ”elite” susceptible of playing an important role in the state bureaucracy, especially with the tendency to state capitalism where the working classes must identify with the state. What better way than to have the most prestigious part of the working class integrated into the state as ”experts”.

The institutionalisation of knowledge about nature leads to a further question. What form can knowledge of society take? As we know from the first volume, study of society contrasts with that of nature in that, for the former, the object is an active subject itself. Thus, strictly speaking, the procedures of an institutionalised science of nature must not be applicable. From the point of view of reproducing existing society, knowledge of that society must differ according to class position. The dominant classes require sufficient knowledge to attenuate the antagonisms and conflicts without actually becoming conscious that the inherent contradictions make their position untenable. The subordinate classes must believe that underlying laws are at work which determine fate against which thay are helpless to act.

Dominant class social theory, then, takes at least two basic complementary forms. The transfer of natural science methodology, without the actual possibility of experimentation to transform the phenomenon about which knowledge is to be required, leads to empiricism. Quantities of facts are accumulated with no knowledge of how they are produced and abstract generalities are drawn from them. By the very method of acquiring the information, knowledge of underlying laws is excluded. The explanation is superficial, but action is possible. At a completely different level, more concretely, explanation of social processes takes the form of acts of great men. Since the dominant class decides, such decisions must determine the course of history and structural constraints lack importance.

Subordinate class social theory also takes two basic complementary ideological forms, symmetrically corresponding to those just outlined. By their position in production, the subordinate classes are directly aware of the possibilities of transformation of nature, but have lost much of the power to decide what to transform, when, and how. At the societal level, this is reflected in religious beliefs that there exist important underlying laws regulating social life, but that individuals cannot act upon them. Here the explanation is profound but action impossible. Again, more concretely, the vision of history and society is structural. All-powerful societal laws regulate life and individual human acts are insignificant.

Obviously, these opposing views of society are not exclusive property of one class or another. All are imposed as part of the dominant contradictory ideology and each class believes, to some extent, in all of them. According to specific historical circumstances, one theory or the other may predominate. By its very nature, ideology must be contradictory and flexible to be able to adapt to the changing struggle, while maintaining certain links within practical reality to make it believable.

The ideologies just outlined are all one-sided in that either they look at surface phenomena which are modifiable, while ignoring underlying laws which would

indicate what it is possible to change and how. Or they concentrate on underlying laws which, however, appear to be immutable. The dominant classes are in a position where a knowledge of the actual contradictions of the underlying laws would render life subjectively untenable. The subordinate classes, on the other hand, must be led to believe that nothing can be changed. Only the subordinate classes are in the position to struggle to escape from these ideologies in order to see the contradictions of capitalist development and to act upon them.

4.6 Capitalism, the eternal system

In class societies, all people daily live the tensions of antagonism and conflict. Their every act is structured by such tensions. However, this does not mean that their routine decisions consciously take into account the class antagonisms. Rather, the influence is mediated and indirect. No society is possible where class struggle is openly lived every day. Instead, people must come to accept their daily way of life as natural and unchanging. Such is the role of the ideologies described above: to inhibit subordinate class perception of the contradictions of capitalist development.[14]

The continued repetition of everyday acts creates an impression of immutability which no state-enforced ideology can hope to equal. Thus, the continuity of market exchange provides the basis of stable existence,[15] for the means of existence can only be obtained on the market, can they not?

However, the subordinate classes are pushed by the social relations of their daily life to develop a collective consciousness of the existing antagonisms. But at the same time, this daily life fragments and oppresses them. Each individual is forced to face his or her own problems, most often alone. Daily psychological survival most often involves accepting the contradictory ideologies in which one is involved, in so far as the daily normal functioning of life is to continue.

But the problem is not only or primarily one of individual psychology. In class society, the subordinate classes are obliged to work under the orders of the dominant classes. This work fills a large portion of waking hours and is physically exhausting. Most often, the subordinate classes have neither the time nor the energy to reflect on their conditions of life and on how to change them. The contrast with the intellectual of the ideological class is here very obvious. The working classes directly live the antagonisms of capitalist society, but usually have little inclination to think about them.

People tend to accept what is as the only realistic possibility if they see no viable alternative. The two existing forms of world capitalism, market and state capitalism, provide mutually reinforcing images, especially as transmitted through

[14] Marcuse (1964) provides a masterful analysis of this process of indoctrination, but seems to think that ideological struggle can actually overcome the fundamental contradiction of capitalist production.

[15] "... mutuality, which is ensured by the laws of the market, lends property the quality of an 'eternal' institution. In contrast to this, the purely political security vouchsafed by the coercive machinery of state amounts to nothing more than the protection of specified personal stocks belonging to the owners..." (Pashukanis, 1978, p. 123).

the mass media.[16] On the one side, we see totalitarian thought control which hides the benevolent welfare state. On the other, we see rampant competition which hides the individual liberty of the market and the vote. Seen through such spectacles, neither can seem attractive to members of the other society.

If an already existing alternative is not available in the world, then a project for an alternative society is required. Here, the vision is socialism or communism. But these terms have come to be associated with one of the two forms of existing capitalism, the state capitalism of the 'Socialist' countries. This project has been reduced to nationalisation of the means of production coupled with an elaborated welfare state, where both individual liberty and collective decision-making are excluded.

The means of bringing about revolutionary change appear equally elusive. During the period of the development of capitalism, a revolutionary period, the problem in any given nation-state was to contain and control the image of revolutions occurring elsewhere.[17] With the implantation of industrial capitalism, and especially since the appearance of fordism, the workers have a certain accumulation of personal belongings and the belief to transmit is that these few possessions will be lost if any revolutionay upheaval occurs. Even revolution in less advanced societies poses an ideological threat to the advanced capitalist countries and must be vigorously suppressed. Then, the only change possible is in the elected government.

Such is the 'normal' state of affairs in capitalist society. For otherwise, the society could not function. But capitalist society is a society of antagonism, struggle , and crisis. However powerful the ideologies, they cannot eliminate the underlying antagonisms which continue to generate struggle and crisis. In the limit, the physical force of class relations can only lie hidden behind them.

[16] Marcuse (1964, esp. pp. 42–57) bases his work around this opposition.

[17] See, for example, Goulemot (1975).

5
The threat of arms

5.1 When all goes well...

In a class society, the threat of repressive force is never more than thinly disguised. And yet, its very existence acts as a potent disuasive ideological factor. Ideologies serve to preserve the normal functioning of society. They provide a non-antagonistic image of antagonistic society, or, at least, displace conflict towards nonfundamental clivages. But ideologies can only hide the underlying antagonisms; they can never eliminate them. Nor can they prevent such antagonisms, once and for all, from rising to the level of conscious struggle. Class society is always a society of potential or actual open struggle.

When the dominant classes believe the 'normal' functioning of society to be threatened, they can be counted upon to resort to repressive violence. In times of strength, they can even apply it as a means of warning simply to prevent even minor development of conflict, as when a strike is brutally repressed. In societies where the dominant ideologies of individualism and the state for all are not well institutionalised, open repression may be the only possible means to assure continuation . However, here, the dominant classes must also search for other, ideological, means of stabilising their position.

The dominant ideologies of individualism and the benevolent state serve to reinforce the necessity and desirability of repressive force. Uncontrolled individualism is nothing less than anarchy and unending conflict which is harmful to all members of society. At the same time, the state, as protector of all, is the ideal institution to control this repressive force for the good of all. Thus, in times of 'normal' functioning of society, institutional repression is seen as a necessary element of capitalism, assuring the well-being of all. Only in times of social conflict does it show its real teeth.

5.2 In the name of law and order

Repression cannot be arbitrary, but must follow well-established rules. Such is the code of laws in any given society.[1] Not only is criminal law relevant here. All laws act to institutionalise repression, to regularise it, and to render it legitimate.

[1] Some classical Marxists, such as Bukharin (1969, pp. 156–157) and Renner (1949, pp. 45–48, *passim*), see this as the basis of all law.

And, in one way or another, virtually all laws turn around that basis of capitalist society, private property and the exchange of commodities.[2]

The existence of private property centres on the possibility for people to enter into contracts.[3] In this way, possessions, whether physical objects or symbols, come to change hands. This circulation of rights over things and the possibility of conflict over private interests[4] forms the basis of private law. Violation of these rules calls for punishment.

One of the most important forms of contract, and also the most peculiar, is that permitting the sale of labour power.[5] Only after the agreement to this contract is the working class allowed access to the means of production, to the factory floor. All the complications of creating a system of laws to cover the case of strikes demonstrates the specificity of this contract.[6] When does a strike constitute a breach of contract? When does occupation of a factory constitute impingement on the capitalists' rights of private property? In what ways can the courts interfere with the employers' selection of employees through anti-discrimination legislation, when the employer pays the wages?[7] Such a situation permits an arbitrary use of force within a non-arbitrary system of law.

In this context, the status of trade unions is particularly pertinent. The work contract is legally an individual agreement to sell a commodity. The ideology of free enterprise and competition pleads against concertation among the sellers. But the power of working class organisation has forced unions to be recognised and institutionalised, on condition that they be restricted to demands pertaining to the work contract, specifically economic matters. By one means or another, politics must be excluded from the workplace.[8] Much of the mass repression of the working classes stems from this opposition between politics and economics.

Law is, thus, implicated in two distinct types of social practices, the circulation of commodities and ideology-repression. The consent involved in the regulation of the relations of production, of their property relations, acts to conceal the coercion involved in the preservation and maintenance of class domination.[9] Juridical regulation of the labour contract is at the heart of this contradiction.

5.3 Internal security

A society based on an ideology of individual liberty and a protective state must contend with the actions which would endanger its general functioning. If in-

[2] See Pashukanis (1978, *passim*).

[3] See Pashukanis (1978, p. 121).

[4] See Pashukanis (1978, pp. 81, 93).

[5] See Edelman (1978, p. 31).

[6] See Edelman (1978, *passim*).

[7] See Gregory (1979).

[8] See Edelman (1978, p. 44).

[9] Hunt (1981) believes that the dichotomy of this contradiction should be overcome by some unitary conception of law.

dividual human beings believe that they have unlimited choice in their actions, then some will necessarily choose activities which may be deemed harmful to the greater good. For example, where social relations are based on private property, theft will be judged a major contravention of accepted rules and norms. If ideologies built on physical differences of race, ethnicity, and sex create social divisions, then these can sometimes be expected to lead to open conflicts which must be mediated. On these bases, an entire system of police and justice can be justified as a part of the neutral state acting in the interests of all.[10]

Punishment must be seen as fair and just for the crime committed, in true market exchange fashion. The more serious the crime, the longer the period of loss of freedom in prison must be paid.[11] Official discourse talks of rehabilitation but common sense shows us that the time paid usually contributes to contribute further crime.

Both the police and the system of justice do have a positive role in protecting (almost) everyone in society. Social problems generated by the very social relations of capitalism must, in turn, be attenuated and controlled by that society.[12] Citizens are protected against the excesses of some individuals. But police and justice also play multiple ambiguous roles: combatting crime while also providing social assistance, keeping the peace while also regulating traffic.[13] Such multiplicity of roles provides a benevolent cover.

However, what is defined as crime or breaking the peace is never clearly and simply anti-social. In many ways, organised crime can simply be seen as capitalism pushed to its logical conclusion, as Al Capone loudly proclaimed it. But when is crime, primarily committed by the poor, not also a political act? And where is the frontier between breaking the peace and starting a social revolution?

The subordinate classes are directly aware of the class pressure of the police. They act in manifold ways to combat it, from direct physical resistance to simply an abusive and aggressive discourse against it.[14]

Police and the justice system work to attenuate the irregularities created by the capitalist social relations. They fight the inner enemy within society by an apparent monopolisation of the legitimate means of force in society. Such struggle is only possible from the neutral position of the state. As with other practices of that institution which is the state, police and justice appear to act in the interests of all.

However, in fact, the state has no monopoly of legitimate force. Even the local night club has its own private bouncer for when the going gets rough. Many enterprises, even in the most democratic capitalist societies, have their goon squads to crush worker dissidence. And private security forces are for hire in most any

[10] See Hall et al (1978, pp. 148–149).

[11] See Pashukanis (1978, pp. 166–188).

[12] See Young (1979).

[13] See Cohen (1979) and Hall *et al* (1978, pp. 148–149).

[14] See Cohen (1979), Harring (1977), and Johnson (1976).

capitalist society. In the more authoritarian dictatorial societies, death squads, quietly supported by the state but independent of it, eliminate the political opposition. No, oppressive force is not the monopoly of the state, but of the dominant classes.[15]

Then, how neutral is the repressive force of the state? In times of 'normal' functioning of society, it certainly appears to act in the interests of all, protecting everyone from the delinquent. But the basis in protection of private property must make one look more closely. For both police and justice are hierarchically differentiated according to wealth. The poor are badly protected from violence and are often subjected to direct police harassment. The crimes of the rich can be overlooked if a persuasive (and expensive) lawyer can be obtained.

In times of open social conflict, the apparent neutrality of state repressive force rapidly disappears. Any important strike can bring out the forces of law and order to protect the private property of those who own. If the social movement grows and threatens to become political, then even more powerful means of repression are called upon. Tanks appear in the streets and fighter planes overhead.

5.4 External security

A world divided into nation-states facilitates the allocation of capital and of workers. It provides bases for the apparently neutral and autonomous state institutions. But, in a world where such nation-states have varying development of their contradictions, the potentiality for inter-nation conflict exists. Many competing capitals are located within national boundaries and the state must identify with them and support their competition with foreign capital. Where capital is directly state controlled, this factor is even more important. Finally, the division of nation-states among a variety of forms ranging from competitive market to state capitalism creates ideological divisions which can possibly break into open conflict.

If the state is to maintain its ideological image as protector of all its citizens, it must be able to do so in the face of external foreign competition or threats. Every nation-state, however insignificant, must have its means of defence, a substantial armed force. The very autonomy of the state takes on a reality of its own which can lead to attempts at expansion over neighbouring territories. But armed conflicts can also arise in attempts to assure supply of certain raw materials in limited supply, even over areas suspected of having such materials.

While police serve for maintaining order within a nation-state, the army is directed, at least ostensibly, towards the exterior.[16] The threat of an external enemy can unify the population behind the state and the nation. It can also divert attention from serious internal problems, especially those arising from the antagonisms of class society. The image of an atrocious enemy oppressing its own population and menacing to invade the country can induce all citizens to prepare to die for

[15] This *contra* Weber (1948, p. 78).

[16] For differences between the police and the army, see Gellner (1974, pp. 144–160).

their land,[17] although such an ideology may not be sufficient in the thick of battle, where small group solidarity is more effective.[18]

The union of an entire nation against another, then, serves to bring together opposing social classes within each nation-state and to push members of the same class from different nations to fight each other to the death. The existence of national armies, and eventually of war, serves to divide the international working class into apparently irreconcilable opposing forces. War is most often war against the whole working class with the support of the working class.

The core of any army is composed of professionals who make it their career. However, the ranks of the army can be obtained in several ways: mercenaries, conscripts, or volunteers. Mercenaries are least satisfactory since they fight only for the money and are not ideologically committed to the nation-state. Volunteers would appear to provide the most reliable army since they, hopefully, have chosen to serve and are prepared to accept the possible consequences.[19] But they are often not available in sufficient numbers and are often drawn from marginal segments of the population, attracted by the possibility of escape from economic hardship and unemployment. Conscripts are perhaps the least reliable, but conscription provides a means of giving most members of the (male) population a taste of military discipline.[20] It is most often the only means of acquiring sufficient soldiers for a major conflict, but if the war becomes unpopular, it can present the danger of dissidence within the ranks and open opposition to the conscription itself.

Service in the armed forces is itself a means of dividing the working classes. By whatever means they are obtained, the rank and file members of the army necessarily come from the subordinate classes. However they are used in conflict, they will necessarily be fighting other members of their own class. If only for this reason, iron discipline is always required in the armed forces.

The army is directed towards the external enemy and the police towards the internal enemy. But when the internal enemy becomes too menacing, the army always takes over from the police.[21] The difference in discipline and the magnitude of the arms available are the two main reasons. For the internal enemy, threatening insurrection, indicates the development of class antagonisms into class consciousness: the subordinate class menace. And here, in spite of all appearances, lies the essential role of the armed forces. The external threat is but a pretext for stronger armed forces. Their continual exhibition within the country demonstrates the real threat of their use therein if ever things get out of hand. The direct role of the military in most capitalist countries illuminates their potential in the few democratic

[17] See Smith and Smith (1983, pp. 42–44, 50-53).

[18] See MacKenzie (1983).

[19] The major change came with the Napoleonic army; see MacKenzie (1983).

[20] See MacKenzie (1983).

[21] See MacKenzie (1983), Smith and Smith (1983, pp. 42–44, 53–54, 93), and Smith (1983).

ones.[22]

[22]Consider how the Canadian government acted during the October (1970) crisis against the FLQ in Quebec; see Valières (1977).

6
The problem of hegemony

6.1 'Natural' laws of subjection

Marx saw the principal contradiction under the capitalist mode of production to be the opposition between the increasing socialisation of the forces of production and the increasing concentration of control of the means of production in the hands of a few, the capitalist class. This socialisation of the forces of production meant that, for the first time in history, the dominated class was brought together in the production process in such a way that revolutionary organisation could be brought about. However, inherent in this contradiction are two important tensions. First, members of the working class are necessarily in direct competition with each other to sell their labour power in order to be able to enter the production process in the first place. At this point, they appear to be free and equal, even with respect to members of the capitalist class, since each individual is buying and selling commodities, at their value, on the market. Only upon entry to the production process are the workers united, in the complex division of labour under industrial capitalism. But here the second tension intervenes: the working class is now also directly subordinated to the coercive power of the capitalist.

Given this contradiction, and the possibility of organisation of the working class for revolutionary action, it is not sufficient that the means of production be removed from control by the working class in order for the capitalist mode of production to be reproduced. Juridical, religious, artistic, philosophical, and political, i.e. ideological, domination, as well as repressive domination, must also be established and maintained, both within and outside the production process. Marx made this very clear in his analysis of the capitalist mode of production:

> It is not enough that the conditions of labour are concentrated in a mass, in the shape of capital, at the one pole of society, while at the other are grouped masses of men, who have nothing to sell but their labour-power. Neither is it enough that they are compelled to sell it voluntarily. The advance of capitalist production develops a working class, which by education, tradition, habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-evident laws of Nature. The organization of the capitalist process of production, once fully developed, breaks down all resistance. The constant generation of a relative surplus-population keeps the law of supply and demand of labour, and therefore keeps wages, in a rut that corresponds with the wants of capital. The dull compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the labourer to the capitalist. Direct force, outside economic

conditions, is of course still used, but only exceptionally. In the ordinary run of things, the labourer can be left to the "natural laws of production," i.e. to his dependence on capital, a dependence springing from, and guaranteed in perpetuity by, the conditions of production themselves. (Marx, 1967, I, p. 737)

Unfortunately, Marx never reached the stage in his work where he would have elaborated on the "education, tradition, habit". On the contrary, he looked to education primarily as a revolutionary means in the struggle of the working class and seemed often to ignore its dominating effects.

The major marxist theorist to pick up on this element of historical materialism was Gramsci. With his theory of hegemony and of the state and civil society, he demonstrated the importance of non-economic dominance in the more advanced capitalist societies and how this must be broken by the working class before the proletarian revolution could succeed. He envisaged this process as one by which the working class would establish its own hegemony, with its own organic intellectuals, within the existing capitalist order. Because of the fragmentary nature of his writings, it is difficult to piece together a coherent theory of how the capitalist class maintains its hegemony. Although elements of the theory have been put in place, an elaboration of the specific mechanisms is often missing. Much of the material necessary to supplement this work can be found in a book written even before Marx's work: Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*.[1]

As a member of the French aristocracy, de Tocqueville was concerned about the possible disintegration of social order accompanying what he saw as the inevitable spread of democracy. Writing in the 1830's, after the rise to power of the 'bourgeois king' in France, he applied a comparative approach, juxtaposing the feudal and capitalist societies familiar to him.[2] De Tocqueville allied himself closely with the dominant classes of the time in his concern to preserve order and hence does not have that marxist interest in the organisation of the working class found in Gramsci. He is rather concerned with the dangers inherent in the transition from feudal to capitalist conditions and comes to the conclusion that the

[1] The translation by George Lawrence published in one volume by Doubleday will be used throughout. All quotations have been checked with the French. The other commonly used translation is that by Henry Reeves, published by Vintage in two volumes. It is extremely bad, when not deliberately misleading, as the following example shows:

"But the demagogues of Europe have made strange discoveries.

According to them, a republic is not the rule of the majority, as has hitherto been thought, but the rule of those who are strenuous partisans of the majority. It is not the people who are preponderate in this kind of government, but those who know what is good for the people, a happy distinction which allows men to act in the name of nations without consulting them and to claim their gratitude while their rights are trampled underfoot." (Reeve translation, vol. I, p. 434)

"Mais nous avons fait en Europe d'étranges découvertes.

La république, suivant quelques-uns d'entre nous, ce n'est pas le règne de la majorité, comme on l'a cru jusqu'ici, c'est le règne de ceux qui se portent fort pour la majorité. Ce n'est pas le peuple qui dirige dans ces sortes de gouvernements, mais ceux qui savent le plus grand bien du peuple: distinction heureuse, qui permet d'agir au nom des nations sans les consulter, et de reclamer leur reconnaissance en les foulant aux pieds."

[2] In this chapter, much of the forcefulness of de Tocqueville's argument is lost, since I virtually ignore the feudal side of his comparisons in order to lay the emphasis on his insights into capitalism.

latter will produce a more stable and totalitarian system than has previously been known. His description of how this happens yields an important contribution to the understanding of bourgeois hegemony. However, a necessary step in the analysis of de Tocqueville's work is to show its relationship to the basic structure of social theory. This I provide in an Appendix.

6.2 Political involvement: the law, administration, and the vote

A first question which may be asked is how capitalism can be maintained politically, when members of all classes can, at least in theory, participate equally in state decisions through universal suffrage and the possibility of running for office. Part of the answer can be traced to the existence of a special body of men, especially lawyers, who come most often to fill the important state functions.[3] Lawyers have perhaps the practices within the ideological class which are most closely tied to the status quo. They form that important bridge between the dominant and subordinate classes, a link which makes them appear both impartial and well trained for the job.[4] Under English law, the conservatism of lawyers is further reinforced because of the importance of precedents which must be traced back in history. This greatly increases the power of the juridical apparatus because of the inherent difficulty of access to such knowledge.[5] Thus, the process

[3] "Men who have made a special study of the laws and have derived therefrom habits of order, something of a taste for formalities, and an instinctive love for regular concatenation of ideas are naturally strongly opposed to the revolutionary spirit and to the ill-considered passions of democracy.

Study and specialized knowledge of the law give a man a rank apart in society and make of lawyers a somewhat privileged intellectual class." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 264)

[4] "Under all free governments, of whatever sort, one finds lawyers in the leading ranks of all the parties. . . .

By nature there is much more affinity between lawyers and executive officials than between the former and the people, although lawyers have often overthrown the executive." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 265)

"What lawyers love above all things is an ordered life, and authority is the greatest guarantee of order. Moreover, one must not forget that although they value liberty, they generally rate legality as far more precious; they are less afraid of tyranny than of arbitrariness. . .

Democratic government favors the political power of lawyers. When the rich, the noble, and the prince are excluded from the government, the lawyers then step into their full rights, for they are then the only men both enlightened and skillful, but not of the people, whom the people can choose. . . .

. . . By birth and interest a lawyer is one of the people, but he is an aristocrat in his habits and tastes; so he is the natural liaison officer between aristocracy and people, and the link that joins them." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 266)

"Lawyers, forming the only enlightened class not distrusted by the people, are naturally called on to fill most public functions. The legislatures are full of them, and they head administrations; in this way they greatly influence both the shaping of the law and its execution. Though the lawyers are obliged to yield to the current of public opinion carrying them along, it is easy to see indications of what they would do if they were free." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 269)

[5] "Our [French] written laws are often hard to understand, but everyone can read them, whereas nothing could be more obscure and out of reach of the common man than a law founded on precedent. Where lawyers are absolutely needed, as in England and the United States, and their professional knowledge is held in high esteem, they become increasingly separated from the people, forming a class apart. A French lawyer is just a man of learning, but an English or an American one is somewhat like the Egyptian priests, being, as they were, the only interpreter of an occult science." (de Tocqueville,

of law is an important, if little noticed, element in the establishment of hegemony; it penetrates all aspects of life in capitalist society.[6]

Law, of course, does not just have an ideological function. It is also the key to the repressive apparatus. Here, it takes on an overtly class character. Money and power can play an inordinate role in subverting justice for those who are arrested.[7] Those crimes which are more closely policed and most severely punished are distinctly poor people's crimes: acts of theft and physical violence. White collar crimes, such as fraud, receive a quite different treatment.[8]

Paradoxically, this vey inequality before the law serves to legitimate the equality of the law. Those who claim the law is applied unfairly use the very value criterion underlying bourgeois law, that everyone *should* be treated equally. The legitimacy of such law would be placed in question only, for example, if unequal justice were demanded for inherently unequal people, such as more severe penalties for those who can afford to pay more, a class-based law.[9]

Conversely, crime provides an ideological rallying point which all law-abiding, hard-working citizens must support. The 'just' society must work to protect the little property held by the working classes as much as it obviously protects the wealth of the powerful. All honest people, across classes, must, then, join together in the common interest of fighting crime and defending their normal, stable way of life.[10]

In spite of these class differences in law, every individual must be integrated into the system; one of the most important institutions to accomplish this is the jury system which leads all citizens to believe that they are participating equally in the execution of the law.[11] Not only does the jury force each individual citizen

---

1966, p. 267)

French law practice is now also close to that described for American law. Interpretation of preceding judgements plays an important role; see de la Pradelle (1979, pp. 43–52).

[6] "In the United States the lawyers constitute a power which is little dreaded and hardly noticed; it has no banner of its own; it adapts itself flexibly to the exigencies of the moment and lets itself be carried along unresistingly by every movement of the body social; but it enwraps the whole of society, penetrating each component class and constantly working in secret upon its unconscious patient, till in the end it has molded it to its desire." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 270)

[7] "The civil and criminal procedure of the Americans relies on two modes of action only, *committal* or *bail*. ...

Clearly such a procedure is hard on the poor and favors the rich only.

A poor man cannot always raise bail even in a civil case, and if he has to wait in prison for the hearing of the matter, his enforced idleness soon reduces him to destitution.

But if it is a civil suit, the rich man never has to go to prison, and, more important, if he has committed a crime, he can easily escape the proper punishment, for having given bail, he disappears." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 48)

"One might put it this way. The surface of American society is covered with a layer of democratic paint, but from time to time one can see the old aristocratic colors breaking through." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 49)

[8] See de la Pradelle (1979, pp. 58–63). This does not imply that a similar type of working class crime does not also go largely undetected; see Ditton (1977) and Young (1979).

[9] Balbus (1977) makes this important point.

[10] See Hall et al (1978, pp. 148–150).

[11] "Juries, especially civil juries, instill some of the habits of the judicial mind into every citizen,

to accept responsibility for a system over which he or she has no actual control, but it also brings them into direct contact with their superiors, in a situation of awe. The relationship is one of pure ideology and naked power.[12]

Laws may only be the juridical reflection of economic relationships: the possession of wealth as private property, freely alienable persons all appearing equal. However, they pervade all aspects of capitalist society: the apparently autonomous class state, the repressive apparatus, ideological integration of all individuals.

The direct involvement of all citizens is important not only in the juridical system but also in certain administrative aspects of the state. For this to occur, it is important that administration be very decentralised while government (law making, foreign relations, etc.) be centralised. By giving all citizens responsibilities for minor acts in local affairs, they will be forced to feel responsible for actions of the state at all levels, hence, the importance of municipal and regional governments which have limited but real powers.[13] This is the ideal rarely attained: to have everyone involved directly in minor local affairs. Thus, as a complement, one of the most important ways to integrate the great masses of people is by the vote.[14] Universal suffrage acts in the same way as the jury system to delegate re-

---

and just those habits are the very best way of preparing people to be free.

It spreads respect for the courts' decisions and for the idea of right throughout all classes. ...

Juries teach men equity in practice. Each man, when judging his neighbor, thinks that he may be judged himself. That is especially true of juries in civil suits; hardly anyone is afraid that he will have to face a criminal trial, but anybody may have a lawsuit.

Juries teach each individual not to shirk responsibility for his own acts..." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 274)

[12]"...It should be regarded as a free school which is always open and in which each juror learns his rights, comes into daily contact with the best-educated and most-enlightened members of the upper classes, and is given practical lessons in the law, lessons which the advocate's efforts, the judge's advice, and also the very passions of the litigants bring within his mental grasp. ...

I have said above that in democracies the lawyers, and the judges in particular, are the only aristocratic body that can check the people's movements. This aristocracy has no physical power but exercises its influence over men's minds. It follows that civil juries are the main source of its power." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 275)

[13]"...the most powerful way, and perhaps the only remaining way, in which to interest men in their country's fate is to make them take a share in its government. ...

...how does it come about that each man is as interested in the affairs of his township, of his canton, and of the whole state as he is in his own affairs? It is because each man in his sphere takes an active part in the government of society.

The common man in the United States has understood the influence of the general prosperity on his own happiness, an idea so simple but nevertheless so little understood by the people. Moreover, he is accustomed to regard that prosperity as his own work. So he sees the public fortune as his own, and he works for the good of the state, not only from duty or from pride, but, I dare almost say, from greed.

...The American, taking part in everthing that is done in his country, feels a duty to defend anything criticized there, for it is not only his country that is being attacked, but himself..." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 236–237)

[14]"In the United States, except for slaves, servants, and paupers fed by the township, no one is without a vote and, hence, an indirect share in lawmaking. ...

...every American feels a sort of personal interest in obeying the laws, for a man who is not today one of the majority party may be so tomorrow, and so he may soon be demanding for laws of his choosing that respect which he now professes for the lawgiver's will. Therefore, however annoying

sponsibility without control. It is the bridge between civil society and the state.[15]

However, elections take very specific forms under capitalism. In general, the administration is not elected. Thus, justice, the army, teaching, health, finances are removed from such direct popular pressure. In addition, more direct access to political life than representative elections very rarely exists. Petitions and referenda rarely play an important role in bourgeois democracy.[16]

The existence of a democratic state is tightly linked with material prosperity, i.e. with capitalist production for the market. Individuals with responsibilities in government affairs will also be prepared to take private initiative in business.[17] This relationshp is reciprocal since prosperity is necessary for the democratic state.[18] Hence, with the constantly recurring capitalist crises, the threat that democracy turn into dictatorship always exists; this is especially true when

---

a law may be, the American will submit to it, not only as the work of the majority but also as his own doing; he regards it as a contract to which he is one of the parties." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 240–241)

De Tocqueville does not treat directly the ideology surrounding the actual process of universal suffrage, only its results for ideological hegemony. It is useful to quote Gramsci at this point.

"...it is not true, in any sense, that numbers decide everything, nor that the opinions of all electors are of 'exactly' equal weight. Numbers, in this case too, are simply an instrumental value, giving a measure and a relation and nothing more. And what then is measured? What is measured is precisely the effectiveness, and the expansive and persuasive capacity, of the opinions of a few individuals, the active minorities, the elites, the avant-gardes, etc. — i.e. their rationality, historicity or concrete functionality. Which means it is untrue that all individual opinions have 'exactly' equal weight. Ideas and opinions are not spontaneously 'born' in each individual brain: they have had a centre of formation, of irradiation, of dissemination, of persuasion — a group of men, or a single individual even, which has developed them and presented them in the political form of current reality. The counting of 'votes' is the final ceremony of a long process, in which it is precisely those who devote their best energies to the State and the nation (when such they are) who carry the greatest weight. If this hypothetical group of worthy men, notwithstanding the boundless material power which they possess, do not have the consent of the majority, they must be judged either as inept, or as not representative of 'national' interests — which cannot help being decisive in inflecting the national will in one direction rather than in another." (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 192–3)

[15] See Miaille (1978, p. 87).

[16] See Miaille (1978, pp. 90–91).

[17] "...In politics he takes a part in undertakings he has not thought of, and they give him a general taste for enterprise. Daily new improvements to communal property are suggested to him, and that starts him wishing to improve his own. ...

...it is not especially the things accomplished by the public administration that are great, but rather those things done without its help and beyond its sphere. Democracy does not provide a people with the most skillful of governments, but it does that which the most skillful of governments often cannot do: it spreads throughout the body social a restless activity, superabundant force, and energy never found elsewhere..." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 244)

"...Experience, mores, and education almost always do give a democracy that sort of practical everyday wisdom and understanding of the petty business of life which we call common sense." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 228)

"...Democracy favors the growth of the state's internal resources; it extends comfort and develops public spirit, strengthens respect for law in the various classes of society..." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 229)

[18] "General prosperity favors stability in all governments, but particularly in a democratic one, for it depends on the moods of the greatest number, and especially on the moods of those most exposed to want. When the people rule, they must be happy, if they are not to overthrow the state." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 279–280)

ideological hegemony cannot be maintained.[19] On the other hand, the guarantee of private property is the greatest insurance against revolution. Every individual must have a certain small amount of property in order to keep public order.[20]

6.3 Equality and individualism

An important element of capitalist ideology can be directly linked up with the economic base: everyone works to earn a living. In this way, everyone appears to be equal. However, this is only an appearance, true at the level of circulation, of the market. Here, all social classes appear to be equal.[21] In actual fact, however,

---

[19] "When the taste for physical pleasures has grown more rapidly than either education or experience of free institutions, the time comes when men are carried away and lose control of themselves . . . they do not notice the close connection between private fortunes and general prosperity. . . . They find it a tiresome inconvenience to exercise political rights which distract them from industry. . . . Such folks think they are following the doctrine of self-interest, but they have a very crude idea thereof, and the better to guard their interests, they neglect the chief of them, that is, to remain their own masters.

As those who work are unwilling to attend to public affairs, and the class which might have wished thus to fill its leisure no longer exists, the role of government is left unfilled.

If, at this critical moment, an able and ambitious man once gets power, he finds the way open for usurpations of every sort.

So long as he sees to it for a certain time that material interests flourish, he can easily get away with everything else. He must above all guarantee good order. People passionately bent on physical pleasures usually observe how agitation in favor of liberty threatens prosperity before they appreciate how liberty helps to procure the same. When the slightest rumor of public passions disturbs the trivial pleasures of their private lives, they wake up and feel worried. The fear of anarchy long haunts them, and they are always ready to jettison liberty in the slightest storm.

. . . A nation which asks nothing from the government beyond the maintenance of order is already a slave in the bottom of its heart. It is a slave to its prosperity, and the road is free for the man to tie the fetters." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 540)

[20] ". . . In democratic societies . . . there is an innumerable crowd who are much alike, who, though not exactly rich nor yet quite poor, have enough property to want order and not enough to excite envy.

Such men are the natural enemies of violent commotion . . .

I am not suggesting that they are themselves satisfied with their actual position or that they would feel any natural abhorrence toward a revolution if they could share the plunder without suffering the calamities; on the contrary, their eagerness to get rich is unparalleled, but their trouble is to know whom to despoil. The same social condition which prompts their longings restrains them within necessary limits. It gives men both greater freedom to change and less interest in doing so.

Not only do men in democracies feel no natural inclination for revolutions, but they are afraid of them.

Any revolution is more or less a threat to property. Most inhabitants of a democracy have property. And not only have they got property, but they live in conditions in which men attach most value to property. . . .

Hence the majority of citizens in a democracy do not see clearly what they could gain by a revolution, but they constantly see a thousand ways in which they could lose by one. . . .

The final result of revolution might serve the interests of industry and trade, but its first effect will almost always be the ruin of industrialists and traders, because it must always immediately change general habits of consumption and temporarily upset the balance between supply and demand." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 636–637)

Here we see the ever latent class struggle, the necessary conflict between rulers and ruled. However, de Tocqueville has a very economistic explanation of this and sees it primarily at the level of circulation and consumption.

[21] "Among democratic peoples where there is no hereditary wealth, every man works for his living, or has worked, or comes from parents who have worked. Everything therefore prompts the assumption that to work is the necessary, natural, and honest condition of all men.

work is of two essentially different kinds, corresponding to those who give and to those who receive orders.[22] At the same time, we have the appearance of social mobility. Everyone believes that they can reach the top, although this usually quickly proves to be an illusion.[23]

A second factor promoting the appearance of equality arises from the fact that capitalism, with its constant technical revolutions, has the capacity to produce a higher standard of living for all than has previously been attained under any other mode of production. Everyone begins to appear to be middle class, at least from the point of view of consumption.[24] However, even at the level of consumption, this equality is strictly an ideology which hides important class differences.[25]

Another important element of capitalist ideology is the appearance and growth of individualism. This concept originates with democracy and the accompanying appearance of equality.[26] Individualism is based on the false conception that one

---

Not only is no dishonor associated with work, but among such peoples it is regarded as positively honorable; the prejudice is for, not against, it." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 550)

[22]"American servants do not feel degraded because they work, for everyone around them is working. There is nothing humiliating about the idea of receiving a salary, for the President of the United States works for a salary. He is paid for giving orders, as they are for obeying them." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 551)

[23]"Add to this taste for prosperity a social state in which neither law nor custom holds anyone in one place, and that is a great further stimulus to this restlessness of temper. ...

When all prerogatives of birth and fortune are abolished, when all professions are open to all and a man's own energies may bring him to the top of any of them, an ambitious man may think it easy to launch on a great career and feel that he is called to no common destiny. But that is a delusion which experience quickly corrects. The same equality which allows each man to entertain vast hopes makes each man by himself weak. His power is limited on every side, though his longings may wander where they will.

Not only are men powerless by themselves, but at every step they find immense obstacles which they had not at first noticed.

They have abolished the troublesome privileges of some of their fellows, but they come up against the competition of all. The barrier has changed shape rather than place." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 537)

[24]"...The passion for physical comfort is essentially a middle-class affair; it grows and spreads with that class and becomes preponderant with it." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 531)

"Where physical pleasures are concerned, the opulent citizens of a democracy do not display tastes very different from those of the people, either because, themselves originating from the people, they really do share them or because they think they ought to accept their standards." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 533)

[25]"Take a look at this opulent citizen. Might one not think him a medieval Jew afraid that his wealth should be suspected? His clothes are simple and his manners modest; within the four walls of this house luxury is worshiped; he allows only a few chosen guests, whom he insolently calls his equals, into that sanctuary. There is no nobleman in Europe more exclusive in his pleasures or more jealous of the slightest advantages assured by a privileged position. But he goes out to work in a dusty den in the middle of a busy town, where everyone is free to accost him." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 179)

[26]"'Individualism' is a word recently coined to express a new idea. Our fathers only knew about egoism. ...

Individualism is a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends; with this little society formed to his taste, he gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 506)

is completely independent of all one's fellows. In other words, social relationships have become invisible.[27] Although this ideology is essential to capitalism, it must be moderated, especially by the influence of the state; individuals cannot be completely atomised or the society would collapse.[28] Since the economic is dominant in capitalist society, economic means, primarily public works and the welfare state, must often be used to break the isolation. However, once again, it is sufficient that only minor affairs be involved.[29]

The role of social cohesion can also be seen at another, more theoretical level. Individuals, even under capitalism, cannot be completely separated from each other. A system of common beliefs must exist in any society. As in any class society, this results in a system of domination, of authority,[30] since people accept these beliefs without question. Under capitalism, this intellectual authority appears to come from the 'public', the 'majority', 'public opinion'.[31] Since the

[27] "As social equality spreads there are more and more people who, though neither rich nor powerful enough to have much hold over others, have gained or kept enough wealth and enough understanding to look after their own needs. Such folk owe no man anything and hardly expect anything from anybody. They form the habit of thinking of themselves in isolation and imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands.

Thus, not only does democracy make men forget their ancestors, but also clouds their view of their descendants and isolates them from their contemporaries. Each man is forever thrown back on himself alone. . . " (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 508)

This bears some similarity to Marx's theory of commodity fetishism, although it remains at the descriptive level while Marx provides a theoretical explanation.

[28] "Citizens who are bound to take part in public affairs must turn from the private interests and occasionally take a look at something other than themselves.

As soon as common affairs are treated in common, each man notices that he is not as independent of his fellows as he used to suppose and that to get their help he must often offer his aid to them." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 510)

[29] "It is difficult to force a man out of himself and get him to take an interest in the affairs of the whole state, for he has little understanding of the way in which the fate of the state can influence his own lot. But if it is a question of taking a road past his property, he sees at once that this small public matter has a bearing on his greatest private interests, and there is no need to point out to him the close connection between his private profit and the general interest.

Thus, far more may be done by entrusting citizens with the management of minor affairs than by handing over control of great matters, toward interesting them in the public welfare and convincing them that they constantly stand in need of one another in order to provide for it." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 511)

[30] "However, it is easy to see that no society could prosper without such beliefs, or rather that there are no societies which manage in that way. For without ideas in common, no common action would be possible, and without common action, men might exist, but there could be no body social. So for society to exist and, even more, for society to prosper, it is essential that all the minds of the citizens should always be rallied and held together by some leading ideas; and that could never happen unless each of them sometimes came to draw his opinions from the same source and was ready to accept some beliefs ready made.

Moreover, considering each man for himself, dogmatic beliefs seem no less indispensible for living alone than for acting in common with his fellows.

If man had to prove for himself all the truths of which he makes use every day, he would never come to an end of it. . . .

. . . Therefore, we need not inquire about the existence of intellectual authority in democratic ages, but only where it resides and what its limits are." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 433–434)

[31] ". . . In times of equality men, being so like each other, have no confidence in others, but this same likeness leads them to place almost unlimited confidence in the judgment of the public. . . .

people have no control over this public opinion,[32] a new invidious form of totalitarian thought control results.[33] This totalitarian control of the mind, under the appearance of freedom, is far greater than in any feudal society with the most absolutist of monarchs.[34] A certain limited area exists within which freedom of thought can occur, but no one can question its boundaries or attempt to go beyond them.[35] Such are the ways by which individuals are made into willing "wage slaves". Many of the institutions of the old feudal society must be substantially altered to ensure the propagation of these new means of domination.

The final aim of bourgeois hegemony is to make capitalism appear natural and eternal, the only possible form of society.[36]

The citizen of a democracy comparing himself with the others feels proud of his equality with each. But when he compares himself with all his fellows and measures himself against this vast entity, he is overwhelmed by a sense of his insignificance and weakness. ...

So in democracies public opinion ... uses no persuasion to forward its beliefs, but by some mighty pressure of the mind of all upon the intelligence of each it imposes its ideas and makes them penetrate men's very souls.

The majority in the United States takes over the business of supplying the individual with a quantity of ready-made opinions and so relieves him of the necessity of forming his own." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 435)

[32] See the remarks on the jury and on the vote provided above.

[33] "... I see clearly two tendencies in equality; one turns each man's attention to new thoughts, while the other would induce him freely to give up thinking at all. I can see how, abetted by certain laws, democracy might extinguish that freedom of mind which a democratic social condition favors. Thus it might happen that, having broken down all the bonds which classes or men formerly imposed on it, the human spirit might bind itself in tight fetters to the general will of the greatest number." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 436)

See also Marcuse (1964, *passim*).

[34] "Thought is an invisible power and one almost impossible to lay hands on, which makes sport of all tyrannies. ... while the majority is in doubt, one talks; but when it has irrevocably pronounced, everyone is silent, and friends and enemies alike seem to make for its bandwagon. The reason is simple: no monarch is so absolute that he can hold all the forces of society in his hands, and overcome all resistance, as a majority invested with the right to make the laws, and to execute them, can do.

Moreover, a king's power is physical only, controlling actions but not influencing desires, whereas the majority is invested with both physical and moral authority, which acts as much upon the will as upon behavior and at the same moment prevents both the act and the desire to do it.

I know no country in which, speaking generally, there is less independence of mind and true freedom of discussion than in America." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 254–255)

[35] "In America the majority has enclosed thought within a formidable fence. A writer is free inside that area, but woe to the man who goes beyond it. ... he must face all kinds of unpleasantness and everyday persecution. A career in politics is closed to him, for he has offended the only power that holds the keys. He is denied everything, including renown. Before he goes into print, he believes he has supporters; but he feels that he has them no more once he stands revealed to all, for those who condemn him express their views loudly, while those who think as he does, but without his courage, retreat into silence as if ashamed of having told the truth." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 255)

[36] "The free institutions of the United States and the political rights enjoyed there provide a thousand continual reminders to every citizen that he lives in society. At every moment they bring his mind back to this idea, that it is the duty as well as the interest of men to be useful to their fellows. ... At first it is of necessity that men attend to the public interest, afterward by choice. What had been calculation becomes instinct." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 512)

6.4 The family

With the changing ideology in the transition to capitalism comes a drastic change in the structure of the family.[37] This is necessary not only for economic reasons, of mobility of the wage labour force and so on, but also to instil the new ideology from an early age. The father's authoritarian control is reduced; under feudalism, he had acted as the intermediary between the 'state' and the rest of the family.[38] In an aristocratic society, the oldest son inherits the family property and thus has power over his brothers. Under capitalism, brothers and sisters are more equal in this respect and family unity depends more on ideology than on law and force.[39]

Fundamental social values are instilled by the family in the new generation. Perhaps the most important are a sense of respectability, a positive image of work and discipline.[40] Working class respectability depends on having a job, staying out of poverty, and avoiding crime.[41] But work not only guarantees respectability; it is a material basis of economic existence, and its reward is leisure, pleasure, and security. Discipline is connected with self-sacrifice under adverse conditions, necessary to continue the collectivism of working class life.

Both economic and ideological pressures come to bear on the women as well. These have specific aspects in Protestant ethics and the dominance of masculine wage labour which alter the forms of the oppression; everything else must be sacrifised to the economics of earning a living.[42] Because of these pressures, girls must be socialised from an early age to accept this treatment. Once again, this takes primarily ideological forms framed in an appearance of free choice.[43]

---

[37] "In America the family, if one takes the word in its Roman and aristocratic sense, no longer exists. One only finds scattered traces thereof in the first years following the birth of children." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 585)

[38] "In democracies, where the long arm of government reaches each particular man among the crowd separately to bend him to obedience to the common laws, there is no need for such an intermediary. In the eyes of the law the father is only a citizen older and richer than his sons." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 586)

"When the state of society turns to democracy and men adopt the general principle that it is good and right to judge everything for oneself, taking former beliefs as providing information but not rules, paternal opinions come to have less power over the sons, just as his legal power is less too." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 587)

[39] "Democracy too draws brothers together, but in a different way.

Under democratic laws the children are perfectly equal, and consequently independent; nothing forcibly brings them together, but also nothing drives them apart. Having a common origin, brought up under the same roof, and treated with the same care, as no peculiar privilege distinguishes or divides them. . . " (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 588)

[40] See Hall et al (1978, pp. 140–145).

[41] See Hoggart (1957, pp. 58–60).

[42] "The Americans are both a Puritan and a trading nation. Therefore both their religious beliefs and their industrial habits lead them to demand much abnegation on the woman's part and a continual sacrifice of pleasure for the sake of business, which is seldom expected in Europe. Thus in America inexorable public opinion carefully keeps woman within the little sphere of domestic interests and duties and will not let her go beyond them." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 592)

[43] "When she is born into the world the young American girl finds these ideas firmly established; she sees the rules that spring therefrom; she is soon convinced that she cannot for a moment depart

The ideology of equality is especially dominant since marriage is no longer so explicitly carried through for reasons of lineage and fortune.[44] All these factors combine to increase the oppression of women. We have in marriage one more contract, guaranteed by law and the state, rather than by religion, although the latter still plays a major ideological role.[45] However, in a certain sense, women as a social group are now more equal among themselves since class differences among them are reduced:[46] the place of women of all classes is in the home. But this is evidently not a step toward greater equality between the sexes!

6.5 Education and religion

In a democracy, a whole series of public institutions are essential for ensuring bourgeois hegemony: education, religion, newspapers, science, literature, and the arts.

All education becomes directly political, an indoctrination to accept the existing system, the existing way of life.[47] The most striking change is that the school

---

from the usages accepted by her contemporaries without immediately putting in danger her peace of mind, her reputation, and her very social existence, and she finds the strength required for such an act of submission in the firmness of her understanding and the manly habits inculcated by her education. . . .

Moreover, the American woman nevers gets caught in the bonds of matrimony as in a snare set to catch her simplicity and ignorance. She knows beforehand what will be expected of her, and she herself has freely accepted the yoke. She suffers her new state bravely, for she has chosen it." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 592–593)

[44]"...No girl then feels that she cannot become the wife of the man who likes her best, and that makes irregular morals before marriage very difficult. For however credulous passion may make us, there is hardly a way of persuading a girl that you love her when you are perfectly free to marry her but will not do so." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 595)

[45]"In a country where the woman can always choose freely and where education has taught her to choose well, public opinion is inexorable against her faults.

The severity of the Americans is in part due to this cause. They regard marriage as a contract which is often burdensome but every condition of which the parties are strictly bound to fulfil, because they knew them all beforehand and were at liberty not to bind themselves to anything at all." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 596)

[46]"...The Americans have applied to the sexes the great principle of political economy which now dominates industry. They have carefully separated the functions of man and woman so that the great work of society may be better performed.

In America, more than anywhere else in the world, care has been taken constantly to trace clearly distinct spheres of action for the two sexes, and both are required to keep in step, but along different paths that are never the same. You will never find American women in charge of the external relations of the family, managing a business, or interfering in politics; but they are also never obliged to undertake rough laborer's work or any task requiring hard physical exertion. No family is so poor that it makes an exeption to this rule.

If the American woman is never allowed to leave the quiet sphere of domestic duties, she is also never forced to do so." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 601)

[47]"In the United States, education as a whole is directed toward political life; in Europe its main object is preparation for private life, as the citizens' participation in public affairs is too rare an event to be provided for in advance. . . .

In Europe we often carry the ideas and habits of private life over into public life...

But the Americans almost always carry the habits of public life over into their private lives. With them one finds the idea of a jury in children's games, and parliamentary formalities even in the orga-

becomes compulsory and that much of the parents' power over their children is transferred to the state.[48] Parents judged incapable of proper care of their children can lose them. Socialisation of children is increasingly taken over by groups, the school, the media, and so on, outside the family.

In spite of appearances, education remains a class education.[49] This is connected with the overall dominance of the economic in capitalist society.[50] Thus, the demands of capitalism mean that education be directed toward more 'useful' learning than under feudalism.[51] There, education meant access to state employment; under capitalism, it can instill the initiative for, or at least the belief in the possibility of, becoming an entrepreneur.[52]

Although it is no longer a dominant component of hegemony, as it was under feudalism, religion continues to play an important ideological role under capitalism.[53] However, previously one 'true' religion was professed in a given state; such is no longer the case. The important thing is that religion should be perva-

---

nization of a banquet." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 304–305)

[48] "But it is the provisions for public education which, from the very first, throw into clearest relief the originality of American civilization. . . .

. . . The municipal officials are bound to see that parents send their children to the schools, and can impose fines on those who refuse to do so; if the parents remain recalcitrant, society can take over the charge of the children from the family, depriving the parents of those natural rights which they abused." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 45)

[49] "Therefore the greater or less ease with which people can live without working sets inevitable limits to their intellectual progress. That limit is further off in some countries and closer in others, but for it not to exist at all, the people would have to have no more trouble with the material cares of life and so would no longer be "the people". It is therefore as difficult to conceive a society in which all men are very enlightened as one in which all are rich. . . " (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 197)

See the vaste recent literature, especially Baudelot and Establet (1971).

[50] "Primary education is within reach of all; higher education is hardly available to anybody. . . .

Almost all Americans enjoy easy circumstances and can so easily acquire the basic elements of human knowledge.

There are few rich men in America; hence almost all Americans have to take up some profession. Now, every profession requires an apprenticeship. Therefore the Americans can devote only the first years of life to general education. . . science is studied in the same spirit as one takes up a trade; and only matters of immediate and recognized practical application receive attention." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 55)

[51] "It is clear that in democracies individual interests and those of the state demand that education for most people should be scientific, commercial, and industrial rather than literary." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 476–477)

[52] "In the United States, when a citizen has some education and some resources he tries to enrich himself either by trade and industry or by buying a field covered in forest and turning into a pioneer. All he asks from the state is not to get in his way while he is working and to see that he can enjoy the fruit of his labor.

But in most of the countries of Europe, as soon as a man begins to feel his strength and extend his ambitions, the first idea that occurs to him is to get an official appointment. . . ." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 632–633)

[53] "Since the Americans have accepted the main dogmas of the Christian religion without examination, they are bound to receive in like manner a great number of moral truths derived therefrom and attached thereto. This puts strict limits on the field of action left open to individual analysis and keeps out of this field many of the most important subjects about which men have opinions." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 432)

sive, not that everyone should have the same one.[54] The relationship between the state and religion as two institutions is, thus, altered under democracy; the two must act much more independently of each other to be effective. Political power changes hands while religion must remain more stable.[55]

The dogmatism of religion must be reassessed; although the basic principles remain untouched, religion must be able to adapt itself to changing times.[56] As with all aspects of capitalist society, this involves accomodation to the predominantly economic concerns.[57] Thus, religion becomes much more grounded in everyday life and is directly regulated by economic interest. This can be seen both in the preachers' actions and in the people's attitude to religion.[58] Sermons often contain overtly political positions, while people's reasons for attending church may be purely professional or economic.

---

[54] "There is an innumerable multitude of sects in the United States. . . . Though it is very important for man as an individual that his religion should be true, that is not the case for society. Society has nothing to fear or hope from another life; what is most important for it is not that all citizens should profess the true religion but that they should profess religion." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 290)

[55] "When a nation adopts a democratic social state and communities show republican inclinations, it becomes increasingly dangerous for religion to ally itself with authority. For the time is coming when power will pass from hand to hand, political theories follow one another, and men, laws, and even constitutions vanish or alter daily, and that not for a limited time but continually. . . .

The American clergy were the first to perceive this truth and to act in conformity with it. They saw that they would have to give up religious influence if they wanted to acquire political power, and they preferred to lose the support of authority rather than to share its vicissitudes." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 298–299)

[56] "... one must make a very careful distinction between the chief opinions which form a belief, and are what the theologians call articles of faith, and those secondary notions which are connected with it. Religions are bound to hold firmly to the first, whatever may be the spirit of the time. But they should be very careful not to bind themselves like that to the secondary ones at a time when everything is in flux..." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 447)

"... The more people are assimilated to one another and brought to an equality, the more important it becomes that religions, while remaining studiously aloof from the daily turmoil of worldly business, should not needlessly run counter to prevailing ideas or the permanent interests of the mass of the people." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 448)

[57] "... American priests do not try to divert and concentrate all of people's attention on the future life; they freely allow them to give some of their hearts' care to the needs of the present, apparently considering the good things of this world as objects of some, albeit secondary, importance. While they themselves do no productive work, they take an interest in the progress of industry and praise its achievements...

Thus, by respecting all democratic instincts which are not against it and making use of many favorable ones, religion succeeds in struggling successfully with that spirit of individual independence which is its most dangerous enemy." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 449)

[58] "Hence I do not think that interest is the only driving force behind men of religion. But I do think that interest is the chief means used by religions themselves to guide men, and I have no doubt that that is how they work on the crowd and become popular." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 529)

"Not only do the Americans practice their religion out of self-interest, but they often even place in this world the interest which they have in practicing it. . . .

But preachers in America are continually coming down to earth. Indeed they find it difficult to take their eyes off it. The better to touch their hearers, they are forever pointing out how religious beliefs favor freedom and public order, and it is often difficult to be sure when listening to them whether the main object of religion is to procure eternal felicity in the next world or prosperity in this." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 530)

6.6 Mass media and the arts

Newspapers[59] and the other mass media are an essential element of hegemony under capitalism; their role is ideological as much as political.[60] They help to create the overall environment of ideas as well as playing a crucial role in influencing political choices. The matters treated in the newspapers change drastically with the development of capitalism, as the place of political analysis is reduced and advertisements fill more and more pages.[61] When the press is free, many different opinions are expressed in turn, each in a shallow way. People grasp one one day, another the next.[62] Recollection of important events is lost in the ever-changing flux.

The media play an essential role as mediator between those with the power to make decisions, the dominant classes, and the 'masses' who do not. The practical pressures of rapid news reporting and of impartiality and objectivity yield a situation where the former have privileged access to the media to have their views aired. They do not create the news, even by conscious selection, but rather reproduce the thought framework of those with such privileged access.[63]

In a democracy, it is important that the press appear not to be overly centralised, either in one locality such as one metropolis, or in a few hands.[64] As with local government and administration, small local newspapers are important for integration of the people; at the same time, this impedes the subversive use of the press.[65] Although all media in a country may be owned by a very few large

---

[59] Newspapers were the only important mass medium in de Tocqueville's time.

[60] "It is not political opinions only, but all the views of men which are influenced by freedom of the press. It modifies mores as well as laws." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 180)

[61] "... In France little space is given over to trade advertisements, and even news items are few; the vital part of the newspaper is that devoted to political discussion. In America three quarters of the bulky newspaper put before you will be full of advertisements and the rest will usually contain political news or just anecdotes..." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 183–184)

[62] "... All social theories having been contested and opposed in turn, people who fixed on one of them stick to it, not because they are sure it is good but because they are not sure that there is a better one.

... When opinions are in doubt, men end by clinging only to instincts and material interests, which by nature are more visible, tangible, and permanent than opinions." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 187)

See also Chomsky (1981) and Chomsky and Herman (1979).

[63] See Hall et al (1978, pp. 58–66).

[64] "... The most enlightened Americans attribute the slightness of the power of the press to this incredible dispersion; it is an axiom of political science there that the only way to neutralize the effect of newspapers is to multiply their numbers." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 184)

[65] "There is hardly a hamlet in America without its newspaper. ... starting a paper being easy, anybody may take to it; but competition prevents any newspaper from hoping for large profits, and that discourages anybody with great business ability from bothering with such undertakings. ... the hallmark of the American journalist is a direct and coarse attack, without any subtleties, on the passions of his readers; he disregards principles to seize on people, following them into their private lives and laying bare their weaknesses and their vices.

... this license of the press, in its political effect, does indirectly contribute to the maintenance of public tranquility. Because of it, men who already hold a high position in the regard of their fellow citizens do not dare to write in the papers and thus lose the most formidable weapon... the personal views expressed by journalists carry, so to speak, no weight with the readers. What they look for in a

groups, local newspapers, programmes, etc. are produced. National media, especially the newspapers, draw their audience primarily from the dominant classes.

Under capitalism, science and the arts are relatively neglected. Everyone concentrates on the material aspects of life.[66] The society is made up of doers rather than of thinkers. Action, not contemplation, predominates.[67] The chief characteristic of science is a distrust of theory and a search for concrete applications. Here we find the basis of empiricism.[68] To some extent, this tendency to neglect theory is offset by the enormous number of people involved in scientific undertakings.[69]

The mass industrial production under capitalism has a direct influence on the arts. Now the main object is to make more, more cheaply, either by increasing efficiency or by lowering quality. This objective is directly transferred to artistic production.[70]

Literature is also directly influenced by the new mode of production.[71] Com-

---

newspaper is knowledge of facts, and it is only by altering or distorting those facts that the journalist can gain some influence for his views." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 185–186)

[66] "It must be admitted that few of the civilized nations of our time have made less progress than the United States in the higher sciences or had so few great artists, distinguished poets, or celebrated writers. ...

...In America everyone finds opportunities unknown anywhere else for making or increasing his fortune. A breathless cupidity perpetually distracts the mind of man from the pleasures of the imagination and the labors of the intellect and urges it on to nothing but the pursuit of wealth. Industrial and commercial classes are to be found in all other countries as well as in the United States, but only there is the whole community simultaneously engaged in productive industry and in trade." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 454–455)

[67] "...New laws are continually being made in the United States, but there have not yet been great writers there inquiring into the general principles of the laws. ...

The same is true for the mechanical arts.

European inventions are sagaciously applied in America, improved and wonderfully adapted to the country's needs. It is an industrial society but does not cultivate the science of industry." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 301–302)

[68] "Those in democracies who study sciences are always afraid of getting lost in utopias. They mistrust systems and like to stick very close to the facts and study them for themselves. As they have little deference for the mere name of any fellow being, they are never inclined to take a master's word on trust, but ever tend to look for the weak side of his argument. Scientific traditions have little hold over them, and they never spend much time studying the subtleties of any school and will not accept big words as sterling coin." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 459)

"In America the purely practical side of science is cultivated admirably, and trouble is taken about the theoretical side immediately necessary to application. ...But hardly anyone in the United States devotes himself to the essentially theoretical and abstract side of human knowledge. ...

The higher sciences or the higher parts of all sciences require meditation above everything else. But nothing is less conducive to meditation than the setup of democratic society." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 460)

[69] "...Democracy may not lead men to study science for its own sake, but it does immensely increase the number of those who do study it. Nor is it credible that among so great a multitude a speculative genius should not from time to time arise..." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 463)

[70] "Aristocracies produce a few great pictures, democracies a multitude of little ones. The one makes statues of bronze, the other of plaster." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 468)

See Benjamin (1968).

[71] "I should say more than I mean if I asserted that a nation's literature is always subordinated to its social state and political constitution. I know that, apart from these, there are other causes that give literature certain characteristics, but those do seem the most important to me.

mercial production directly penetrates into it.[72] But the individual's attitude to literature also changes under democracy. Books must be easily readable and quickly understood; they must be exciting to counteract the monotony of everyday life[73] — hence the sex and violence.

Most important, history takes on a new and central role in ideological hegemony. We find a change from the 'great men' history to a 'structural' history.[74] The role of the individual in influencing history disappears, as does the role of the people as a whole.[75] The whole function of history has changed, made possible by the increased literacy among the people. The old history taught how to govern; the new structural history teaches how to obey.[76]

There are always numerous connections between the social and political condition of a people and the inspiration of its writers. He who knows the one is never completely ignorant of the other." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 474)

[72] "Democratic literature is always crawling with writers who look upon letters simply as a trade, and for each of the few great writers you can count thousands of idea-mongers." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 475)

[73] "... Such men will never have a deep enough understanding of literature to appreciate its refinements. Fine nuances will pass them by. With but short time to spend on books, they want it all to be profitable. They like books which are easily got and quickly read, requiring no learned researches to understand them. ... Accustomed to the monotonous struggle of practical life, what they want is vivid, lively emotions, sudden revelations, brilliant truths, or errors able to rouse them up and plunge them, almost by violence, into the middle of the subject." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 473–474)

[74] "Historians who write in aristocratic ages generally attribute everything that happens to the will and character of particular men, and they will unhesitatingly suppose slight accidents to be the cause of the greatest revolutions. With great sagacity they trace the smallest causes and often leave the greatest unnoticed.

Historians who live in democratic ages show contrary tendencies.

Most of them attribute hardly any influence over the destinies of mankind to individuals, or over the fate of a people to the citizens. But they make great general causes responsible for the smallest particular events. There is a reason for these opposite tendencies.

Historians of aristocratic ages, looking at the world's theater, first see a few leading actors in control of the whole play. These great personages who hold the front of the stage strike their attention...

Seeing some men do great things gives them an exaggerated idea of the influence one man can exercise and leads them to suppose that one must always explain the actions of the crowd by tracing the impulse back to one man's act.

But when all the citizens are independent of one another and each is weak, no one can be found exercising very great or, more particularly, very lasting influence over the masses. At first sight individuals appear to have no influence at all over them, and society would seem to progress on its own by the free and spontaneous action of all its members." (de Tocqueville, 1966, pp. 493–494)

[75] "Once the trace of the influence of individuals on the nations has been lost, we are often left with the sight of the world moving without anyone moving it. As it becomes extremely difficult to discern and analyze the reasons which, acting separately on the will of each citizen, concur in the end to produce movement in the whole mass, one is tempted to believe that this movement is not voluntary and that societies unconsciously obey some superior dominating force." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 495)

"Thus historians who live in democratic times do not only refuse to admit that some citizens may influence the destiny of a people, but also take away from the peoples themselves the faculty of modifying their own lot..." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 496)

[76] "In reading the historians of aristocratic ages, those of antiquity in particular, it would seem that in order to be master of his fate and to govern his fellows a man need only be master of himself. Perusing the histories written nowadays, one would suppose that man had no power, neither over himself nor over his surrounding. Classical historians taught how to command; those of our own time teach next to nothing but how to obey." (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 496)

6.7 Appendix

To seize the import of de Tocqueville's work, a certain translation of terms is necessary. De Tocqueville uses the term, social state or social condition (*l'ètat social*) in a way which can be interpreted as the economic base. Corresponding to ideology, he uses mores or customs (*les moeurs*). His terms, law and politics, can be taken as they stand, while his use of democracy, at times, has its usual restricted sense but most often can be taken to refer to the capitalist mode of production or to capitalist society in general.

De Tocqueville continually emphasizes his order of causality among these concepts. It is the same as that found in historical materialism:

> More than once in the course of this work I have tried to point out the prodigious infuence which, I believe, the social state exercises over laws and mores. (p. 328)
>
> One must go to America to understand the power of material prosperity over political behavior, and even over opinions too, though those should be subject to reason alone. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 285; see also p. 474).

In addition, de Tocqueville sees a very dialectical relationship among these elements:

> The social state is commonly the result of circumstances, sometimes of laws, but most often of a combination of the two. But once it has come into being, it may itself be considered as the prime cause of most of the laws, customs, and ideas which control the nation's behavior; it modifies even those things which it does not cause.
>
> Therefore one must first study their social state if one wants to understand a people's laws and mores. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 50)

In the same way that Marx emphasises the structural aspects of society through his capitalist as the "personification of capital", so de Tocqueville argues against the 'great men' theory of history.

> Sometimes, after a thousand efforts, a lawgiver succeeds in exercising some indirect influence over the destiny of nations, and then his genius is praised, whereas it is often the geographical position of the country, over which he has no influence, a social state which has been created without his aid, mores and ideas whose origin he does not know, and a point of departure of which he is unaware that give to society impetuses of irresistible force against which he struggles in vain and which sweep him, too, along. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 163)

As will be seen throughout what follows, as with Marx, he is constructing a dialectical relationship between social structure and conscious class struggle. For example, he sees the conflict of power between the people and the dominant class,

---

We see here an important critique of the Althusserian subjectless history. Gramsci, himself, provides a critique of another aspect of Althusserian marxism, the isolation of theory from practice as 'theoretical practice', that justification for a marxist ivory tower which is currently so important in the attempt to coopt historical materialism to the use of the bourgeoisie:

"One may term 'Byzantinism' or 'scholasticism' the regressive tendency to treat so-called theoretical questions as if they had a value in themselves, independently of any specific practice." (Prison Notebooks, p. 200)

represented by the state, pervading both feudal and capitalist societies.

The king of France is absolute master in the sphere of executive power.

The President of the United States is answerable for his acts. French law states that the person of the king is inviolable.

Nevertheless, over the one as over the other, there is a directing power, that of public opinion. That power is less defined in France than in the United States, less recognized and less formulated in the laws, but it does in fact exist there. In America, it works through elections and decrees, in France by revolutions. So France and the United States, in spite of their different constitutions, have this point in common, that, in practice, public opinion is the dominant power. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 124)

However, de Tocqueville has no concept of appropriation of surplus and his elaboration of social class is very crude.

Societies, like other organized bodies, are shaped according to certain fixed rules from which they cannot escape. They are made up of certain elements which are found at all times and in all places.

It will always be easy theoretically to divide each people up into three classes.

The first class is composed of the rich. The second of those who, without being rich, are in all respects comfortably off. The third class includes those with little or no property, who live primarily from the work which the other two classes provide for them. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 209

Although he is primarily concerned with the USA as a society of petty commodity producers, he is aware of the existence of a propertyless working class.

Now, it is certain that up to the present in all countries of the world those without property or those whose property was so modest that they could not live comfortably without working have always formed the largest number. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 210)

De Tocqueville is primarily concerned with analysis of the superstructure and thus does not study in detail the economic base, the social state of the society. His position on the latter is clearest when he compares the slave South with the free North.

The free laborer is paid, but he works faster than the slave, and the speed with which work is done is a matter of great economic importance. The white man sells his assistance, but it is bought only when needed; the black can claim no money for his services, but he must be fed the whole time... (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 346)

... one of the most immediate effects of the equal sharing of inheritances has been to create a class of free laborers. As soon as the free worker begins to compete with the slave, the latter's inferiority begins to be felt, and the very basis of slavery, namely, the master's interest, is attacked. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 349)

De Tocqueville's work centres on how democracy, the capitalist mode of production, is maintained. Here he sees ideology, and law, as the prime determinants, and relegates ecological determinism to a subordinate role. His argument involves a comparison of the various republics of North and South America.

It is their mores, then, that make the Americans of the United States, alone among Americans, capable of maintaining the rule of democracy; and it is mores again that make the

various Anglo-American democracies more or less orderly and prosperous.

Europeans exaggerate the influence of geography on the lasting powers of democratic institutions. Too much importance is attached to laws and too little to mores. Unquestionably those are the three great influences which regulate and direct American democracy, but if they are to be classed in order, I should say that the contribution of physical causes is less than that of the laws, and that of laws less than mores. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 308)

He clearly distinguishes between the ideological and repressive state apparatuses and emphasises the overall vital importance of the first.

Governments in general have only two methods of overcoming the resistance of the governed: their own physical force and the moral force supplied to them by the decisions of the courts.

A government for whom war was the only means of enforcing obedience to its laws would be on the verge of ruin. . . .

The great object of justice is to substitute the idea of right for that of violence, to put intermediaries between the government and the use of its physical force. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 139)

Force is never more than a passing element in success; the idea of right follows immediately after it. Any government which could only reach its enemies on a battlefield would soon be destroyed. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 272)

He recognizes the dependence of state power on the maintenance of some form of legitimation among the subordinate classes. The state is a class state.

No one has yet found a political structure that equally favors the growth and prosperity of all the classes composing society. These classes have formed something like distinct nations within the same nation, and experience has proved it almost as dangerous completely to entrust the fate of all to one of these as it is to make one nation arbiter of the destiny of another. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 233)

It is not exercise of power or habits of obedience which deprave men, but the exercise of a power which they consider illegitimate and obedience to a power which they think usurped and oppressive. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 14)

Various fractions of the dominant classes struggle to influence and control state policy.

. . . The parties that threaten the Union rely not on principles but on material interests. In so vast a land these interests make the provinces into rival nations rather than parties. Thus recently we have seen the North contending for tariffs and the South taking up arms for free trade, simply because the North is industrial and the South agricultural, so that restrictions would profit the former and harm the latter. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 177)

However, the state is relatively autonomous and is not directly run by the dominant classes.

Nowadays one may say that the wealthy classes in the United States are almost entirely outside politics and that wealth, so far from being an advantage there, is a real cause of disfavor and an obstacle to gaining power. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 179)

But we in Europe have made some strange discoveries.

According to some among us, a republic does not mean the reign of the majority, as

conceived hitherto, but the rule of its strenuous partisans. In governments of this type it is not the people who control affairs, but those who know what is best for the people: a happy distinction which allows rulers to act in the nation's name without consulting it and to claim its gratitude while trampling it under foot. (de Tocqueville, 1966, p. 396)

Thus, there is a body of individuals located within the state who are not directly members of the dominant class, but who are responsible for maintaining control over the people.

7
Resistance

7.1 The struggle

Class society is society where one cannot live without daily facing the relations of the antagonism of opposing classes. Such struggle is not always and may even not often be conscious. But each act must take it into account. The dominant class side of the struggle is well organised and often institutionalised. For as long as capitalism continues to exist, it is more or less successful. The dominant ideology is the ideology of the dominant class.[1]

For these reasons, subordinate class uses of ideology are much more difficult to discern. Which ideas emanating from the working classes serve to deflect the dominant classes from their hegemony over society? Are they not all simply coopted and inverted, serving to integrate these classes further within capitalist society?[2] Capitalism can put a price on virtually anything and sell it at a profit!

However, therein lies one contradiction which permits penetration of potentially subversive ideas throughout society, including into the dominant classes.[3] An example may clarify this. During the student movements of the 1960s, one costly problem of university administrations was to clean the graffitti off the walls of the buildings. And yet these same administrations often ran campus shops which sold spray paint!

If a product promises a wide potential market, the most subversive message may be transmitted. The music of The Clash is one excellent example. And the largest market for mass cultural products is to be found in the working classes. On the other hand, equally subversive but much more intellectual products, such as abstract political analyses, are liable to censure, ostensibly through lack of market.[4] Access to a large market puts pressure on the producer to conform, but the message is not necessarily lost or completely coopted.

The most acute and powerful confrontations necessarily occur in the production process where the antagonism is sharpest. This I have already discussed at some length. We have also seen how the family provides a nucleus of working class resistance. What is now required is study of the broader aspects of this

[1] See Marx and Engels (1976, p. 59).

[2] This is the well-known thesis of Marcuse (1964).

[3] See Clarke (1975) and Murdock and McCron (1975).

[4] See, for example, the publishing history of Chomsky and Herman (1979, pp. xiv–xvii).

working class struggle, that which some call working class culture.[5]

Domestic labour is labour outside direct capitalist control. It provides one area of working class autonomy. But it is only the nucleus of a larger area of autonomy and resistance, that commonly known as leisure. As with all social relations, this one is contradictory, especially in its oppressive nature with regard to women. However, leisure does provide an area of relative freedom,[6] since work discipline cannot be maintained here and since some part of salary can be spent in a relatively arbitrary way. In addition, many aspects of leisure are provided by the working classes themselves: participation in sports, music, visiting, ...

7.2 Working class culture

A culture is a symbolic system through which a social class experiences its life activities, and thereby expresses them. Since social classes are defined by their social practices, their experiences necessarily differ, and culture must be class specific. However, such experience also can vary within a social class, for example, according to sex, age, or nationality, and can give rise to distinctive subcultures.[7]

Two basic foundations of working class culture are the class solidarity arising out of participation in the socialised production process and an extended family network arising from the importance of domestic labour. Both, however, are contradictory. Solidarity is continually threatened by the competitive sale of labour power. Family networks are menaced by the necessary mobility of this labour power. It need hardly be said that working class culture evolves historically as do all aspects of capitalism.

The solidarity of the working classes finds its most immediate expression in language. In languages, such as French, which distinguish formal and informal modes, working class speakers tend to use much more readily the informal mode, at least within their class. To their superiors, they use the appropriate form. With the bonding of close work and leisure ties, a relatively context-tied sociolinguistic code is very often possible, using condensed symbols and metaphor. "[T]he intent of the other person can be taken for granted as the speech is played out against a backdrop of common assumptions, common history, common interests. ... the speech cannot be understood apart from the context, and the context cannot be read by those who do not share the history of the relationships." (Bernstein, 1971, p. 201). A specific cultural history, daily lived, permits a condensed form of communication.

The importance of group solidarity to the working classes means that the individual taken in isolation will have a distinctly different reaction to that when found in the group context. The individual with practices in the working classes will be a subject of conformity, respecting authority, distrustful of others (outside

[5] See Clarke (1975).

[6] See, for example, Hall and Jefferson (1975) or Thompson (1968).

[7] See Clarke et al (1975).

the class-group), obedient to the letter of the law, and so on.[8] Such behaviour is necessary to survival and is immediately understandable to (and appreciated by) the dominant classes. But, the change which comes about during the weekly pub-night, at the favourite sports event, on the picket line, or in the mass demonstration is in radical opposition to this. It produces only fear and incomprehension in the dominant classes.[9]

Working class resistance, thus, takes many forms. The extreme ones will, in one way or another, be found to be outside the law. Acts which seem to disrupt the social order may be placed outside legality. But illegal acts may also, at times, be used as a means of resistance. The relationship is never unambiguous.[10]

Common work relations, unifying language codes, strong kinship ties, and a relatively integrated local community mean that the working class has a strong sense of 'us' and 'them'.[11] This operates at several levels. At the broadest level, the working class is vaguely aware of its common features across the world.[12] The opposition, daily lived, to the authorities that be is always much more explicit. But the local working class can also find itself different from that of another locality or ethnic group, in customs and habits which make communication and common action more difficult.

In their everyday activities, in work and leisure, the working classes are constantly generating and reproducing their culture.[13] Parts are coopted and absorbed by the dominant class institutions, the mass media, the state, ... Thus, sports become professionalised, music commercialised. These are then fed back to the working classes as the one and only way things should be. But, the working classes only reabsorb this appropriated material in their own selected and specific ways. They are not the passive recipients of messages beamed at them.

7.3 Youth

Each generation eventually finds its own means of accomodating to daily life under the antagonistic relations of production. Conflict and resistance are never abandoned, but pressure becomes concentrated on certain points of oppression, while others are accepted and ignored. Idealism fades to realism, only to flare up in the too rare moments of critical confrontation. The global working class culture makes such a position possible.

Each new generation grows up within this general environment of working class culture. It unconsciously realises how essential such culture is to class survival. From birth, it feels the pressure of the antagonisms through the tensions in

[8] See Kohn (1969, p. 189, *passim*).

[9] On the different class attitudes to hierarchy, authority, and discipline, see Hall et al (1978, pp. 142–144).

[10] See Hall et al (1978, pp. 186–194).

[11] See Hoggart (1957, pp. 53–78).

[12] See, for example, Hoggart (1957, p. 81).

[13] See Hoggart (1957, *passim*).

the family. But it also soon sees the points of accomodation and acceptance of the parents, most often much more clearly than the points of continued resistance and conflict. It feels the humiliation of the battle still not won, of the class dominance weighing upon it.

Without the weariness of work and of struggle which have closed in on the parent generation, youth is ready to continue the battle, confidently believing that it can avoid the weaknesses and mistakes. To do this, it must clearly differentiate itself from the previous generation by creating a new subculture of its own, but a subculture which is clearly within the working class culture.[14] Invariably, this new subculture will contain its own points of strength and weakness, of resistance and accomodation, adapting to the changing situation of developing capitalism and, at the same time, deflecting the class struggle along new paths.

The experience of young people under capitalism is distinctive in that they are herded away from the adult activities of productive life and kept within schools. This forced submersion in the dominant culture creates varied responses of acceptance and resistance among working class youth. But what distinguishes them from the youth of the dominant classes is that they enter the work world, or unemployment, much earlier. This gives them access to a different circle of cultural goods and activities than those destined for the dominant classes.

As a class culture, a youth subculture will necessarily be in opposition to the dominant class culture. "... subcultural styles are the product of a cumulative process of selection and *transformation* ... A central part of this process involves appropriating the ostensibly classless artifacts and commodities of the 'teenage culture' indirectly and investing them with class-based meanings and resonances." (Murdock and McCron, 1975, p. 203). Thus, working class youth subculture finds itself in opposition to the dominant youth culture as well as preparing itself for opposition to the overall class dominance of capitalist society.

7.4 Music

Music and song find their places as one of the essential forms of working class culture[15] and, specifically, of resistance. Singing together yields a sense of unity and courage:[16] the International, the Marseillaise, We Shall Overcome, ... The musical form is a basic conveyor of historical memory, as songs relate to specific experiences and tend to recreate and perpetuate them. Song and poetry provide forms of expression for collective emotions, and a means of transmitting and retaining them.[17]

Even more than speech, music and song create solidarity. They are communal actions, to be performed and experienced together. Many types are born directly in resistance to another, dominant, culture: jazz, blues, folk, rock 'n roll. Such

[14] See Clarke et al (1975).

[15] See Hoggart (1957, pp. 119–134).

[16] This section draws much from Chambers (1975).

[17] See Caudwell (1937, pp. 33–38).

forms have significant meaning for certain groups and are completely alien to others. The specificity can be very narrow, as with the audience associated, say, with Steppenwolf, The Who, Pink Floyd, . . . , which does not mean that such were the only people to appreciate these forms of music.

Music is something some members of any group can produce. The mass media being so vast and encompassing, they also have some chance of reaching are larger audience. Much of oppositional music depends on relatively simple and widely available instruments, from the jug to the guitar, although the availability of electronic means significantly altered this situation.

The mass media impose a selection and censureship on music production, concentrating on what makes money — the top ten for whatever type of music, from country to pop. But the listeners impose their own further selection. In the period of relative prosperity after World War II, subcultural groups could diffuse their own type of music and make their own selections fairly freely through the wide availability of records, and the money to buy them. The restrictions of a period of economic crisis weigh heavily on this autonomy, as the prime means of diffusion becomes much more restricted to the medium of radio. The less 'popular' forms of resistance are crushed by a

8
The internationalisation of crisis

8.1 Crisis in the '80s

In spite of the illusions of the prosperous 1950s and 1960s, the society in which we live is a society of endemic crisis. To all appearances, it is a society of primarily economic crises: *goods* cannot be sold and *money* cannot be made. Of course, this also produces an unfortunate secondary result — unemployment. But the essential problem seems to lie in the business (=market) activities of firms. The decade of the 1960s saw student unrest, race riots, anti-war demonstrations, women's movements, wildcat strikes, and so on, but little talk of a crisis such as we hear in the 1970s and 1980s. However, these two periods may be more closely linked than we think, phases of the same crisis.

Every inhabitant of the globe must feel the direct effect of the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s in some way, if only through a very noticeable drop in their standard of living. This very fact means that it is lived as an *economic* crisis, something beyond the control, and perhaps even the comprehension, of everyday people. The economic system has somehow become structurally unstuck and the people in important places are struggling valiantly, in everyone's interest, to get it working again. If the crisis is economic, then the solutions must also be economic.

Such is the conventional wisdom poured upon us everyday by the mass media. But such a representation wilfully ignores that the economic hides the ordinary lives of everyday people. Goods are not produced and money is not made if people do not work. And under capitalism, such work is only performed when someone gives orders as to what is to be done. If the crisis appears to be economic, it is most profoundly social and political, a matter of interplay among the forces of society. To understand a crisis, we must look beneath the surface appearances.

But we must go even further. Conventional wisdom tells us that a period of prosperity occurs when the bosses have everything well in hand and things are operating smoothly. Crisis occurs when they lose such tight control. Paradoxically, a close look at those underlying social forces indicates the opposite. Prosperity is a time when workers are on the offensive and making gains. A crisis is initiated when these gains threaten to become too important and the bosses must reassert control. Capitalist crisis is the drastic means of disciplining the working classes.

Let us now consider a preliminary sketch of the development of the crisis of

the late 1970s and 1980s to see if and how these ideas may apply.[1] In order to understand the crisis, we must look briefly at events following the Second World War. If we were to consider the long-term historical development of capitalism, we might find that it is more difficult to explain the twenty-five years of post-war stability, prosperity, and affluence than the subsequent economic crisis!

The last great crisis, that of the 1930s, only ended with a global war. Some claim that it could only be resolved by war, but, in any case, we do not know what would have been the outcome without war. that they were fighting for a better society. The rapid concentration and centralisation of capital over fifty years had slowed down during the war in spite of the major government war contracts. The question at the end of the war was how to keep the economy moving or to rebuild it in the devastated areas.

In a certain sense, the entire post-war period can be seen as a struggle over the amount of centralisation of capitalist planning and over how it would be carried out. What would be the relative roles of the market and the state in investment decisions? The ideological form of this struggle was the Cold War. In the USSR, the problem of capital investment had long been resolved by central state control. This solution was now extended, by force, to eastern Europe. Western Europe, North America, and Japan (the West) opted for another solution, leaving the monopolies intact. This did not, however, exclude massive state intervention, especially through the Marshall Plan in Europe and the MacArthur Plan in Japan. The re-establishment of western European and Japanese production with American help opened the door for US monopoly firms to become multinationals. In turn, the European monopolies, once on a firm footing, would have to expand internationally in the same way. Thus, motivated state intervention in capital investment provided an important restructuring of capital which weakened the pressure of the tendency for state capitalism to develop in the West for a significant period after the war. In a similar way, where state capitalism was established, capital restructuration involved transfer of capital goods from the newly conquered countries to the USSR.

Certain figures may help to show the importance of movements of capital. In the USA, for example, the one hundred largest firms held 35to 48due to mergers and takeovers averaged around 500 per year in the 1920s. After 1929, up until the end of the war, it hovered around 100 but then began to climb, reaching over 2000 per year in the late 1960s.[2]

During the inter-war period, control of the labour process had been undergoing a great change. New technical means of increasing the intensity of labour were being introduced, especially the assembly-line, but also the detailed analysis of work activities known as Taylorism. The execution of tasks was being separated from knowledge of what was going on. An ideological class of intellec-

[1] For a masterful analysis of the development fo crisis in Britain, see Hall et al (1978, esp. pp. 218, 317).

[2] See Aglietta (1976, pp. 193–194).

tual workers was penetrating into and controlling the labour process to an extent previously unknown. Such a labour process now began to permit mass production of consumer goods, which, in turn, required a mass market. The working classes would have to receive a sufficiently high wage to enable them to purchase these consumer goods, the policy of Fordism. However, in the inter-war period, Taylorism and Fordism were still in their infancy, and, in addition, were not developing in unison. Mass consumption could not keep apace with mass production. Only the war, with mass destruction, ended this impasse.

By the end of the war, Taylorism was on the way to being well-established. The post-war capital restructuration accelerated the process, providing a structure of industrial production which ensured a high level of labour intensity. Capitalism had temporarily resolved the second aspect of the fundamental contradiction, that between labour power and work done. For an unprecedented number of years, up until the middle 1960s, the pressure of the tendency for the rate of industrial profit to fall would hardly be felt.

A capitalism which is increasingly centralised and concentrated and which is geared for mass production requires the possibility to plan production in terms of a relatively stable demand. What has been said so far, about capital restructuration and about Taylorism, applies equally, although in somewhat differing ways, to the Comecon countries and to the West. In a centrally-planned capitalist economy, production can be more easily synchronised with demand. And the Comecon countries chose to continue to concentrate on capital goods production throughout the immediate post-war period. The West did not have this choice. Monopolies, however large, are still private producers. They compete with each other, both within and between branches. One crucial aspect of this competition is that concerning control and expansion of markets. Distribution networks and advertising are especially important.

In spite of the importance of circulation activities under monopoly conditions, sufficient demand can only be ensured by state intervention. Stable demand came to be ensured by evening out the vagaries of working class income through unemployment insurance, pension funds, and sick benefits. But the welfare state measures also fitted well in other ways with post-war developments. Health insurance schemes coordinated with the increasingly more intensive labour process to keep the working classes healthy and active. The welfare state proved the validity of the war propaganda promises of a better society. But these welfare measures also assumed a rapidly growing economy to finance them, that is, a society where the contradictions of capital restructuration and of the labour process appeared to be eliminated.

The post-war period was not a period of social peace. Welfare measures and the Cold War were not sufficient to keep the working classes quiet. For they were living the reality of the other two aspects of the fundamental contradiction. The concentration of decision-making was accompanied by massification of the working classes. They were being brought together in greater numbers than ever before, as the production process was socialised. And they were being worked

harder and in more monotonous ways than ever before. In the immediate post-war period, through the 1950s, this antagonism manifested itself primarily through strikes having economic demands for higher wages. Given the war propaganda and the development of the welfare state, this was a logical outcome. For these workers were determined that their children would never know the deprivation that they, themselves, had lived through. And money was the key. Unfortunately, for the working classes, this suited the capitalist class too, as they searched to develop the mass market. Wages came to be linked more or less with "productivity" increases, which were, in fact, most often increases in labour intensity. Actual productivity increase, through improved techniques, could be syphoned off to profits.

The trends in capital restructuration, in the labour process, and in the welfare state continued into the 1960s. But, in spite of appearances (the end of ideology), all aspects of the fundamental contradiction were developing. The mass worker was being socialised and faced with an increasingly unified decision-making power over what work activities would be performed. This socialised working class was learning the tricks to overcome the constraints of Taylorisation and to beat the increased labour intensity. The working class base outside the labour process, in domestic labour, was consolidated through welfare measures, which saved the free individual selling labour power, but also provided security and confidence. On top of this, the first generation which had not directly known the war but which, rather, had been brought up in an atmosphere of eliminated deprivation (affluence), began to reach the labour market.

The 1960s was a decade of open protest. But it was not a decade of crisis, as the economy continued to expand. Fordism reached a peak, as mass production and mass consumption marched forward together. The underlying antagonisms no longer expressed themselves as economic demands, but in terms of quality of life. Strikes centred on the work week, labour intensity, health and safety, pollution. Marginalised workers, those in smaller firms not conquered by Fordism, struggled to attain the mass consumption held out before them. Capital could only respond by importing new marginalisable workers, the immigrants. As western European growth began to reach the multinational stage, on a par with the USA, the European Economic Community was formed to facilitate continued capital restructuration, while enabling increased control of worker movements. Capital and consumption goods could flow freely within its frontiers, but people could not. Workers moving to another country within the EEC lost their political rights.

The security and confidence provided by the welfare state had saved the family as the basis for the free individual selling labour power. But it also radically transformed the family. Old age, sickness, and unemployment needed no longer to be provided for by the family, which remained primarily a centre for producing new workers. Even there, state involvement ensured increasing standardisation. This renewed basis of the family yielded several, and conflicting, feminist movements. Some sought equality with men on the labour market — the right to be equally capitalistically exploited. Others fought for the abolition of the family without

seeing the impossibility of this in a society based on the free sale of labour power. Few saw the link between the feminist movements and the other aspects of the fundamental contradiction.

The development of mass consumption, linked with quality of life demands emanating from the work-place, led to a more global questioning of what was produced. Consumer movements, such as Naderism in the USA, watched over the quality of consumption goods. Ecology movements attacked the uses to which the earth's resources were being put, without seeing how this depended on the way decisions were made about the allocation of labour activities. The power of the capitalist class to make such decisions came directly under scrutiny, but in a one-sided way, as with the feminist movements.

Post-war changes in society, from the Cold War to surveillance of the labour process, had increased the size of the ideological class. The major producer of this class, the universities, grew apace. But with the peak of Taylorisation and Fordism in the 1960s, this growth stagnated, while hopeful candidates continued to pile into the universities. The students' awareness of the disappearance of such openings for graduates accompanied by their position of relative leisure, permitted them to see some of the difficulties of the developing capitalist contradictions. The resulting student protest movements were only one, albeit spectacular, manifestation of the growing problems underlying capitalist development.

Thus, by the 1960s, the working classes held a very strong position in the class struggle and could come to the verge of placing the whole system in question. In the late 1960s, global society seemed to be shaken. Why a sufficient class consciousness did not develop to correspond to the high level of class antagonism is a question no one can yet answer. In any case, deep social change did not occur, although many of the bases for it were established and continue to exist. Instead of the expected social and political change, the class antagonisms ended up being manifested primarily as a refusal of work which carried on into the early 1970s. The working class offensive, first with economic demands in the 1950s, then with quality of life demands in the 1960s, had failed to change society fundamentally.

Because of the antagonistic structure of the control of labour allocation, working class failure necessarily meant a capitalist offensive in return, an offensive to win back some of the small gains of the 1960s and to force the working classes to do what they were told, as fast as possible. In the early 1970s, the problem facing the capitalist class was clear. The solution was not. Immigrant labour had not worked as a means of pressure on the working classes. Mass consumption under Fordism had peaked within the western countries while the Comecon, and soon China, were just reaching that stage. Contact with the Comecon could open up new markets, as the Cold War was momentarily forgotten. The less advanced countries also seemed to provide a possibility of markets. But Fordism only operates with mass production, which existed, or could be quickly created in the Comecon. Elsewhere, establishment of major industry required a disciplined labour force, something which the capitalist class soon discovered did not exist in the less advanced countries, and would take a considerable time to develop. Ex-

panding markets could conceivably solve a purely economic crisis, if such could exist. But markets were relatively static during the prosperity and expanded with the crisis. They are not a solution to political and economic crisis for they have little to do with forcing the working classes to do what they are told. This crisis had to strike the Comecon countries as well as the West, something which had not occurred in the 1930s.

One attempt to attack the problem directly was the introduction of workers' participation. The monotony of the assembly line, and its constant surveillance by the ideological class, was to be replaced by responsible cooperating units. The workers controlled their labour intensity, within limits, and even if they worked somewhat more slowly, time lost due to protest would be reduced, as could the costs of paying the ideological class. The dangers of more worker responsibility were obvious from the start, however, and this could only be an isolated, individual, and interim solution at best.

Another early attempt involved the breaking up of the huge socialised work places, primarily by subletting to many small firms. Workers would be scattered and isolated in firms leading a precarious existence and, thus, forced to exert the utmost pressure for high labour intensity. Again, this solution could not be the final one, since it went against all of the tendencies of capitalism. Centralisation and concentration, with their obvious advantages, could not be arbitrarily abolished at will. Monopoly decision-making power over labour allocation would be weakened. The savage increases in labour intensity would only augment the refusal of work. And the precarity of the workers' situation, once again, would endanger, in the long run, their ability to continue freely selling their labour power.

The era of the beneficial effects of the post-war restructuration of capital had come to an end. Economic growth slowed down and stopped, endangering the welfare state. Capital investment had to be re-allocated in a new way so as to get the working classes back to work under capitalist control. But how and by what means? A capitalist offensive is at the origin of any economic crisis. How re-allocation will occur can only be determined by trial and error, even under centralised state capitalism, as long as consumers and production decisions are radically separated. The means of re-allocating are the subject of conflict within the capitalist class.

In the West, two major options are available. Reliance can be placed primarily on the market and the state used to influence and control it: the liberal way. Or the state can become increasingly involved in direct capital management, especially through nationalisations: the social democratic or "socialist" way. The crisis of the 1970s and the 1980s is a struggle between fractions of the capitalist class maintaining that one of these two means is best to reassert control over the working classes. Whatever the outcome, one of the basic tools was to be rising unemployment, something which had been only recently believed no longer possible.

8.2 The economics of crisis

Economists have traditionally seen the world in terms of goods and money. Their explanation of crises and their remedies must necessarily follow suite. The problem is lack of profitability of investment, insufficient markets, and little propensity to invest. Goods cannot be sold and money cannot be made. Inflation devalues money, interest rates rise, and bankruptcies increase. The working classes only creep in through the unemployment rate and the high costs of wages and welfare measures. Solutions are conceived in terms of the amount money, the cost of money, the flexibility of prices, especially wages, incentives to invest, more productive technology. Again, the working classes only appear through the need to lower wages to increase profits. The complexities of class relations are virtually absent.

Yet all of these factors relating to money and goods are very important. They represent, at a phenomenal level, the working of the underlying processes of class antagonism and the fundamental contradiction. Day to day decisions are taken in these terms and these decisions influence the underlying processes. Although hidden, the links between the movement of money and goods and class struggle are more or less direct. Behind economics lies relations of social and political power. What else is unprofitability but the capitalists' representation of the working classes' refusal to do what it is told?

Of all the economic mystifications, that surrounding money must be the strongest. In its greatest generality, money is a symbol accepted in place of taking any immediately required goods. As such, it can occur in the most diverse societies. Its specifically capitalist characteristics lie elsewhere. If the capitalist class has the power to decide to what activities the working classes will be applied, then the complexity of this task is enormous. For every type of work is qualitatively different from all others. To make choices about possible work activities, comparison must be possible. One directly in terms of working times is not feasible because of differences of skill, of education, of monotony, and so on, that are required. Different types of concrete work must be evaluated, given a value, to be compared. But this value cannot be an arbitrary one assigned by an individual capitalist, for no accord would be possible. It must be a social value. This social value arises by the exchange of the products of the concrete work on the market. Their ratios of exchange yield the social evaluation of the labour incorporated in them. And the general measure of this value is the money for which they can be exchanged. Thus, money is the abstract representation of the work activities being performed in a capitalist society. Money provides a social measure by which labour can be allocated to different tasks.

If the social evaluation of concrete labour cannot be arbitrarily manipulated, the amount of money can be, at least indirectly. The relation between a given amount of money and a given value, or a given amount of social labour, can change. This is inflation or deflation. Such changes can result in a number of ways. To simplify, I shall assume that the number of transactions of a given

amount of money in a given time (its velocity) remains constant.

The amount of value produced might alter without a change in the amount of money. Thus, the amount of time worked by the production working class might increase or decrease, while the amount of money in circulation remained constant. For example, the work week may be reduced, or the active working population increase, or labour intensity change without any corresponding compensation in the amount of money. However, such a phenomenon must be extremely rare, since money is constantly being privately generated or destroyed to meet just such fluctuations. Little can be done to influence this.

The amount of value produced may remain constant while the amount of money changes. Thus, while the time worked by the production working class remains static, the amount of money in circulation may change. Despite many illusions, this cannot result from the state simply introducing more notes into circulation, since the result, other social factors remaining constant, would simply be a decrease in the number of transactions per note. The state can only guarantee money and not create it in such situations. Consider rather the following example. A technical change in productivity increases the number of goods produced per hour of equal intensity worked. The same number of equally intense hours of work continues to be performed, but a larger number of goods hit the market. If prices per unit do not decrease for some reason, there will be inflation, although unit prices have not increased. More money will be required to pay for all of the goods, but the social labour which it represents will not have increased in the same way. The relation between value of goods, which decreased, and money will have come unstuck.

A third, more complicated, case is also possible under capitalist conditions, when credit is considered. Suppose that credit money is advanced for production investment in anticipation of future goods, and value, to be produced. Money is in circulation which corresponds to no value production as yet achieved. This momentary inflation is reabsorbed if the goods reach the market, but continual advances of credit to different ventures can create a creeping inflation. The situation changes if the venture fails and the anticipated goods never reach the market. Traditionally, the excess money is absorbed by the resulting business losses. But, the state may consolidate the debt, that is, cover the losses, leaving the excess money in circulation and creating permanent inflation. A similar effect is produced by the deficit financing of non-production state activities through loans from the central bank.

We can now examine the problem of inflation in the post-war situation leading up to and including the crisis in this light. Fordism provided a rising standard of living for the working classes and a mass market for capitalists. The strike movements of the 1950s in the West, aiming at wage increases, eventually led, by the 1960s, to forms of linkage of wages to some kind of cost of living index, at least for the major industries where Fordism prevailed. The increasing affluence of the working classes was made possible by the technical changes, accompanying capital restructuration, which yielded increased productivity. Even if wages re-

mained stationary, rising productivity would ensure a higher standard of living if prices decreased correspondingly. But such a situation would give all the benefits of the increased productivity to the working classes. In the context of Fordism, the only possible capitalist strategy was to refuse to lower prices. The result was necessarily a slow monetary inflation. Credit advances for capital investment also contributed minimally to inflation, although the prosperity ensured that most ventures were successful and that those which were not did not require government intervention. This latter credit-induced inflation forced sporadic minimal price increases, for example to recoup losses elsewhere. Thus, a creeping inflation was necessary in the 1950s and 1960s to provide capitalist profits where otherwise much of the results of technical change would be passed on to the working classes. The capitalist class was in an essentially defensive position, since it had to accede to wage demands to create the mass market necessary for Fordism, and then had difficulty resisting the quality of life demands.

The situation changed drastically with the beginning of the crisis in the 1970s, as the capitalist class, feeling the pinch of the working class offensive through growing unprofitability, but also sensing the failure of this movement after 1968, went on an investment strike. According to market rationality, they could still make investments, but they no longer wanted to. The search began to find new ways to impose capitalist order on the unruly working classes. Masses of workers began to be laid off while the second major post-war capital restructuration began. Computers and robots provided leaps in productivity while fewer workers were actually employed. Instead of greatly increasing amounts of goods being produced by the same amount of work, static or slowly increasing amounts were being produced by less and less work. The policy of not reducing wages, or prices, continued, at least for a time, but less value was corresponding to the same or slightly more goods. The basis of monetary inflation had changed. Now, in a period of crisis, credit-based inflation took its permanent form, as many ventures failed and some, at least, had to be bailed out by the state to ensure continued stability of the system. As economic growth slowed down, placing the financing of welfare measures in difficulty, the increasing debt of the state only accentuated the inflationary trend.

Inflation is not a phenomenon which is solely monetary and, hence, can simply be controlled by monetary measures. It is rather a reflection of the underlying class relations. A change in the type of inflation reflects changes in the class struggle.

Many economists, the Keynesians, see an inverse relation between inflation and unemployment. If the state will put extra money in circulation, through deficit spending, this will create demand for goods which, in turn, will induce capitalists to invest, creating employment. This reasoning assumes that the capitalist psychology is based solely on a rationale of supply and demand. The simple fact of the existence of extra demand will cause prices to rise making investment profitable. Capitalists do not invest if they do not foresee an outlet for their production.

During the post-war period of expansion, until the 1960s, such an analysis was reasonably accurate. Economic recessions resulted primarily from capitalist miscalculation of what would sell, due to the separation between production units and consumers. But capitalists remained ready to invest if they could anticipate a demand for the product. Thus, the state could operate a fine-tuning of the economy to eliminate the recessions and maintain a maximum of economic activity. Economists became convinced that, in this way, great depressions were forever eliminated.

In the 1970s, such state intervention ceased to have the same effect. State-created demand was accompanied by inflation and by unemployment. Both continued to grow together. Why? In the previous period, investment dropped when capitalists believed there would not be sufficient demand. Now, however, the capitalist class was refusing to invest in order to discipline the working classes. Increased demand would be met by using the extra productivity available, without increasing employment, or would simply be ignored.

In face of the changed situation, the state could not openly admit the new capitalist class psychology of creating unemployment or it would lose its appearance of neutral arbitrator among classes. Indeed, it would eventually have to oppose such a policy. For as unemployment increased, so did the burden of state finances, a very different situation from the depression of the 1930s. The capitalist class could very well attempt to discipline the working classes through rising rates of unemployment, but this was placing the state in an untenable position. The state had to combat both inflation and unemployment. The capitalist class must be encouraged to end its investment strike. State induced demand was not working. Monetarists began to insist that production activities must be encouraged while the expansion of money is limited, that inflation and creation of money are closely linked, as are unemployment and rigid wages.

Direct state control of the amount of money is impossible. But discouragement of the creation of credit money is possible through manipulation of interest rates. High interest rates could lower the amount of investment made through credit arrangements. This might reduce the amount of credit-based inflation. But it also carried the danger of causing more business failures due to rapidly growing interest charges. For this policy would affect primarily the smaller firms and those most financially precarious, while large profitable firms could expand through internal financing. One question must be whether the state consolidates the growing business debts or not. If it does, the effect on inflation could be the opposite of that sought. Under certain social conditions, a policy of high interest rates might lower the rate of inflation. But it could only worsen the state's other problem, unemployment.

High interest rates discourage certain types of investment, limiting or reducing production, with the adverse effect on employment. The state must use other means to promote capitalist investment. One direct means is through the reduction of taxes on enterprises, with the hope that the increased money retained by the capitalist class would be re-invested. Another is to increase demand through direct

state purchases. For this to concord with the process of disciplining the working classes, such purchases cannot be within the context of welfare measures. Rather, the ideal state expenditures are on military equipment. These benefit the capitalist class while the product can be used, when necessary, to repress the working classes.

Within certain limits, manipulation of interest rates can be a tool used by the dominant classes. However, if the interest rate is less than the expected inflation rate, no one will give credit. Conversely, if the interest rate is higher than the expected profit rate, no prospective investor will consider accepting credit, except in dire circumstances. If interest rates can be used to limit inflation, while letting unemployment produce its full disciplinary effect, they will also have varying effects within the capitalist class itself, depending on the size of the enterprise and on its current financial situation.

Both inflation and interest rates are economic concepts concerned with money, the most abstract representation of labouring activities. Changes in these two rates reflect changes in the activities of the working classes and in the capitalist success in controlling them. Inflation represents the movement of past activities and the successes and failures in their regulation. Interest rates represent one aspect of the capitalist aspirations to allocate future activities. However, in their abstraction, these two phenomena remain recalcitrant in the face of policy decisions. Attempts to control inflation and interest rates can only have indirect and often unforeseen effects on labour allocation. Economic theory cannot rely solely on monetary explanations.

Indeed, economic theory ultimately seems always to turn to problems of supply and demand ... of goods. Here is a more direct representation of labour activities, their immediate product. In a society where production and consumption are separated by the market and where the subordinate classes are not direct dependents of the dominant classes, labour allocation can only be controlled through such indirect means as money and goods.

The traditional position on supply and demand has been that, if demand is expected, the capitalist class will respond by putting the production machinery in movement to create the corresponding supply. If this is the case, then vast new markets should lead to expanding production and prosperity. However, the postwar period found the western capitalist countries faced with a divided world, with half the population excluded from their reach. Yet, this was a period of growth and affluence. The early 1970s saw the establishment of links between East and West and the opening of huge potential markets. But this was the beginning of a period of crisis. Obviously, the market demand situation is not a sufficient explanation of economic activity.

Under Fordism, demand is maintained by rising wages and by welfare measures. Mass production goes hand in hand with mass consumption. In such a situation, it is possible to conceive that increases in supply will generate their own demand. Any investment, with its multiplier effect, will yield direct demand through the employment created and, also, stimulate further demand indirectly

through a chain effect. If we follow this reasoning, the state should not create demand by deficit spending, since this is inflationary, but should directly encourage business to invest and hence increase supply. Tax reductions, incentive grants, and even long-term, low interest loans, may be offered to the capitalist class by the state. This may be a perfect complement to high interest rates, used to combat inflation.

The big question is whether the capitalist class is prepared to expand its production. Will the state gifts end up as productive investments? In a situation of crisis, the answer has several aspects. The capitalist class is on strike in order to discipline the working classes. Investment is not profitable enough because the working classes will not do what they are told. Until this situation changes, the capitalist class is not prepared to extend production. On the other hand, an investment strike means that profits will not be coming in. For some individual capitalists, this may be nothing new, if the previous situation had been one of cumulating losses. In any case, state gifts will be welcome as just that, gifts primarily to replace the missing profits, without any bother of the risks of investment.

A crisis must, however, have another, more long term aspect. The working classes must be disciplined. But the whole production apparatus must be restructured in some way which will permit an eventual resumption of expansion. State gifts provide the means to displace investments to other regions, to adopt new techniques, and to shift to new fields of production, all without any necessary increase in production, or in employment. All such changes must be tentative and experimental, made in the hope of hitting the right combination: production processes which will force the working classes to work.

Money and goods represent, and hide, the underlying class relations of power to decide about labour activities. This power is circumscribed by the conditions in which the capitalist class must operate: the market, the free labourer, the various contradictions and tendencies operating in society. But it remains a crushing power. Economists must theorise in terms of goods and money because capitalists must act in these terms. In such conditions, class relations, too, can only be seen as a question of goods and money. How will the total revenue or the total product be distributed among the various social classes? To economic theory, the underlying labour activities remain invisible; only a lack of activity is important.

In the same way, if the capitalist class can easily launch an investment strike in order to discipline the working classes, it cannot so easily bring one to an end. Each decision to curtail investment due to lack of profitability further reduces markets, creating a chain reaction of ever less investment. A crisis, once initiated, has its own structure and momentum which cannot easily be reversed. If it is to end on the capitalists' terms, they must become convinced that they can profitably put the working classes back to work under their control.

Working at the level of monetary and material representations, economists necessarily miss the fundamental social movement represented. Economic policy must be an empirical trial and error approach. Such policies will influence the

underlying laws, but most often in unforeseen ways. The fundamental contradiction, with its accompanying tendential laws, will continue ineluctably to operate. But even if economists could take this into account in their theories, little would be changed since these are no less than the expression of the inbuilt class antagonisms which can only be eliminated by abolishing capitalism.

8.3 Lessons of protest

An economic crisis is a period when the capitalist class attempts to reassert its decision-making power over the working classes. It is a period of intense struggle in which the dominant class takes the offensive. However, this remains true only as long as the crisis remains economic. The task is to transform it into an open social and political crisis, to alter the entire framework of the struggle.

The struggle, arising out of the antagonisms of production activities, is between proletariat and bourgeoisie. As with all human activities, struggle must involve a moment of thought and planning, a projection of what is to be done. Capitalist society imposes a division of labour between intellectual and execution activities within the production process and this division is repercuted throughout society. The bourgeoisie has its own class, the ideological class, to perform these activities of struggle. The proletariat has no such advantage. But it is directly involved in the antagonistic process which generates such thought first-hand. Intellectuals can only serve to organise this thought, and, if bourgeois, to divorce it from its source in the proletariat.

The most dramatic, if ephemeral, intellectual movement in the 1960s was that of university students. Potential future members of the ideological class placed the whole system momentarily in question. After the Second World War, the rapidly expanding ideological class, made necessary by the full development of Fordism, in the West, induced a radical change in the number and social composition of university students. In the less advanced countries, freeing themselves from colonial bonds, a similar change was also occurring. The expanding student body, although still to become an elite, could not draw from a sufficiently large already existing elite, as children from the subordinate classes entered in significant numbers. But just as the universities were entering into full expansion, Fordism reached its peak in the West and the demand for candidates to the ideological class dropped, while the state apparatuses of the newly-created countries began to freeze into their state capitalist forms, belying the aspirations of their liberation movements. The result was the simultaneous outbreak of student movements throughout the world, except in the established state capitalism of the Comecon, which long had placed the formation of its ideological class under firm control.

The student movements of the 1960s were important for one essential point, their international occurrence. Social conditions were such as to produce virtually simultaneous movements throughout much of the world. This demonstrates to what extent social conditions and the resulting events in any given country are linked to what is happening in the rest of the world. But it also illustrates, if

only by analogy, how a social revolution must be international. The overthrow of capitalism in one country is not possible. Indeed, nation-states, themselves, must be abolished.

Student protest was the most spectacular movement of the 1960s. Perhaps for this reason, other movements arising or reviving in the 1960s are usually closely associated with it. However, these have very distinct social origins. Three have the most importance: the feminists, the ecologists, and the Marxists. Although, in all three, students were, and are, very directly involved, they have their sources much more profoundly in the contradictions of capitalism, and in the attempts to resolve them, than did the student protest movements, which were essentially conjunctural.

Capitalism is characterised by a radical separation between decision-making about what to produce, and how, and consumption activities. Such decisions are made by a minority dominant class following market and profit criteria in virtual ignorance of what is going on in the minds of the future consumers. Only factors which have a value, that is are socially evaluated on the market and, hence, given a monetary price, are taken into consideration in these decisions. For example, anything which appears to be available in unlimited quantities and to be of free access, such as air, is not taken into account. As the first aspect of the fundamental contradiction, the concentration and centralisation of capital, specifically in the multinationals, develops, this decision-making power becomes ever more arbitrarily concentrated in a few hands.

By the beginning of the 1960s, as Fordism entered into full swing and the working classes had secured an element of financial security through rising wages and welfare measures, attention shifted to working conditions within the labour process. The working class offensive struggle changed fronts, from the purely economic to a reform of working conditions. This new form of struggle necessarily had repercussions throughout working class thought and action. Suitable working conditions included a safe, healthy working place, unpolluted by toxic chemicals. But it also meant a comfortable home in which to relax after work and well-built consumer goods, such as cars which would not become deadly killers through mechanical defects. The big question was quality of life.

The workers' struggle remained within the context of capitalist social conditions. For that reason, it suffered a defeat, permitting the crisis. It did not question how the decisions were made, but tried, rather, to improve the existing decision-making process to the workers' benefit. However, any such improvements would either be turned to profitable advantage or ultimately refused.

One movement of protest went further. The ecologists questioned the rationality of decisions made solely on market and profit criteria. Decision-making about labour allocation must take into account environmental factors or soon the earth would be no longer fit to live on. Present quality of life, and capitalist expansion, were being paid for by future possibility of life. For example, nuclear power provides a highly-centralised system of energy production which can easily be kept under capitalist decision-making power, but which also carries potential

environmental hasards. Solar, wave, and wind power, while perhaps posing less environmental danger, may be much more decentralised, with the accompanying threat of popular control. Thus, the question turned more on who controls than simply on the problem of markets and profitability.

Decision-making power was being questioned. But with what could the present system be replaced? Under capitalism, the factors used in decision-making about labour allocation are all socially evaluated, given a price on the market. The ecologists' environmental factors have no such social value attached to them. In the context where quality of life underlay the movement, the only evaluation could be personal. The ecologists were personally proclaiming that the environment had a value which must be taken into account. But how much value as compared to those factors weighed on the market? The answer could only appear to be arbitrary.

Given the problem confronting them over evaluation of environmental factors, the ecologists' solution had also to be personal. An alternative society of individuals living on a minimum of natural resources would be the answer — a culture of deprivation. As the ecologists could see in other movements, worker or student, power lay in solidarity. So they dutifully created a new life in communes. But the individualistic and personal social basis of their movement would over-ride them, as the communes dissolved as fast as they were created.

The ecology movement has provided two elements eminently favourable to cooptation by the dominant classes. The argument in terms of conservation of natural resources leads to technocratic solutions of the labour allocation problem. With the tendency to state capitalism, those decisions which cannot be made on the market must depend on an accurate measurement of resources used, something which can only be done by those few in the know, the state technocrats. At the same time, the culture of deprivation can be used as an ideological weapon against the working classes. The world's resources are rapidly disappearing and workers must tighten their belts. The world can no longer afford the high-living of the welfare state and Fordist wages. Just look at the poverty in the Third World. Look how the exaggerated demands for a better life in the 1960s have led to the present unemployment!

If the ecology movement has been coopted, one important fact will remain in the working class mentality. The market and profitability are not sacrosanct. Other ways must exist to make decisions about production activities.

The modern feminist movement has its origins in a different aspect of the fundamental contradiction, that surrounding the free sale of labour power. In the post-war period, the development of this aspect was most favourable to the working classes, as compared to the other two aspects, which saw the growth of the multinationals and the acceleration of the labour process. Fordism and the welfare state changed qualitatively the way of life of the vast majority of the working classes, at least in the West. Theories that everyone had become middle class and bourgeois abounded. The working classes appeared to be protected from the most savage effects of capitalism outside the workplace. On the other

hand, if the greatly increased intensity of work within the labour process was to be maintained, the rest of the day had to be spent in conditions which would permit recuperation for the following day's work.

Such a radically altered context necessarily meant that the family itself would undergo fundamental changes. It lost many of its traditional functions as a welfare centre for the working classes, as these were transferred to the state. It was no longer the principal agent responsible for sickness, old age, unemployment, or even recreation. Ties across generations were weakened as the family constricted to centre around parents and young children. Even the reproduction role was brought under closer control through the hospitals, psychology, and schools.

The free labourer must be ready to sell labour power where it is required. Formerly, this had primarily meant changing jobs as various industries expanded, contracted, or disappeared. Most often this occurred within a given locality, so that the workers maintained their local ties to kin and friends. The new job would be just down the street from the old one. If a whole region faced difficulty, mass migration might result, but many such ties could still be maintained. The rise and dominance of multinationals produced another situation. These firms have branches all over the country and around the world. Even in normal times, workers must be prepared to move as the company plans dictate. No specific job and no home is a definitive one. In more difficult times, the problem of mobility is only amplified. Thus, two major complementary factors joined to create the small, extremely mobile family, welfare measures and the multinationals.

Nevertheless, in one very important sense, the family remains a bastion of the working classes: here, they are free to act without being told what to do by the dominant classes. Production activities in the domestic unit are activities which are not regulated by the market and profitability. They are not directly exploitable by the capitalist class. This is reflected in the very words used: they have no value, they are not productive, they are not even work. The ideology which belittles domestic activities finds its basis in the fact that these activities are not subject to exploitation, to control by the dominant classes.

The feminist movement developed in this social context of increasing working class security, of increasing state control, and of increasing mobility. Working class women found many of the responsibilities lifted from their hands and placed under state control. They saw their roots in kinship and community torn up as they were forced to move where the company had called them (or rather more often, their husbands). The post-war prosperity also meant that jobs were available. At the same time, the combined ideology of Fordism promoting mass affluence and of devaluation of domestic labour pushed women to seek such jobs.

The same ideologies worked on the ideological class, a true middle class, bringing bourgeois women out to work. But here it also led to a direct attack on the family, as the numbers of single working women and of divorces soared. Much of the feminist movement originated here, with women who had received an education which they had not been able to use. They accepted the bourgeois ideology of possessive individualism to the full and set out to save womenkind

as a race. Their promotion of salaried work and the breakup of the family was certainly applicable to their own situation. But, applied to the working classes, it could only be a disaster.

Working class women find work in order to contribute to the support of their family. The bourgeois ideology maintains that wage labour is the essence of freedom. But, these women know from daily experience that it is rather the foundation of exploitation. Why should they add direct exploitation in such work to the already existing oppression of the domestic scene? The working classes rely on the family as a centre of opposition to capitalist rule. Without accompanying fundamental changes to all aspects of society, the breakup of the family can only weaken this resistance.

Within a self-contained, although divided, movement, various feminists have taken two extreme positions which illustrate well the dominant capitalist ideologies. Certain feminists, accepting the valorisation of money, demand a wage for housework. Women should be paid for all of the household duties they perform. These feminists do not see that such work is outside the value circuit. It is not paid because it is not and cannot be evaluated on the market. Indeed, if it were paid, the body financing it would necessarily require a control of what was being done and would be able to demand increased intensity to raise productivity! The basic illusion about wages arises from the belief that one is paid for work done, rather than to provide what the working class family requires *on the market* for labour power to reproduce itself. Wage earners in a normal family receive the money necessary to supply the market needs of all members of the family. State welfare allocations are supposed to compensate for variations from the norm.

The second position is that the family can, and will, disappear under capitalism. The trend is for everything to become a commodity. This position takes labour power as a commodity at its face value and ignores the underlying contradiction. Labour power is a commodity for the capitalist buying it. But the working class sells its labour power only because it is forced to in order to survive. The aim of the working classes is to live and wage labour is only a necessary means to that end. If everything, including labour power, were a capitalist commodity, then, a capitalist industry would have to produce it. In such a situation, the capitalist would own the labour power, and not its bearer. The working classes would not be free and the society would be slavery, not capitalism.

Feminism has been primarily a bourgeois movement. But it has made clearer an underlying contradiction of capitalism, that of the free labourer. It has demonstrated that struggle does not centre only in the capitalist labour process and that the working classes have other strengths besides their unity in the socialised production process. However, this strength, the ability to allocate the production activities of domestic labour outside capitalist control, only exists in a private, non-collective way.

It is no less than surprising that, when virtually anyone working in the social sciences can call themselves Marxist, no serious social analysis has been made of this fundamental change over the past fifteen years. Those on the ”left” accept it

uncritically as a verification of the validity of their position. Those on the "right" inject Marxism into the more traditional approaches to their disciplines in order to give them new life. Universities and publishers have opened their doors to this new wave of ideas. One must ask whether it is the beginning of a peaceful revolution or the final cooptation and dissolution of revolutionary Marxism.

The interaction between Marxist and bourgeois analyses of society is, of course, not new. The split between the Communist and the Social-Democratic Parties early in the century has been but the clearest manifestation of this. The epithet, "revisionist", signifies nothing else. Throughout its history, Marxism has continually been subject to incorporation into the dominant analysis of society. But previously, this has ultimately meant a denial of Marxism as such: the elements incorporated lost their Marxist signification. In contrast, at present, much social analysis, even although only slightly influenced by Marx, retains, and even insists upon, the Marxist label.

Marx, himself, only analysed the pre-conditions for the dynamic of capitalism and showed how the process develops, but he never explained how society could continue to operate once the process is well on its way. Is a society with one big monopoly still capitalist? Is the competition described by Marx essential to developed capitalism?

As the centralisation and concentration of capital increases and as the state capitalist countries become more numerous and demonstrate their success, the question of economic rationality when the state replaces the market for many labour allocation decisions takes on added importance. At the same time, this process jeopardises the ideology of individual liberty and equality in the face of the all-pervasive state and the multinationals. An approach which claims to be able to plan investment allocation in the name of the working classes finds that its day has arrived.

Let us look more closely at two types of competition. First, competition over which techniques to use to produce a given product occurs within the branch which produces that product. However, such competition can only explain the spread of a technique once introduced by one capitalist. The origin must be found elsewhere — in the relationship between capitalist and workers. A capitalist labour process necessarily involves extraction of surplus labour and the techniques must be adapted to this end. But once a technique has been installed, the workers quickly learn how to accommodate to it in such a way as to minimise the surplus labour which will become capitalist profits. Introduction of new techniques is a constant struggle on the part of capitalists against this adaptation. Of course, given capitalist conditions, the technique must also be "progressive" in that it yields more use values per unit of value expended (and paid for by the capitalist). We must conclude that this technical change will not be greatly affected by concentration and centralisation for as long as the opposition between capitalists and workers continues to exist.

Such is not the case for the competition for new investment capital among branches producing different products. Even with a certain number of firms in

each branch, the growing fixed capital entailed by concentration and centralisation impedes the movement of capital among branches. Reinvestment where the profits are higher becomes increasingly difficult. The market, although indicating what decisions should be made, is less and less able to serve as the vehicle for such decisions about what work will be applied to. The only alternative is for the state to play an increasing role in this field. Paradoxically, the most advanced and the less advanced capitalist countries converge on this point of state intervention, the culmination point of which is state capitalism. However, this dynamic of capitalism is not simply an abstract economic law. The process, in any specific situation, depends on the struggle among class forces.

The different fractions of the capitalist class cannot simply decide among themselves how best to allocate the work activities of others. The working classes continuously react back against this power to control their activities, in the same way as with the problem of change of techniques. But such struggle is certainly not restricted to purely economic activities. What is classically called the superstructure consists of these conscious struggles over this power. Whereas the capitalist class is occupied with the allocation of work activities through its investment decisions, the ideological class is concerned with their control and reproduction within the antagonistic relations of exploitation.

While many of the activities of the ideological class are directly within the labour process (its control and surveillance), what concerns us here is its position within the state. For the state is a highly contradictory combination of conflicting activities, ranging from capital allocation through ideologico-repressive control to the ”domestic” labour of welfare services. The first might be represented by nationalisations, the second by education and the media, and the third by the welfare state. In this perspective, all have been presented, *by the ideological class*, as aspects of socialism.

Let us consider, successively, the relation of the various classes to the state. For the capitalist class, both ideologico-repressive measures and certain welfare services are essential to the continued existence of the exploitative relations of production. And indeed, a certain amount of interference in capital investment is also necessary (what capitalist ever refused incentive grants?). Here, the question is rather one of degree and emphasis, with private capitalists upholding the value of the market mechanism and state capitalists underlining its incapacity and irrationality under modern conditions. For the ideological class, a growing state can only facilitate its task. Finally, if the working classes can be convinced that all of these roles of the state constitute socialism, the potential for strange alliances exists.

In the light of these general social conditions and specific post-War developments, let us now consider the revival of Marxism. The part of Marx’s theory which has been most consistently rejected as untenable during the current revival has been his labour theory of value. The argument runs that this theory is incapable of explaining prices and profits (the transformation problem) and is, hence, unnecessary. The technical data of production are sufficient to determine

prices, while struggle is simply about the division of the "surplus", above technical inputs, between wages and profits. The only question is the production of commodities and their subsequent distribution within the society.

Even if the theory of value is to be rejected, the Marxist political economist is still Marxist because Marx's theory of exploitation is retained. Instead of the product being the result of the proportional contribution of the different factors of production, it is seen to incorporate surplus labour. Thus, although the essential economic part of Marx's theory is false or unnecessary, and prices can be determined by technical data, Marxism provides the surrounding social pre-conditions.

Strangely enough, if value theory is not relevant in capitalist conditions, it provided the centre-piece for the elaboration of an economic theory of the first attempts at socialist construction. The division into constant, variable, and surplus (for accumulation) capital and the distinction between the department producing means of production and that producing consumption goods provided the basis for an economic theory of central planning. However, historical developments fairly quickly demonstrated that such planning in value terms was difficult or impossible without a certain action of a market.

How can these contradictory trends be explained? One of the principal accomplishments of Marx's theory of value was to demonstrate how the exchange of commodities is, in fact, the surface phenomenon hiding the allocation of labour activities — the fetishism of commodities. In other words, the law of value, even transformed into prices of production, is not primarily a theory of prices, but of control of labour activities. Value is not a thing to be produced and distributed but a representation or *evaluation* of labour performed. With a few well-known exceptions, this has been lost to Marxist interpretations of Marx's theory. The convergence between the dominant interpretation and bourgeois economic theory is evident, for here also the sole concern is with the product and not with labour activities. For the capitalist class prefers to deal with the working classes through the commodities produced rather than directly through their production and circulation activities.

In the early attempts at socialist construction, as in the third world today, a major problem is deciding how to allocate investment in conditions where the market must play a limited role. Bourgeois economic theory, with its reliance on the market mechanism, is of little use here. Marx's theory of value provides the only usable approach to such problems of labour allocation. Although specifically state capitalist conditions prevail, the ideology of constructing socialism permits a direct and conscious application of "Marxist" principles. However, the limits of such central planning and the dependence on market regulation quickly become apparent in such a class-divided capitalist society.

The situation is slightly more complex in the recent Western Marxist rejection of value theory. Here, the problem is not to institute directly some form of state capitalism which requires a conscious blue-print. Rather than occurring after an abrupt seizure of power, state intervention in labour allocation within the advanced capitalist countries becomes increasingly necessary by the very dynamic

of capitalist development. The ideological class pushes for increasing state powers, often in the name of socialism. Here, Marxist theory can play an important role, but only if the capitalist relations of labour allocation remain hidden. The fetishism must not be unveiled. The question is not power to control the activities of the working classes, for they are in control, but state intervention to ensure more equitable production and distribution of the product. This is a technical problem to be regulated by the state technocrats. A labour theory of value can only be a disservice in this context. On the other hand, since the socialised state acts in the name of the working classes, the revelation of an extracted surplus is permissible since, in any case, it will be controlled by the working-class state.

In the minds of many, increasing state intervention is associated with (creeping) socialism. In a complementary fashion, orthodox Marxism has seen the transformation to socialism, whether by reformist or by revolutionary means, as being accomplished by taking over control of the state. This coincidence is not accidental since it is central to the class struggles over the roles of the capitalist state.

At the economic level, the primary role of the state lies in regulating labour allocation among branches, either as a complement to the market or eventually replacing it. In other words, it acts to determine how surplus labour extracted will be reused. In this context, we can distinguish three types of "normal" capitalist state: the democratic state of advanced capitalism, which relies mainly on the market, with Keynesian interference and very limited nationalisations; the authoritarian state, which attempts also to rely as much as possible on the market, but by force of (usually imperialist) circumstances has a very large nationalised state sector; and the totalitarian state, which regulates inter-branch investment allocation centrally, as state capitalism, with as little reliance on the market as possible.

Socialist seizure of state power, whether by democratic or by jacobin means, necessarily aims at control of this labour (investment) allocation mechanism. In the name of the working classes, control over working class activities is acquired. No other result is possible because such conquest of power (and what power!?) by a restricted group, whether a social democratic or avant garde party, can only lead to a modification of control over the working classes and not to elimination of such control. A conquest of the capitalist state by the entire working class would, by definition, make the state disappear.

A Marxist theory of revolution which centres on control over the state can, then, play a central role in the class struggle over the place of the state in capitalist society. The ideological class can use this theory to reinforce its position within the state for as long as the working classes believe that it is the only and true road to socialism. This conquest of the state in the name of socialism leads directly to the development of state capitalism. In this way, the alliance among state capitalists, the ideological class, and the working classes, written on the economics of labour allocation, enveloped by the ideology of socialism, is sealed and stamped by the politics of statism.

Protest movements, generated by the antagonisms of capitalist society, arise from the reality of day to day life in an attempt to cope with it. Given proper

social conditions, there may be vast movements seeming to shake the foundations of society. But as long as they accept the capitalist division of labour and all of the aspects of capitalism not directly relevant to their immediate aim, they will remain one-sided, reformist, and ultimately coopted. What are the lessons which can be gained from recent such movements?

(1) The attack on capitalist society must ultimately be a global one, facing all of the contradictions simultaneously.

(2) The subordinate classes find power primarily in their unity. The first aspect of the fundamental contradiction generates this unity through the socialised production process of Taylorism and Fordism, but in conditions of capitalist despotism within the factory. Such unity must be forged in other working class struggles.

(3) The student movement has shown that opposition to capitalism can and must be international. A movement which remains within a single country or region will necessarily be defeated. The abolition of capitalism entails the abolition of nation-states.

(4) The ecologists have demonstrated that capitalist rationality based on markets and profit is not the only possible way to decide how labour activities should be allocated in society. The question, however, remains as to how else it can be done.

(5) Feminism has shown the basis of working class power outside the work place. The working classes, in their daily life outside work, are a strength against capitalism which, although now private and fragmented, must somehow be developed in a united and collective way.

(6) Marxism has attempted to provide the only global understanding of society from a working class perspective. But recent developments in Marxism have proven that the working classes must overthrow capitalism and create a new society themselves, without relying on others more knowledgeable to do it for them.

Then where exactly are the working classes in all these protest movements? Simply passive and gullible partners? With so many friends to help them, no wonder they show an inherent distrust of all intellectual, and especially left-wing intellectual activity. The basis of capitalism is the allocation of labour activities by the free sale of labour power as a commodity and the subsequent purchase of consumption goods. Whether the system is absolutely free enterprise or completely centrally planned, under such conditions, it is still capitalist. For one class has the power to make decisions about the activities of another, as mediated through the sale of labour power. No such dominant class can possibly enter into the minds of all of the subordinate class in order to decide what should be produced in the latter's "interest". Decisions about social labour allocation must be made, in ways as yet unforeseen, by the working population as a whole. "Workers' control" is the continuous destruction of the state.

8.4 World capitalism

The most important and original characteristic of the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s is that it is a truly world crisis. All previous crises affected primarily the countries of Europe and North America. Western economists were forced to admire how the USSR escaped the crisis of the 1930s relatively unscathed. But the extension of multinational investments to all parts of the world and the effective integration of all regions, including the Comecon and China, into a world market since the Second World War have drastically altered the situation. Labour allocation decisions now take place on a world scale from which no one can escape. Despite the illusions of certain nationalist movements, a socialism in one country is strictly impossible. No country can function in autarky, independently of the rest of the world. A primarily market-based regime and a state capitalist regime are now in the same situation. Any radicalisation leads directly to a blockage of trade, credit, and aid.

But this seemingly bleak situation of uniform capitalist oppression throughout the world has a reverse side to it. For the first time in history, all of the people of the globe are beginning, if just beginning, to live under the same social conditions. At no previous time has such been the case. If capitalist labour allocation has begun to penetrate everyone's lives, everyone is subjected to the same power of capital. They are constrained within the same antagonisms, with the same potentiality of generating a class consciousness of the relations of exploitation. For the first time, an international working class consciousness is developing, not primarily through international communication and solidarity within the working classes, although this also is essential, but because a real international working class, living in identical social conditions, exists for the first time.

At the end of the Second World War, most regions of the world had at least 80% of their populations living in rural areas. Their main contact with capitalism was through the slow penetration of certain industrially-produced goods. With the development of the Cold War, any possibility of a world market was stopped by the rupture between East and West. But the expanding capitalism of Fordism could not forever remain in this situation. Multinational investments and migrant labour forces began to break down the rural economy in the 1950s and 1960s. And with the development of working class movements in the Comecon countries, trade barriers also began to fall. Regions which had not felt the direct power of capitalist labour allocation decisions were integrated by investment where they had only seen trade before. Regions which had (state) capitalist labour allocation but were isolated were linked by world market ties.

In the less advanced countries, the process is far from terminated. But already, in all countries, a significant proportion of the population lives under capitalist labour allocation conditions. The small plot of land is disappearing as the shanty town city suburbs swell and former peasants are liberated from their means of production. As long as the rural exodus continues to supply a seemingly unlimited number of unqualified workers, the pressure of the need for welfare measures, at

least for this segment of the population, will not be felt. But, the investments of the multinationals require a qualified, stable, and disciplined labour force, something which can only be created slowly. Here, a certain security is essential. If mass production is to be introduced, so also must mass consumption. The conditions for and pressures towards a welfare state are being created, although often at first it may be a privately-financed one, aimed only at this aristocracy of labour.

New workers are being pushed rapidly into a capitalist world of sale of labour power, while they retain their kin ties in the community/village. With the large numbers seeking wage employment, the capitalist class can hire them in the most precarious conditions. Except for the privileged few, the domestic situation does not yet provide a position of power for the working classes of the less advanced countries.

As more and more people are forced to sell their labour power, they are faced with the gulf between labour capacity paid for and work actually performed. Small independent producers selling on a capitalist market can at least decide, within certain limits, what to produce and when to work at it. Wage labourers have no control over decisions as to what their labour will be applied. But the small producers also know that they can only sell if they produce. For a wage worker, no such direct link exists between pay and work done. Alienation of decision-making power generates antagonisms which can be expressed by collectively questioning the amount of work to be performed and how it will be done.

Whether made by the multinationals or by state capitalism, all major investments are now on a vast scale. Production in any country, even if only for local consumption, must face the threat of world market competition. A multiplication of small production units is impossible to manage and control. But, if the production unit is large, so is the number of workers brought together. In spite of the attempts in some advanced capitalist countries to fragment it by subcontracting and so on, the working class throughout the world is being increasingly socialised. One capitalist reponse is to permit, and even actively to encourage, trade unions, with their bureaucracy, as the means of keeping protest within acceptable limits. But everywhere, the conditions of work, decided by an exterior power, will necessarily generate antagonisms which cannot be so contained.

At the same time as the workers are being brought together, decision-making is being placed in fewer and fewer hands. Promotion of free enterprise and the advantages of the market serve only further to centralise production, as the weaker are eliminated by this very competition. The fewer the number of firms, the more difficult is labour allocation through the market. With few large firms competing to produce goods, decisions must be made according to plan. In the limit, this means one firm, a state enterprise. Even the most rabid advocates of the market are forced to admit this trend, as can be seen, for example, by the American acceptance of Mexican nationalisation of banks in 1982 in the face of an enormous external debt.

Throughout the world, the working class exists, living in increasingly similar social conditions. Workers everywhere find themselves brought together in the

immense capitalist labour process, but with no power of decision over what they will do. This situation must generate a consciousness of their strength in unity. Workers everywhere experience the separation between what they are paid for and what they must do. This situation must generate a consciousness of the possibility of struggle within the workplace. Workers everywhere must be free to sell their labour power, with an accompanying security to reproduce themselves in their homes away from capitalistically controlled work. This situation, however unequal throughout the world, must generate a consciousness of a life outside capitalist control.

The crisis of the 1970s and 1980s is a social and political crisis created by the capitalist class as it take offensive to put the working classes in their place. This does not mean that the capitalist class will necessarily achieve its goal. The working classes will not forget the lessons of the struggles of the 1960s. This in spite of the dominant interpretation of these events. Nor can they fail to see that the struggle continues, in Poland, in El Salvador, in Turkey, and elsewhere. Only three possible outcomes exist: a renewed capitalism, a social revolution, or barbary.

One sign of the working classes taking labour allocation and production decisions into its own hands that has appeared is the workers' alternative plans, the most well-known of which is that of Lucas Aerospace in Britain. Social need is determined by asking the community at large and products are planned in function of this and of the possibilities of the production apparatus, instead of relying on criteria of markets and profitability. But such a plan depends on close cooperation between technical-scientific staff and those who actually execute the production. The former must shed their ideologico-repressive activities. The managerial reaction to such plans reveals their importance.

World capitalist conditions are ripening. Barriers are breaking down. It is interesting to see how the capitalist class attempts to maintain the appearance of continuing division. Similar events are given completely opposing interpretations depending on where they occur. The American government, after conducting the imperialist war of Viet Nam, condemns the same act by the USSR in Afghanistan. Reagan, after breaking the air controllers' union in the USA in 1981, condemns the same act by Jaruzelski in Poland. Progressives opposed to Soviet imperialism and a Polish coup d'Etat find themselves, in this way, supporting Reagan and the American government. American workers on strike can only wonder why their government, while so enthusiastic about Solidarity, has no such sentiment for their own struggle.

The capitalist class is on the offensive on a world scale. But an international working class is also beginning to exist for the first time. However, the world is still divided into nation-states, and each has its particular history of struggle. If the fundamental social conditions are the same throughout the world, each country has its own specificity. The fundamental social conditions yield the possibility of growing class consciousness. But specific circumstances spark the open struggle in any given context. Capitalist contradictions can never develop uniformly

throughout the world. Open struggle breaks out here or there and advances to its limits. So isolated, it can never create a revolution. But with similar fundamental conditions, the possibility exists for such struggle to break out in one place and then another and so on until the working class of the world is in revolt. That is the only possible revolution: an international one.

Bibliography

1. Aglietta, M. (1976) *Régulation et Crises du Capitalisme. L'Expérience des Etats-Unis.* Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
2. Albert, E.M. (1964) "'Rhetoric', 'logic', and 'poetics' in Burundi: culture patterning of speech behavior." *American Anthropologist* **66**(6,2): 35–54.
3. Althusser, L. (1961) "Sur le jeune Marx." La Pensée **96**: 3-26. Reprinted in Althusser (1965), pp.45–83.
4. Althusser, L. (1963) "Sur la dialectique matérialiste (de l'inégalité des origines)." *La Pensée* **110**: 5–46. Reprinted in Althusser (1965), pp.161–224.
5. Althusser, L (1965) *Pour Marx.* Paris: Maspero.
6. Althusser, L. (1970) "Idéologie et appareils idéologique d'Etat." *La Pensée* **151**. Reprinted in *Positions (1964-1975).* Paris: Editions sociales, pp.66–125.
7. Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* London: New Left Books.
8. Balbus, I.D. (1977) "Commodity form and legal form: an essay on the 'relative autonomy' of the law." *Law and Society Review* **11**: 571–588.
9. Bateson, G. (1956) "Towards a theory of schizophrenia." *Behavioral Science* **1**: Reprinted in Bateson (1972), pp.173–198.
10. Bateson, G. (1972) *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* London: Paladin.
11. Baudelot, C. and Establet, R. (1971) *L'Ecole capitaliste en France.* Paris: Maspero.
12. Benjamin, W. (1968) *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Redproduzierbarkeit. Drei Studien zur Kunst Soziologie.* Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag.
13. Benveniste, E. (1952) "Communication animale et langage humain." *Diogène* **1**: reprinted in Benveniste, E. (1966) *Problèmes de Linguistique générale.* Paris: Gallimard, pp.56–62.
14. Bernal, J.D. (1954, 4th ed. 1969) *Science in History.* (4 vol.) Harmondsworth: Penguin.
15. Bernstein, B. (1971, 1973, 1975) *Class, Codes, and Control.* vol.I *Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language.* vol.II *Applied Studies Towards a Sociology of Language.* vol.III *Towards a Theory of Educational Transmission.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
16. Bourque, G. (1977) *L'Etat capitaliste et la Question nationale.* Montréal: Presses universitaires de l'Université de Montréal.
17. Braudel, F. (1958) "Histoire et sciences sociales: la longue durée." *Annales (E.S.C.)* **13**: 725-753.
18. Bridger, W.H. (1960) "Signaling systems in the development of cognitive functions." in *The Central Nervous System and Behavior.* 3rd Conference of the Macy Foundation, pp. 425–456.

19. Bruner, J.S. (1971) *The Relevance of Education.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
20. Bruner, J.S. (1973) *Beyond the Information Given: Studies in the Psychology of Knowing.* New York: Norton.
21. Bruner, J.S., Goodnow, J.J., and Austin, G.A. (1956) *A Study of Thinking.* New York: Wiley.
22. Bukharin, N. (1969) *Historical Materialism. A System of Sociology.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
23. Cartelier, L. (1982) "Intervention économique et responsabilité juridique de l'Etat. Un point de vue d'économiste." *Recherche économique de Louvain* **48**: 159-175.
24. Caudwell, C. (1937) *Illusion and Reality. A Study of the Sources of Poetry.* London: Lawrence and Wishart.
25. Caudwell, C. (1971a) *Studies in a Dying Culture.* New York: Monthly Review Press.
26. Caudwell, C. (1971b) *Further Studies in a Dying Culture.* New York: Monthly Review Press.
27. Chambers, I. (1975) "A strategy for living." in Hall and Jefferson (1975), pp.157–166.
28. Chomsky, N. (1957) *Syntactic Structures.* The Hague: Mouton.
29. Chomsky, N. (1965) *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.* Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
30. Chomsky, N. (1969) "Language and the mind." *Psychology Today*. Reprinted in Cashdan, A. *et al* (1972, ed.) *Language in Education.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 129–135.
31. Chomsky, N. (1980) *Rules and Representations.* New York: Columbia University Press.
32. Chomsky, N. (1981) *Radical Priorities.* Montréal: Black Rose Books.
33. Chomsky, N. and Herman, E.S. (1979) *The Political Economy of Human Rights.* Vol.I *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism.* Vol.II *After the Cataclsym: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology.* Montréal: Black Rose Books.
34. Clarke, J. (1975) "Style." in Hall and Jefferson (1975), pp. 175–191.
35. Clarke, J., Hall, S., Jefferson, T. and Roberts, B. (1975) "Subcultures, cultures and class." in Hall and Jefferson (1975), pp. 9–79.
36. Cohen, P. (1979) "Policing the working class city." in Fine et al (1979), pp. 118–136.
37. Ditton, J. (1977) "Perks, pilferage and the fiddle. The historical structure of invisible wages." *Theory and Society* **4**: 39-71.
38. Edelman, B. (1978) *La Légalisation de la Classe ouvrière.* t.I. *L'Entreprise.* Paris: C. Bourgois.
39. Ervin-Tripp, S. (1964) "An analysis of the interaction of language, topic, and listener." *American Anthropologist* **66**(6,2): 86-102.
40. Ferguson, C.A. (1964) "Baby talk in six languages." *American Anthropologist* **66**(6,2): 103-114.
41. Fine, B., Kinsey, R., Lea, J., Picciotto, S., and Young, J. (1979, ed.) *Capitalism and the Rule of Law. From Deviancy Theory to Marxism.* London: Hutchinson.

42. Fischer, E. (1963) *The Necessity of Art. A Marxist Approach.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
43. Fishman, J.A. (1965) "Who speaks what language to whom and when." *La Linguistique* **2**: 67-88.
44. Frake, C.O. (1961) "The diagnosis of disease among the Subanun of Mindanao." *American Anthropologist* **63**: 113-132.
45. Frake, C.O. (1964) "How to ask for a drink in Subanun." *American Anthropologist* **66**(6,2): 127-132.
46. Friere, P. (1970a) *Cultural Action for Freedom.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
47. Friere, P. (1970b) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
48. Gal'perin, P. Ia. (1957) "An experimental study in the formation of mental actions." in Simon, B. (ed.) *Psychology in the Soviet Union.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 214–225 and in Stones, E. (1971, ed.) *Readings in Educational Psychology. Learning and Teaching.* London: Methuen, pp. 142–154.
49. Garai, L. (1973) "The strength and weakness of psychological science." *International Social Science Journal* **25**: 447-459.
50. Geertz, C. (1960) *The Religion of Java.* New York: Free Press.
51. Gellner, J. (1974) *Bayonets in the Streets. Urban Guerrilla at Home and Abroad.* Toronto: Collier-Macmillan.
52. Goffman, E. (1959) *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
53. Goffman, E. (1964) "The neglected situation." *American Anthropologist* **66**(6,2): 113-136.
54. Goffman, E. (1971) *Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
55. Goldmann, L. (1948) *Introduction à la Philosophie de Kant.* Paris: Gallimard.
56. Goldmann, L. (1959) *Le Dieu caché. Etude sur la Vision tragique dans les Pensées de Pascal et dan le Théatre de Racine.* Paris: Gallimard.
57. Gough, I. (1979) *The Political Economy of the Welfare State.* London: Macmillan.
58. Goulemot, J.-M. (1975) *Discours, Histoire et Révolutions. (Représentations de l'Histoire et Discours sur les Révolutions de l'Age classique aux Lumières.* Paris: 10/18.
59. Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks.* London: Lawrence and Wishart.
60. Gregory, J. (1979) "Sex discrimination, work and the law." in Fine *et al* (1979), pp. 137–150.
61. Habermas, J. (1973) *Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismus.* Frankfort: Suhrkamp.
62. Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., and Roberts, B. (1978) *Policing the Crisis. Mugging, the State, and Law and Order.* London: Macmillan.
63. Hall, S. and Jefferson, T. (1975, ed.) *Resistance through Rituals. Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain.* London: Hutchinson.
64. Halliday, M.A.K. (1975) *Learning How to Mean. Explorations in the Development of Language.* London: E. Arnold.

65. Harring, S.L. (1977) "Class conflict and the oppression of tramps in Buffalo, 1842-1894." *Law and Society Review* **11**: 873-911.
66. Hobbes, T. (1968) *Leviathan.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
67. Hoggart, R. (1957) *The Uses of Literacy. Aspects of Working Class Life with Special Reference to Publications and Entertainments.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
68. Holloway, J. and Picciotto, S. (1978, ed.) *State and Capital. A Marxist Debate.* London: E. Arnold.
69. Hunt, A. (1981) "Dichotomy and contradiction in the sociology of law." *British Journal of Law and Society* **8**: 47–77.
70. Hymes, D.H. (1974) *Foundations in Sociolinguistics: An Ethnographic Approach.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
71. Jakobson, R. (1941) "Langage enfantin, aphasie et lois générales de la structure phonique." Reprinted in Jakobson, R. (1969) *Langage enfantin et Aphasie.* Paris: Minuit, pp. 13–101.
72. Jakubowski, F. (1976) *Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism.* London: Allison and Busby.
73. Johnson, B.C. (1976) "Taking care of labor. The police in American politics." *Theory and Society* **3**: 89–117.
74. Kinsey, R. (1978) "Marxism and the law: preliminary analyses." *British Journal of Law and Society* **5**: 202–227.
75. Kinsey, R. (1979) "Despotism and legality." in Fine et al (1979), pp. 46–64.
76. Kohn, M.L. (1969) *Class and Conformity: A Study in Values.* Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey.
77. Labov, W. (1966a) *The Social Stratification of English in New York City.* Washington: Center for Applied Linguistics.
78. Labov, W. (1966b) "Hypecorrection by the lower middle class as a factor in linguistic change." in Bright, W. (ed.) *Sociolinguistics.* The Hague: Mouton. Reprinted in Labov (1972b), pp. 122–142.
79. Labov, W. (1969) "The logic of nonstandard English." *Georgetown Monographs in Language and Linguistics* **22**: 1-31. Reprinted in Labov (1972a), pp. 201–240.
80. Labov, W. (1972a) *Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
81. Labov, W. (1972b) *Sociolinguistics Patterns.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
82. Labov, W. (1972c) "The social setting of linguistic change." *Current Trends in Linguistics* **11**: Reprinted in Labov (1972b), pp. 280–325.
83. Lacan, J. (1953) "Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse." in Lacan, J. (1966) *Ecrits.* t.I Paris: Seuil, pp. 111–208.
84. Laing, R.D. (1959) *The Divided Self. An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
85. Larrain, J. (1979) *The Concept of Ideology.* London: Hutchinson.
86. Lea, J. (1979) "Discipline and capitalist development." in Fine et al (1979), pp. 76–89.

87. Lenin, V.I. (1908) "Materialism and empirio-criticism. Critical comments on a reactionary philosophy." in *Collected Works.* Vol.14. Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 17–361.
88. Lenneberg, E.H. (1964) "A biological perspective on language." in Lenneberg (ed.) *New Directions in the Study of Language.* MIT Press, pp. 65–88.
89. Leont'ev, A.N. and Gal'perin, P. Ia. (1965) "Learning theory and programmed instruction." *Soviet Education* **7**(10): 7–15.
90. Levi-strauss, C. (1962) *La Pensée sauvage.* Paris: Plon.
91. Lukacs, G. (1950) *Studies in European Realism. A Sociological Survey of the Writings of Balzac, Stendhal, Zola, Tolstoy, Gorki, and Others.* London: Merlin.
92. Luria, A.R. (1959) "The directive function of speech in development and dissolution. Part I." *Word* **15**: 341–352.
93. Luria, A.R. (1971) "Towards the problem of the historical nature of psychological processes." *International Journal of Psychology* **6**: 259–272.
94. Luria, A.R. (1973a) "The long road of a Soviet psychologist." *International Social Science Journal* **25**: 71–87.
95. Luria, A.R. (1973b) *The Working Brain: An Introduction to Neuropsychology.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
96. Luria, A.R. (1976) *Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
97. MacKenzie, D. (1983) "Militarism and social theory." *Capital and Class* **19**: 33–73.
98. Macpherson, C.B. (1962) *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Hobbes to Locke.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
99. Marcuse, H. (1964) *One Dimensional Man. The Ideology of Industrial Society.* London: Sphere.
100. Marx, K. (1967) *Capital. A Critique of Political Economy.* Vol.I *The Process of Capitalist Production.* Vol.II *The Process of Circulation of Capital.* Vol.III *The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole.* London: Lawrence and Wishart.
101. Marx, K. (1970) *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.* London: Lawrence and Wishart.
102. Marx, K. and Engels, K. (1973) "Manifesto of the Communist Party." in *The Revolutions of 1848.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
103. Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1976) *The German Ideology. Critique of Modern German Philosophy According to its Representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner, and of German Socialism According to its Various Prophets.* in *Collected Works.* Vol.V, pp. 19–539. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
104. Mead, G.H. (1934) *Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
105. Miaille, M. (1978) *L'Etat du Droit. Introduction à une Critique du Droit constitutionnel.* Grenoble: Presses universitaires de Grenoble/Maspero.
106. Miliband, R. (1969) *The State in Capitalist Society. The Analysis of the Western System of Power.* London: Quartet.
107. Miller, G.A. (1965) "Some preliminaries to psycholinguistics." *American Psychologist* **20**: 15–20.
108. Murdock, G. and McCron, R. (1975) "Consciousness of class and consciousness of generation." in Hall and Jefferson (1975), pp. 192–207.

109. Offe, C. (1972) *Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates.* Frankfort: Suhrkamp.
110. Panofsky, E. (1957) *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism.* New York: Meridian.
111. Pashukanis, E.B. (1978) *Law and Marxism. A General Theory. Towards a Critique of the Fundamental Juridical Concepts.* London: Ink Links.
112. Picciotto, S. (1979) "The theory of the state, class struggle and the rule of law." in Fine *et al* (1979), pp. 164–177.
113. Plekhanov, G.V. (1969) *Fundamental Problems of Marxism.* London: Lawrence and Wishart.
114. Poulantzas, N. (1968) *Pouvoir politique et Classes sociales.* 2 t. Paris: Maspero.
115. Poulantzas, N. (1970) *Fascisme et Dictature. La Troisième Internationale Face au Fascisme.* Paris: Maspero.
116. Poulantzas, N. (1975) *La Crise des Dictatures. Portugal, Grèce, Espagne.* Paris: Maspero.
117. Poulantzas, N. (1978) *L'Etat, le Pouvoir, le Socialism.* Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
118. de la Pradelle, G. (1979) *L'Homme juridique. Essai critique de Droit privé.* Grenoble: Presses universitaires de Grenoble/Maspero.
119. Pribram, L.V. (1969, ed.) *Brain and Behaviour.* Vol.I *Mood, States, and Mind.* Vol.II *Perception and Action.* Vol.III *Memory Mechanisms.* Vol.IV *Adaptation.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
120. Renner, K. (1949) *The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
121. Rudé, G. (1980) *Ideology and Popular Protest.* London: Lawrence and Wishart.
122. Sapir, E. (1921) *Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech.* London: Hart-Davis.
123. Sapir, E. (1929) "The status of linguistics as a science." *Language* **5**: 207–214.
124. Sapir, E. (1933) "Language." *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* **9**: 155–169.
125. Sartre, J.-P. (1952) *Saint Genet. Comédien et Martyr.* Paris: Gallimard.
126. Sayer, D. (1979) *Marx's Method. Ideology, Science and Critique in 'Capital'.* Sussex: Harvester.
127. Scaife, M. and Bruner, J.S. (1975) "The capacity for joint visual attention in the infant." *Nature* **253**: 265–266.
128. Schlegoff, E. (1968) "Sequencing in conversational openings." *American Anthropologist* **70**: 1075–1095.
129. Schlegoff, E. (1971) "Notes on a conversational practice: formulating place." in Sudnow, D. (ed.) *Studies in Social Interaction.* New York: Free Press.
130. Smith, D. and Smith, R. (1983) *The Economics of Militarism.* London: Pluto.
131. Smith, R. (1983) "Aspects of militarism." *Capital and Class* **19**: 17–30.
132. Talyzina, N. (1968) "The stage theory of the formation of mental operations." *Soviet Education* **10**(3): 38–42.
133. Tanner, N. (1967) "Speech and society among the Indonesian elite: a case study of a multilingual community." *Anthropological Linguistics* **9**(3): 15–39.
134. Therborn, G. (1979) "The travail of Latin American democracy." *New Left Review* **113–114**: 71–109.

135. Thompson, E.P. (1968, 2nd ed.) *The Making of the English Working Class.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
136. de Tocqueville, A. (1966) *Democracy in America.* New York: Doubleday.
137. Toulmin, S. (1972) *Human Understanding. The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
138. Vallières, P. (1977) *L'Exécution de Pierre Laporte. Les Dessous de l'Opération Essai.* Montréal: Editions Québec/Amérique.
139. Volosinov, V.N. (1973) *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language.* New York: Academic Press.
140. Volosinov, V.N. (1976) *Freudianism: A Marxist Critique.* New York: Seminar Press.
141. Vovelle, M. (1982) *Idéologies et Mentalités.* Paris: Maspero.
142. Vygotsky, L.S. (1934) *Thought and Language.* Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
143. Vygotsky, L.S. (1971) *The Psychology of Art.* Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
144. Weber, M. (1962) *Economy and Society.* Vol. I. New York: Bedminster Press.
145. Weber, M. (1948) "Politics as vocation." in Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W. (ed.) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 77–128.
146. Whorf, B.L. (1956) *Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
147. Williams, R. (1973) "Base and superstructure in Marxist cultural theory." *New Left Review* **82**: 3-16. Reprinted in Williams (1980), pp. 31–49.
148. Williams, R. (1980) *Problems in Materialism and Culture. Selected Essays.* London: New Left Books.
149. Wilson, E. (1977) *Women and the Welfare State.* London: Tavistock.
150. Wittfogel, K. (1957) *Oriental Despotism. A Comparative Study of Total Power.* New Haven: Yale University Press.
151. Young, J. (1979) "Left idealism, reformism and beyond: from new criminology to Marxism." in Fine et al (1979), pp. 11–28.